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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequently over the last two decades the U. S. Supreme Court
has seemed troubled by inconsistent and unfair application of the
death penalty. Reflecting this concern, the Court now requires that
lower courts consider relevant mitigating evidence, including psy-
chiatric opinions and reports, when rendering capital punishment
decisions.1 As a result, mental health professionals have a variety
. Associate Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati College of
Medicine, and Attending Physician, Psychiatry Service, Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Center, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A. Oberlin College, 1976; M.D. University of
Michigan, 1981. The author thanks Michael L. Perlin, Kathleen J. Hart, and Sidney Moss-
man for their advice, assistance, support, and encouragement
Portions of this article formed the bases for presentations at the Department of Psy-
chiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston, South
Carolina, April, 1988; the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and
the Law, San Francisco, California, October, 1988; and the Department of Psychiatry,
University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinniti, Ohio, November, 1988.
1. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320-30 (1989) (holding that unless the
jury is instructed to consider mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood
abuse, jurors are deprived of a way to express a reasoned moral choice not to impose the
death penalty); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (holding that the sentenc-
ing authority must consider any relevant mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051
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of awkward yet crucial roles in capital punishment decisions.
Supreme Court rulings have firmly established the role of
mental health testimony in the sentencing of capital defendants.2 In
1972, disturbed by the "arbitrary and capricious" manner in which
the death sentence was being imposed, the Court declared all exist-
ing death penalty statutes unconstitutional. 3 State legislatures re-
(1985); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that the sentencer must not be
prevented from considering, in mitigating a death sentence, "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that defendant proffers").
See also MIcHAEL L. PERUN, 3 MENTAL DISA=IITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 17.08
(1989) [hereinafter MENTAL DISABIL=TY LAW] (noting states' reactions to five Supreme
Court decisions which held that the death penalty is constitutional only if the sentencer
possesses individualized information and is directed by clear standards). See generally Paul
S. Appelbaum, Psychiatrists' Role in the Death Penalty, 32 HOsp. COMMUNITY PsYCHIA-
TRY 761, 761 (1981) (stating that it is unclear whether psychiatric testimony makes the
capital sentencing process fairer and more consistent); James S. Liebman & Michael J.
Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Dis-
order as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 791-94 (1978) (summarizing the role of
mental disability as a mitigating factor in Anglo-American law prior to the twentieth
century).
Professor Perlin believes that the Supreme Court's view of the role of the psychiatric
opinion is confused and that its decisions reflect widely-shared, ambivalent, and ambiguous
feelings about the mentally ill and the death penalty. See, Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme
Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatrtc Testimony in Death Penalty
Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3
N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 91 (1985) [hereinafter Barefoot's Ake]; Michael L Perlin,
The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values:
Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?", 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987)
[hereinafter Doctrinal Abyss]. The "relative paucity of executions and the elaborate proce-
dural requirements applicable in capital cases suggest a profound societal ambivalence on
the subject. That ambivalence affects both the judges who must enforce laws which pro-
duce intense moral dilemmas and a public which seems to want some executions, but not
too many." Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on
Implementing Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 238 (1988)
(citation omitted).
2. See infra notes 5-16.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Furman represented three consol-
idated cases in which black defendants were sentenced to death. Id. at 252-53. While the
short per curiam opinion in Furman gave no reasons for the Court's decision, fears of
racial prejudice were present in the concurring opinions of several justices. Justice Doug-
las, for example, cited a study of U.S. capital cases which concluded that "'some suspi-
cion of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided.'" Id. at 250 n.15. Later, the Court
rejected a similar study which purported to show a disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty based on the race of both the murder victim and the defendant. McClesky
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987), cert. granted, 496 U.S. 904 (1990), aft'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1454 (1991) (denying second habeas corpus petition). Assuming the validity of the
study, the court rejected it as evidence that the death penalty was capriciously or arbitrari-
ly applied because the study was insufficient to support the inference that the death penal-
ty was imposed with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 292-97.
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sponded by enacting mandatory death penalty statutes that allowed
little or no discretion in applying the law, but the Supreme Court
ultimately deemed this approach unacceptable as well.4 In Lockett
v. Ohio5 the Court held that when imposing the death penalty,
sentencers could not be prevented from considering mitigating
factors such as information about personality and character supplied
by mental health experts.6 Judges are now required to instruct
jurors in death penalty cases about the nature and relevance of
mitigating circumstances! As a result, psychiatric opinion concern-
ing the impact of a defendant's background and the likelihood of
future dangerousness8 may play an important part in jurors' deci-
sions about whether to impose the death penalty.9 That such opin-
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600 (1978) (discussing state responses to Furman).
The Ohio statutes overturned in Lockett were OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03 -
2929.04 (1975). See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589. For examples of other states with mandato-
ry death sentences which were subsequently overturned, see, e.g., Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (overturning N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Com. Stat. 1975)). In
Woodson, the defendants were convicted of murder committed during the course of an
armed robbery of a convenience store. Id at 282-83. Under the North Carolina statute, in
such circumstances the defendants were to -be punished with death." Id. at 286 (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)). The Supreme Court held that the imposi-
tion of capital punishment without allowing a level of discretion for the decisionmaker is
unconstitutional because such laws "depart[] markedly from contemporary standards re-
specting the imposition of the penalty of death .. . ." Id. at 301. See also Rockwell v.
Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976) (overturning Penal Code §§ 190 - 190.3,
which allowed imposition of the death penalty when the defendant commited murder un-
der -special circumstances." 556 P.2d at 1104.) The Rockwell defendant, who was convict-
ed of murder in conjunction with attempted rape, qualified for the death penalty. Id. The
California Supreme Court found the statues unconstitutional because they called for the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty without providing for consideration of mitigat-
ing evidence or personal characteristics of the defendant. Id. at 1116.
5. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
6. Id. at 604.
7. See Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the judge
must instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances or guide the jury toward considering
such circumstances), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
8. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of
TE. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2) (West Supp. 1976)). The statute in Jurek re-
quired juries to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant would threaten so-
ciety through future acts of criminal violence. "What is essential is that the jury have
before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it
must determine." Id.
9. See Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penally: Emerging Problems in
Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167, 174 (1980) (by'requiring individualization of death penalty
decisions, the Supreme Court -has virtually assured routine participation by mental health
professionals, especially psychiatrists, in the sentencing phase of capital murder trials"); C.
Robert Showalter & Richard . Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing: Risks and
Responsibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159,
1992]
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ion has been roundly criticized in both medical and legal litera-
ture1° has not dissuaded the Court from allowing its admission as
evidence." The increasing importance of mental health testimony
in capital trials was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma," a decision
in which the Supreme Court explicitly condoned an extensive role
for mental health professionals in assisting counsel for capital de-
fendants. 3 In Ake, the defendant's attorney informed the court
that he would raise an insanity defense and requested the state pay
for a psychiatric evaluation, claiming such an evaluation was guar-
anteed by the U.S. Constitution. 4 The request was denied even
though the defendant's behavior immediately following arrest was
so "bizarre" that the court sua sponte had him evaluated and sub-
sequently committed to a psychiatric hospital. 5 "The examining
psychiatrist reported: 'At times [Ake] appear[ed] to be frankly
delusional .... He claim[ed] to be the 'sword of vegence of the
Lord and that he [would] sit at the left hand of God in
heaven."", 6 Without the psychiatrist's diagnosis that Ake was a
paranoid schizophrenic, he would have been executed.
160 (1984) (language of recent death penalty statutes renders psychiatric testimony
indispensible).
10. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association, at 14,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) [hereinafter Barefoors Brief]
(stating long-term predictions of dangerousness should be based on "predictive statistical
or actuarial information that is fundamentally non-medical in nature"); Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Erpertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 734-735 (1976) ("Psychiatrists have absolutely no ex-
pertise in predicting dangerous behavior - indeed, they may be ess accurate predictors
than laymen - and.., they usually err in overpredicting violence."). See generally
MENTAL DISABULITY LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.14, 2.15, 17.13 (discussing empirical studies
assessing the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness and the accuracy of
psychiatric diagnoses, the debate over the role of mental health professionals, and the
Supreme Court's response); George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of
"Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523 (1980) (discussing problems posed
by clinical prediction of dangerousness of persons not afflicted with traditional mental
illness).
11. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898-903 (finding psychiatric testimony admissible to
prove future dangerousness, despite the argument, supported by the American Psychiatric
Association ["APA], as amicus, that such predictions are unreliable).
12. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
13. Id. at 83 (holding that when a defendant shows that his "sanity at the time of the
offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination
and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 71.
16. Id.
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These rulings have both increased the importance of participa-
tion by mental health professionals in capital punishment cases and
focused attention on the ethical problems" they face. Two other
recent Supreme Court cases have raised troublesome issues for
psychiatrists who may be called upon to evaluate or treat inmates
for whom execution is imminent In 1986, a sharply-splintered
Court ruled that executing Alvin Ford, a Florida inmate who had
become psychotic18 while awaiting execution, would violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.' 9 The Court also ruled that Florida's process" for deter-
17. For discussions on ethical problems raised by Ake for mental health professionals
who provide forensic services, see Paul S. Appelbaum, In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics
of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 15
(1987) (discussing whether after Ake, psychiatrists must act as advocates for the defense
and, if not, whether their impartiality is still affected); Stephen Rachlin, From Impartial
Expert to Adversary in the Wake of Ake, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25
(1988) (arguing that psychiatrists should not lose their objectivity and be influenced by
the possible outcome of the case). But see Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Foren-
sic Psychiatrist: Ethics and the Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
249 (1990) [hereinafter Appelbaum's Parable] (stating that forensic psychiatrists are gov-
erned by different ethical principles than psychiatrists).
18. "Psychotic" is defined as
[g]ross impairment in reality testing and the creation of a new reality ....
When a person is psychotic, he or she incorrectly evaluates the accuracy of his
or her perceptions and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about external
reality, even in the face of contrary evidence ....
Direct evidence of psychotic behavior is the presence of either delusions
or hallucinations (without insight into their pathological nature). The term psy-
chotic is sometimes appropriate when a person's behavior is so grossly disorga-
nized that a reasonable inference can be made that reality testing is markedly
disturbed. Examples include markedly incoherent speech without apparent aware-
ness by the person that the speech is not understandable ....
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEN-
TAL DISORDERS 404 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
19. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-410 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State,
522 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom, Ford v.
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
A subsequent decision, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320-30 (1989), touched on
a related issue - the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded. Despite stating
that it may be cruel and unusual punishment to execute individuals who are severely
retarded, a majority felt that the protection provided by the insanity defense made it un-
likely that such persons would be subject to punishment. Id. at 333. In her concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor could not conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits exe-
cuting all mentally retarded persons based solely on their mental retardation; instead, the
court would need to make an individualized determination of personal responsibility in
each case. Id. at 340. Penry holds that mental retardation does not automatically preclude
execution, but Penry fails to distinguish between incompetence stemming from mental re-
tardation and incompetence brought on by mental illness. The symptoms of mental illness
are often ameliorated by psychotropic medication. Unlike mental illness, mental retardation
1992]
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mining whether Ford was competent to be executed was inade-
quate.21 However, no majority could agree on what an adequate
process might be.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court was presented with an issue antic-
ipated2 but not addressed in Ford: whether a state can force an
incompetent inmate to take medication that would render him com-
petent to be executed. After agreeing in March, 1990 to hear Perry
v. Louisiana,24 the Court - using reasoning one commentator
is not remediated by medication. See also MENTAL DISABILIY LAW, supra note 1,
§17.06A (Supp. 1990) (discussing Penry); cf AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ABA CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-5.6(b) at 290, 293 (1989) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS] (rejecting the use of the term insanity and employing the term incompetent),
discussed infra, note 28.
20. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 & Supp. 1992); see infra text accompanying notes
69-70 (summarizing the process).
21. Ford, 477 U.S. at 413-16. The Court noted three defects in Florida's procedures:
"I) failing to include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process, 2) denying the prisoner
any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions, and 3)
placing the final decision wholly within the Executive Branch." Id.
22. For a summary and discussion of the Justices' differing opinions on appropriate
procedures in Ford, see Mental Disability Law, supra note 1, §§ 17.05-17.06.
23. Numerous authors writing before and after the Ford decision analyzed both the
legal and ethical problems connected with restoring the competence of inmates whose
mental illness, if left untreated, rendered them safe from execution. See, e.g., Douglas
Mossman, Assessing and Restoring Competency to be Executed: Should Psychiatrists Par-
ticipate?, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 397 (1987) (raising objections to psychiatric participation
but arguing that evaluation and treatment by psychiatrists of condemned inmates does not
conflict with ethical standards); Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Ethics and the
Psychiatric Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIA-
TRY & L. 37, 49 (1986); Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law
and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 35, 76-100 (1986) (anticipating the issues of
who should determine whether a condemnee is competent, and who should treat that
condemnee, as problems associated with the decision to restore a prisoner to competence).
24. 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment to execute and remanding "for further
consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (1990)]"), reh'g denied,
111 S.Ct. 804 (1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992 WL
296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly medicated to re-
stored competency for the purposes of execution).
Perry was not the first post-Ford case, or even the first Louisiana case, in which
the Court was asked to deal with issues addressed in Ford. In April, 1988, Leslie
Lowenflield, a Louisiana condemnee, petitioned the Court for a stay of execution based on
his incompetence; his application was denied. Lowenfield v. Butler, 485 U.S. 995 (1988).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan noted that Lowenfield supported his appli-
cation with the sworn affidavit of a clinical psychologist who had examined him for five
hours. The state trial and supreme courts denied Lowenfield's application without offering
any refuting evidence or reason. Id. at 995-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court
subsequently denied Lowenfield's application for habeas relief based on an "extended
conversation" with the psychologist and ruled that Lowenfield was competent to be exe-
cuted. Id. at 996 (citation omitted). The court of appeals affirmed the decision; its opinion
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found "particularly puzzling"25 - ordered the 19th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Louisiana to reconsider Perry's case in light of
Washington v. Harper,26 a decision issued by the Supreme Court
in February, 1990 which held that a prison inmate with a serious
mental illness may be forcibly treated with antipsychotic drugs.'
reached the U.S. Supreme Court "a mere fifteen minutes before the scheduled execution."
Id. On April 13, 1988, '[a]t 1:05 am., with petitioner already strapped in the electric
chair, th[e] Court denied his application for a stay of execution. ... At 1:25 am. peti-
tioner was pronounced dead . . . before . . . [the Court] voted on the certiorari petition
that accompanied petitioner's stay application." Id at 999 (citation omitted).
Commenting on these events, Justice Brennan stated, "every court that has considered
petitioner's insanity claim has made a mockery of this Court's precedent and of the most
fundamental principles of ordered justice." Id. at 996. He added-
The haste that attended disposition of this case is reprehensible. It is
hardly surprising that a case scudding through the state courts in 24 hours
should yield orders devoid of law or logic - the ones in this case simply
read, "DENIED" . . . And simple arithmetic suggests grave injustice when the
Court of last resort takes 15 minutes to read and analyze 17 pages of opinions
from the court below and cast a vote on life or death ....
Regrettably, this case is not atypical. It is the natural product of a penal
system conducive to inaccurate factfinding and shoddy analysis .... Even
were I not convinced that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment. . . .I would have no part of a penal system that permits
a State's interest in meting out death on schedule to convert our constitutional
duty to dispense justice into a license to dispense with it.
Id. at 999-1000 (citations omitted).
25. Linda Greenhouse, New Hearing on Forced Medication of Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1990, at A.30.
26. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
27. Id. at 226-27. Although Harper was not a death penalty case, it did address the
issue of whether prison officials can medicate prison inmates against their will for purpos-
es of prison administration and security. The majority in Harper found that the 14th
Amendment's due process clause gives inmates a "significant liberty interest" in avoiding
unwanted medication, but that, nevertheless, a state may "treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental ilness with anti-psychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous
to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interesL" Id.
Greenhouse finds the Court's reasoning in Perry puzzling in view of the fact that
the Harper decision was issued before the Court agreed to hear Perry: "In fact, the Court
had deferred acting on the Louisiana case for months last term, while the Washington
case was under consideration." Greenhouse, supra note 25, at A30. She speculates that the
Court was deadlocked 4 to 4 in the case, because Justice David H. Souter, who joined
the Court after Perry was argued, could not participate. "A tie would have automatically
upheld the state court permitting the inmate . . . to be medicated and executed. By con-
trast, [the Court's] action vacates the lower court's decision and bars the execution until
constitutional question is resolved in a new round of appeals." Id.
Dr. Paul Appelbaum speculates that the Supreme Court might be asking the lower
court to expand the factual elements in Perry that are relevant in light of Harper "tihe
record is devoid of information about Perry's dangerousness, whether he meets Louisiana's
commitment criteria, or whether it would be in his best medical interest to be treated,"
which am the Harper criteria for a the involuntary treatment of an inmate. Rojean Wag-
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Ford and Perry raise a host of practical and procedural prob-
lems for mental health professionals who may be called upon to
evaluate or treat potentially incompetent prisoners. These problems,
which the Court has left unaddressed so far, include the legal
standard for execution incompetence, 28 the method for selecting
competency evaluators, the method and detail with which evalua-
tors should examine prisoners, the nature of adequate representation
for prisoners undergoing competency evaluations, the proper forum
for hearing evaluators' findings, the proper scope of mental health
expert testimony, and the procedure for initiating treatment of pris-
oners found incompetent.29 Although these problems are important
and nettlesome, they are logically secondary to an ethical question
ner, Supreme Court Sends Involuntary Medication Case Back to Louisiana, 8 PSYCIIATRIC
TIMES, January, 1991, at 55 (quoting Dr. Appelbaum).
28. The American Bar Association ["ABA'] recommends that a convict be deemed
"incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the
convict cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was
tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the the nature of the punishment[,]" or cannot
"recognize or understand any fact . . . which would make the punishment unjust or un-
lawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or to the court." ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standard 7-5.6. This language was adapted from Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 n.3 (1950) (hold-
ing that it is not a denial of due process to leave the question of a convicted individual's
sanity to the governor, who has the aid of experts). The ABA also suggests standards for
selecting evaluators and procedures for hearing their testimony. See ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 19, Standard 7-5.7.
29. For discussion of the special problems raised by Ford regarding informed consent
for evaluations, conflicts of interest and the proper scope of psychiatric testimony, see
Ward, supra note 23, at 76-81. For discussion on current Florida procedures for evaluat-
ing and treating an incompetent condemned prisoner, see Michael L. Radelet & George
W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent for Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only
One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 298, 301-03 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Ethical Chaos]. For guidelines concerning clinicians' decisionmaking about whether to
participate in the assessment of incompetence and methods for undertaking evaluations and
providing testimony, see Kirk S. Heilbrun & Harry A. McClaren, Assessment of Compe-
tency for Execution? A Guide for Mental Health Professionals, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1988). For some provisional guidelines that clinicians might use
when gathering information about execution incompetence, see William D. Kenner, Compe-
tency on Death Row, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 253, 254 (1986). For discussions of
issues related to appropriate legal procedures, see Paul F. Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital
Punishment and the Incompetent: Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed
After Ford v. Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REV. 115 (1989); Rachelle Deckert Dick, Note,
Ford v. Wainwright: Warning - Sanity on Death Row May Be Hazardous to Your
Health, 47 LA. L. REV. 1351 (1987); Stephen L. Din, Note, Ford v. Wainwright: The
Eighth Amendment, Due Process and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89,
103-112 (1987) [hereinafter Due Process and Insanity]; Gordon L Moore III, Comment,
Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the Executioner's Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1470-82
(1987) [hereinafter Iowa Comment].
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which psychiatrists must answer"o before practical and procedural
issues become relevant: may psychiatrists "ethically... participate
at alt 31 in the evaluation or treatment of the condemned?
A substantial number of professionals believe that "this arena
is no place for a psychiatrist to function, that it downgrades the
profession, and that all psychiatrists should refuse to participate" in
such proceedings.32 Overall, the profession is divided as to wheth-
er participation in the evaluation and treatment of condemnees is
ethical. During a debate conducted at the American Psychiatric
Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, an audience poll showed lis-
teners to be evenly split on the matter.33 A subsequent survey of
psychiatrists found that a slight majority felt that participation was
30. For much of the rest of this discussion, this article refers to ethical problems faced
by psychiatrists, even though they comprise only a sub-group of the mental health pro-
fessionals who might be involved in the evaluation and treatment of condemned prisoners.
As physicians, psychiatrists are the sole mental health professionals who could order med-
ication for an incompetent condemnee against his will (nurses might share responsibility
for administering such medication); medication is likely to be the core of treatment for
prisoners whose mental disorders are severe enough to make them incompetent for execu-
tion. See, e.g., infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing the role of medication
in maintaining a prisoner's competency). Psychiatrists must also recognize moral obliga-
tions they share with other physicians and hold themselves bound by ethical codes
uniquely applicable to physicians. See infra text at notes 129, 151, and 180-188 (discuss-
ing the Hippocratic Oath and the American Psychiatric Association Code of Ethics). De-
spite some inter-professional points of difference, however, the ethical issues confronted by
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals overlap extensively. This article's focus
on ethical problems for psychiatrists is intended primarily to simplify exposition. Many of
the ethical difficulties faced by psychiatrists who deal with the condemned are very simi-
lar to those faced by other mental health professionals. See infra text accompanying notes
334-43.
Indeed, attorneys representing the condemned face problems similar to those con-
fronted by psychiatrists treating the condemned, particularly where the issues of inferring
prisoners' desires or best interests are concerned. For a discussion of these issues, see
Richard 1. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious Absten-
tion, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
67, 68-75 (1990).
31. Ward, supra note 23, at 76 (emphasis added).
32. Radelet & gamard, supra note 23, at 45 (citation omitted). See also Louis Jolyn
West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689
(1975) (arguing that capital punishment is outdated, immoral, and unjust and that medical
professionals should declare participation unethical); Questioning Psychiatry's Role in
Death Penalty Cases (interview with Doudlas A. Sargeant), PsYCHIATRY '86 at 3 (Decem-
ber, 1986) [hereinafter Questioning Psychiatry's Role) (asserting that "a fair reading of the
ethics of our profession should ban participation in executions").
33. K. Hansman, Forensic Experts Debate Ethics of Restoring Prisoners' Competency
to Allow Their Execution, PsYCIATRIC NEWS (June 5, 1987) 15, 21 (discussing the de-
bate between four leading forensic psychiatrists over the ethics of treating incompetent,
condemned inmates).
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ethically permissible23 The American Psychiatric Association's
Council on Law and Psychiatry reacted ambivalently to Ford.
"After much discussion, the council was unable to agree, on the
basis of principle, whether psychiatric participation in the evalua-
tion and treatment of persons sentenced to execution is consistent
with ethical standards., 35 The changing views of the Council's
chairman, Dr. Paul Appelbaum, further demonstrate just how per-
plexing psychiatrists have found this problem. Initially, he believed
that both evaluation and treatment were unethical; 36 now he views
evaluation, but not treatment, of the condemned to be consistent
with physicians' moral and social obligations.37 This latter posi-
tion is consistent with that taken by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation ["APA"] and the American Medical Association ["AMA"]
in an amicus curiae brief filed in Perry.
38
The focus of this article is whether it is ethical for physicians
to participate in the evaluation or treatment of condemned prisoners
who are incompetent. According to Ward, this may be the "ulti-
mate question"39  faced by psychiatrists who are asked to deal
with execution competency. This article is not intended to offer an
answer to this question.' Rather, it seeks to (1) elucidate issues
34. A clear majority of the psychiatrists polled saw no ethical problem in evaluating
competency to be executed, and a slight majority felt that treatment to restore competency
posed no problem. A substantial minority, however, thought that treatment was ethically
problematic or contrary to personal moral standards. Robert Weinstock, Controversial
Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: A Survey, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 176 (1988).
35. Loren H. Roth, The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 411,
412 (1987).
36. Dr. Appelbaum previously believed that a psychiatrist who participated in evalua-
tion or treatment of the incompetent condemned "'abandon[ed] his role as healer' and
acted as the 'final certifying stamp' for the prisoner's execution." Hansman, supra note
33, at 15 (quoting Paul S. Appelbaum, Remarks at the Debate at the APA Annual Meet-
ing (1987)). See also Panel Discussion, The Death Penalty: Dilemmas for Physicians and
Society - a Panel Discussion, 50 THE PHAROS OF ALPHA OMEGA ALPHA HONOR MEDI-
CAL SOCIETY, Summer 1987, at 23-27.
37. Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 256-57.
38. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical Asso-
ciation as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 25, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38
(1990) (No. 89-5120) [hereinafter APA/AMA Brief] (stating that the state cannot medicate
a condemned inmate only for the purposes of capital punishment).
39. Ward, supra note 23, at 76.
40. In an earlier article I argued that if one "presume[s] that capital punishment can
be, under some conditions, justified," both evaluation and participation are ethical. Moss-
man, supra note 23, at 407. I suggested "that those who decry such proceedings are also
voicing an aversion to executions." lid However, I wish I had made clearer that I oppose
capital punishment on moral grounds and, therefore, oppose psychiatrists' participation in
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connected to the "ulinate question's" resolution, (2) articulate a.
set of premises within which psychiatrists should evaluate their
relationship to institutions whose purposes include punishing crimi-
nals, and (3) suggest that, if the death penalty itself is just, then
there are no coherent ethical objections to psychiatric
participation.4" Part II of this article offers a brief review of the
sociopolitical issues that provide the context for Ford and Perry, as
well as brief summaries of those cases. Part I summarizes four
types of arguments that advance the view that psychiatric participa-
tion is unethical and shows how these arguments are internally
execution competency proceedings. Professor Richard Bonnie believes that opposition to
psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings, along with opposition to
other aspects of capital punishment (e.g., opposition to executing those who commit capi-
tal crimes as minors or who are retarded but legally sane), is really opposition to the
death penalty. Conversation with Professor Richard Bonnie (May 14, 1990.) Although I
suspect many would endorse this view, most mental health professionals who have argued
against participation by psychiatrists have not explicitly opposed capital punishment. In-
stead, their arguments are silent on the morality of the death penalty itself. See, e.g., Kirk
Heilbrun et al., The Debate on Treating Individuals Incompetent for Execution, 149 AM.
. PSYCHIATRY 596, 597 (1992) (voicing opposition to the manner in which the death
penalty "is currently practiced," but avoiding taking an explicit, principled opinion on the
morality of capital punishment). See infra text accompanying notes 107-135.
Psychiatrists, I believe, have a special obligation to be honest with others and them-
selves. Many psychiatrists are ambivalent about implicitly endorsing punishment as an
institution, insofar as punishment involves inflicting an evil or harm on others. See, e.g.,
Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 250 (asking "if psychiatrists are committed to
doing good and avoiding harm, how can they participate in legal proceedings from which
harm may result?"). As this article explains, by viewing punishment as 'doing harm, we
misconstrue the decision to hold someone accountable. See infra notes 120, 293-294 and
accompanying text.
Confusion about the justification of punishment and the ethics of holding patients
accountable for their actions may create some of the ambivalence psychiatrists have about
viewing their patients as responsible for assaults. For discussions of this problem, see
John 0. Beahrs, Legal Duties of Psychiatric Patients, 18 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 189, 198-99 (1990) (stating that patients should retain their duties created by an im-
plied contract between the patient and the psychiatrist but that, in practice, involuntary
patients are likely to be held to a lower standard of responsibility); Seymore L. Halleck,
The Concept of Responsibility in Psychotherapy, 36 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 292 (1982)
(arguing that the issue of responsibility is dealt with inconsistently and suggesting a mod-
el to think about free will in a practical, rather than an absolute, way); Seymour L
Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and Law: A Utilitarian Perspective, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 127 (challenging determinate sentencing and
proposing the use of a medical model of criminal justice that stresses utilitarian princi-
ples).
41. This is not to suggest that psychiatrists, therefore, would be morally obligated to
participate. They might refuse to do so for a variety of reasons, such as finding partic-
ipation repugnant or emotionally intolerable. See, e.g., Ethical Chaos, supra note 29, at
303-04 (discussing how mental health professionals treating Gary Alvord, a condemned,
incompetent inmate, were emotionally tom).
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inconsistent and are contradicted by our intuitions about the "right"
course of action in other situations. Part IV discusses the ethical
justification of retributive punishment in a reasonably fair42 crimi-
nal justice system. Particular attention is given to those issues that
might trouble psychiatrists contemplating evaluation or treatment of
the potentially incompetent condemned. Part V suggests in a rea-
sonably fair criminal justice system, psychiatrists can assume that a
condemned criminal has given his hypothetical rational consent to
evaluation and treatment, and that this consent provides a moral
authorization for psychiatric participation in execution competency
proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sociology and Statistics
Opinion polls consistently show that at the most general level,
the American public overwhelmingly supports the use of the death
penalty.43 When pollsters probe more specific issues, however,
this picture changes somewhat. A majority of the public supports
mandatory execution for particular crimes; however, only a fraction
of this group is willing to specify the crimes to which the penalty
should be mandatorily applied." In addition, even fewer persons,
42. For a discussion of what is implied by a "reasonably fair" system, see infra note
230.
43. Laura A. Kiernan, After Decades Without I4 Is Death Penalty Necessary?, BOSTON
GLOBE, April 26, 1992, New Hampshire Weekly, at 2 (stating that in a 1991 Gallup poll,
"76% of adult Americans said they favored the death penalty for murder,... [a] number
[that] has remained constant for eight years."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Death Penalty Laws
Return Amid Rising Debate in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1981, at 1 (offering Gallup
poll evidence that 66% of Americans favor the death penalty); FRANK G. CARItNGTON,
NmTHER CRUEL NOR UNUsUAL 58-60 (1979) (citing Gallup and Harris polls for the years
1976 and 1977, which found that at least 65% of Americans supported capital punish-
ment); Recent Survey Research Data on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 85, 85-88 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Recent Survey] (atti-
tudes toward capital punishment for persons convicted of murder were examined by vari-
ous demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, race, religion, education and income;
in all categories except race, support for the death penalty was greater than 2:1, while for
race, opposition was either greater or equal to support). But see Anthony N. Doob &
Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward Sentencing,
16 CAN. J. BEHAV. Scl. 269, 277 (1984) (The public's concerns about leniency in sen-
tencing reflect impressions left by the mass media, not courts' actual behavior, thus, poli-
cy makers should not accept these attitudes at face value, but should recognize that con-
cers about judicial leniency are "founded upon incomplete and frequently inaccurate news
accounts.").
44. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A
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as jurors, would sentence convicts to death.45 The public also is
quite ignorant about, and has little interest in, many of the details
of capital punishment.' These findings suggest to Entin that "the
death penalty remains in force mostly as a symbol of opposition to
crime and disorder."4 He believes that public acceptance of the
ancient prohibition against executing the incompetent shows that
"the rule... serves an important social function .... [It] oper-
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ.
116, 126-137 (1983) (64% percent of the respondents indicated that they would definitely
or probably vote for the death penalty; however, support for mandatory execution for a
specific crime ranged from a high of 57.4% in the case of a mass murder, to a low of
32.0% for murder committed during a robbery); Neil Vidmar & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
68 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (indicating that higher support for capital punish-
ment on a general level relative to lower support for capital punishment on a more spe-
cific level may reflect the hypothesis that people favor the idea of capital punishment but
not the implications).
45. Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 44, at 83-84 (45% of subjects questioned gener-
ally about capital punishment indicated their support for the death penalty, when asked to
assume the position of a juror in a trial where the defendant had been found guilty of a
very serious crime, only eight percent indicated that they would vote for the death penal-
ty); Recent Survey, supra note 43, at 85, 90 (39% of individuals questioned reported that,
as jurors, they would vote guilty "even though the defendant would automatically receive
the death penalty; nationally, general support for the death penalty was 60%).
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Americans
"know almost nothing about capital punishment."); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (If the public "were better informed they would
consider [the death penalty] shocking, unjust, and unacceptable."); Neil Vidmar & Tony
Dittenhoffer, Informed Public Opinion & Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CAN. J. CRMINoLo-
oy 43, 52 (1981) ("[O]n the whole,] if the public were informed, opinion polls would
show more people oppos[img] . . .capital punishment than favor[ing] it."). See also Rob-
ert M. Bohm et al., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hy-
potheses, 28 . RES. CRIME & DEINQ. 360, 369-370 (1991) (finding that during the
pretest phase of experimentation, the 272 subjects were able to answer only 52% of
knowledge questions correctly; no knowledge question was answered correctly by more
than 67.3% of the subjects and only half of the 14 questions were answered correctly by
more than 50% of the subjects); Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 38, at 139-145, 161 (con-
cluding that "respondents [to the survey] had little knowledge of the factual issues [sur-
rounding the death penalty,] . . . and their willingness to admit this ignorance may indi-
cate that they did not feel that factual knowledge is very important); Austin Sarat & Neil
Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Mar-
shall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171, 184-187 (72% of experimental subjects knew
that there were people awaiting execution. However, knowledge of the application and
deterrent value of capital punishment and its effects on those sentenced to die, issues
which Marshall deemed relevant to the formation of an informed opinion, was consider-
ably lower. Only 36% of subjects were familiar with deterrence arguments. Such findings
indicate that people are moderately well-informed about "how capital punishment is ap-
plied, but are less well-informed about its effects.").
47. Entin, supra note 1, at 239.
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ates to reduce the class of persons subject to execution," and thus
"diminishes our larger ambivalence" about the use of the death
penalty.4
8
The Supreme Court appears to share this ambivalence. Al-
though, since Furman, no majority of justices has been willing to
declare capital punishment unconstitutional, 49 the Court generally
has affirmed elaborate post-conviction procedural requirements that
have slowed the pace of executions. Several justices who object to
abolishing capital punishment judicially appear to support eliminat-
ing it legislatively."o The Court's recent frustration with the task
of reviewing death sentences5t should not be construed as support
for more executions.52
In the late 1980s, the United States' "death row" population
surpassed 2000."3 The combination of undiminishing legislative
48. Id. at 238-39.
49. But see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Execution for the rape of an
adult woman is grossly disproportionate and excessive as compared to the crime, and
therefore violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.).
50. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 375 (stating that "[i]f... [this Court] were
possessed of legislative power, I would either join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall [to eliminate capital punishment] or, at the very least, restrict the use of
capital punishment to a very small category of the most heinous crimes") (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); see also id at 405-06
(Blackmm, J., dissenting) ("Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty.").
51. This impatience is reflected in the Court's recent decision to allow states to limit
habeas corpus petitions. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. CL 2546, 2553-55 (1991)
(holding that a federal court may not review a state court's decision to deny a prisoner's
federal constitutional claim if the decision of the state court is based upon a procedural
default established by the state court which is independent of the prisoner's federal ques-
tion).
52. See FRANKLIN E. ZMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 46 (1986) (noting that in the early 1980s there was a "wave of deci-
sions voiding death sentences and sections of state death penalty laws" after which wide
latitude was given to states in a series of cases); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 305, 387-388 (asserting that the federal courts have struck a
balance between the competing demands of the death penalty debate by handing down a
very large number of death sentences relative to the small number of actual executions).
53. See David Bruck, On Death Row in Pretoria Central, THE NEW REPUBLic, July 13
& 20, 1987, at 18-19 (number of death row inmates nearing 2000). Articles published
after 1988 consistently state that "over 2,000" convicts are residing on death row. See,
e.g., Bonnie, supra note 30, at 67 (stating that there were over 2000 condemned prisoners
awaiting execution); Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 297 (stating that in early 1988,
America's death row population exceeded 2000 inmates).
According to a Justice Department study, there were, as of December 31, 1990,
"2,356 prisoners awaiting death penalties ... .up 5% from the previous year." Associat-
ed Press, 40% on Death Row are Black, Report Says, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 30,
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and public support for the rendering of death sentences coupled
with a comparatively slow rate of executions suggests that the
numbers of persons awaiting execution will continue to rise. Both
courts and commentators have noted repeatedly that confinement on
death row entails extreme emotional distress.' Many condemned
inmates arrive on death row with significant histories of neurologi-
cal and psychiatric problems.5 The inmate who awaits execution
faces a unique and terrible form of emotional stress: "the anticipa-
tion of death at a specific moment in time and in a known man-
ner."s 6 The available evidence suggests that a substantial fraction
of death row inmates - who, by virtue of their psychological and
medical histories, are especially vulnerable to stress-induced decom-
pensation - display significant levels of severe psychiatric
symptoms, including psychosis.5 7 As the nation's death row popu-
lation increases, psychiatrists who work within or provide consulta-
tion to state prison systems can expect to perform a proportionately
greater number of services for those who appear incompetent to be
executed.58
1991, at AS.
54. See, eg., Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Mhe onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phe-
nomenon."); Rector v. Bryant, 111 S. Ct. 2872, 2875 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("The stark realities are that many death row inmates were afflicted with serious mental
impairments before they committed their crimes and that many more develop such impair-
ments during the excruciating interval between sentencing and execution."); see also infra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational
Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
838, 840, 844 (1986) [hereinafter Characteristics] (Lewis detailed the psychiatric and
neurological evaluations of 15 condemnees which revealed serious psychiatric impairment.
Six were determined to be chronically psychotic, suffering from delusions, hallucinations
and bizarre and sadistic behavior, nine suffered from psychiatric symptoms during child-
hood; three attempted suicide during childhood and one attempted it during adolescence;
all had histories of head injuries.).
56. Johnnie L. Gallemore Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death
Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1972); see also Harvey Bluestone &
Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962) ("Presumably, the greatest of stresses would be imposed on the
man who knows he is going to be put to death - and knows just when that will be.").
57. See Gallemore & Patton, supra note 56, at 168, 169; Bluestone & McGahee, supra
note 56, at 393. At the time that Ford's case was advancing through the appellate courts,
it was estimated informally that half of Florida's condemnees become psychotic at some
point during their confinement. Robert Sherill, Electrocution Binge: In Florida, Insanity is
No Defense, 239 THE NATIoN 537, 555-556 (1984) (quoting the director of Florida Clear-
ing House for Justice).
58. "The pace and complexity of the present death penalty process guarantees a long
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B. Ford v. Wainwrigh 9
Before the Supreme Court heard Ford v. Wainwright, the legal
and ethical issues involved in executing an incompetent person had
received a modicum of scholarly consideration.' The Court's de-
cision to hear Ford greatly increased both academic and practical
interest in the potential problems raised for mental health profes-
sionals who might become involved in execution competency pro-
ceedings.
Neither Alvin Ford's mental competence nor his legal sanity
were ever at issue at the time that he was tried and convicted of
murder in 1974.6 Ford began to evince significant mental deterio-
ration after spending eight years on Florida's death row.62 His
psychosis was initially manifested in a pervasive delusion that he
wait between sentence and execution. Clearly, post-sentencing incompetence will become
more common. Therefore, doctors can anticipate that the state will require their services
more frequently to provide evaluations and treatment pursuant to competency to be exe-
cuted statutes." Rochelle G. Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Execut-
ed, 96 YALE L. J. 167, 172-73 (1986). See also Heiltrun et al., supra note 40, at 996
("increasing numbers of mental health professionals will be asked to become involved").
During an October, 1988 presentation of an earlier version of this paper to a national
audience of forensic psychiatrists, approximately one-fifth of about 60 listeners indicated
they had been involved in some way in execution competency proceedings.
59. 477 U.S. 399 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 522 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (de-
nying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub noma. Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071
(1989).
60. A sample of frequently-cited pre-Ford writings on execution competency includes
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of
Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 401 (1962) (reviewing the procedure for determining
whether a prisoner is indeed insane, and recommending procedural protections "both com-
mensurate with . . . society's aversion to execution of the insane and consistent with the
need to avoid interminable delay"); Paul 3. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the
Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 804 (1980) (arguing that
the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the presently incompetent, thus providing an
alternative basis for resolving problems raised by the "condemned prisoner who refuses to
pursue legal claims that might prevent his execution"); Note, Insanity of the Condemned,
88 YALE L. . 533, 533 (1979) (arguing that court-sanctioned state procedures to assess
the sanity of condemnees are inadequate when analyzed under "subsequently prescribed,
more stringent constitutional guidelines" and proposing "a framework of procedural safe-
guards designed to protect the rights of condemned prisoners to raise the issue of insanity
and to have that claim properly evaluated").
Prior to Ford, the incompetency issue seems to have been raised infrequently by
condemned prisoners. For example, only four of 180 condemned California prisoners
raised the issue of incompetency between 1942 and 1956. Note, Post-Conviction' Remedies
in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN. L REV. 94, 131 (1958).
61. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401-402.
62. Id. at 402.
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was the target of a conspiracy in which the Ku Klux Klan and
others plotted to induce him to suicide. He believed that prison
guards were a part of this conspiracy, and that they were killing
people and putting bodies in prison beds. Later, Ford began to be-
lieve that his female relatives were being tortured in the prison,
and that members of his family had been taken hostage. The hos-
tage delusion then expanded: Ford began to speak of a "hostage
crisis" by "day 287" in which Senator Kennedy and others were
among the hostages. By 1983, Ford appeared to have assumed
authority for the "crisis." He also began referring to himself as
"Pope John Paul II," claimed to have fired several prison officals,
and claimed to have appointed nine new Florida Supreme Court
justices.'
Over the course of his illness, Ford's counsel arranged for two
psychiatrists to examine him.' Amidst "long streams of seemingly
unrelated thoughts," 5 Ford told the second psychiatrist, in No-
vember, 1983: "'I can't be executed because of the landmark case.
I won. Ford v. State will prevent executions all over. '"' The psy-
chiatrist was convinced Ford was not malingering and concluded
that Ford neither understood why he was condemned to death, nor
that he would be executed.' One month later, Ford regressed to
almost complete incomprehensibility. He spoke in a sort of code
that involved the "intermittent use of the word 'one,' making state-
ments such as 'Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God one, father
one, Pope one. Pope one. Leader one. ' ' 6
Ford's attorney then invoked Florida's procedures for deter-
mining a condemned prisoner's competency to be executed.6 9 In
63. Id
64. Id. at 402-03.
65. Id at 403.
66. Id
67. Id See also infra note 115 (discussing psychiatric detection of malingering).
68. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403.
69. Id at 403-04. FLA. STAT. ch. 922.07 (1985) details procedures to be followed
when a person sentenced to death appears to be insane. Under the statute, the governor
must stay the execution and appoint three psychiatrists to jointly examine the prisoner to
determine whether the prisoner "understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and
why it is to be imposed upon him." Id at § 922.07(1Y After the psychiatrists make a
determination, they submit a report to the governor. If, based on the report, the governor
decides the prisoner is competent to understand the situation, the governor will order the
warden to proceed with the execution. However, if the governor believes that the prisoner
is incompetent, the prisoner must be committed to a Department of Corrections mental
health facility until he is restored to sanity. At that time, the governor must again appoint
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accordance with the statute, the Governor stayed the execution and
appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate whether Ford had "the
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and
the reasons why it was imposed upon him."" The psychiatrists
jointly interviewed Ford for 30 minutes and submitted separate
written reports to the Governor. Each psychiatrist offered a differ-
ent diagnosis, but all thought Ford was competent to be executed.
Pursuant to the statute, after receiving the psychiatrists' reports, the
Governor signed Ford's death warrant on April 30, 1984, without
explanation or comment.7 After a series of appeals, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider both the constitutionality of
executing the insane and the adequacy of Florida's procedures for
hearing Ford's claim.72
Even before Ford's appeal, all states with death penalty stat-
utes prohibited execution of the incompetent.' Indeed, for centu-
ries, Anglo-American law has protected a person from being exe-
cuted if he has "lost his sanity."' 4 The Ford Court noted that his-
torians and jurists have offered several rationales for this prohibi-
tion but "the reasons for the rule are less sure and less uniform
than the rule itself."7" Justice Marshall agreed with Sir Edward
Coke's view that the execution of a "mad man" serves as no ex-
ample to others, has no deterrent value, and is extremely cruel.76
Marshall also noted that Sir John Hawles found execution offensive
to religion because it dispatches someone into the next "world,
a panel of three psychiatrists to ascertain the prisoner's competency to be executed.
70. 477 U.S. at 412 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 522.07(2)). "The Governor's order specifi-
cally directed that the attorneys [who were present at the examination] should not partic-
ipate in the examination in any adversarial manner. This order was consistent with the
present Governor's 'publicly announced policy of excluding all advocacy on the part of
the condemned from the process of determining whether a person under a sentence of
death is insane.'" 477 U.S. at 412-13 (quoting Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999,
1001 (Fla. 1984), aff'd, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that FLA. STAT. ch.
522.07 met minimum standards required by procedural due process), cert. denied and stay
denied, 466 U.S. 932 (1984)).
71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
72. 474 U.S. 1019 (1985), aft'd, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 522
So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v.
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
73. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 n.2 (noting that '41 states had a death penalty or statutes
regulating execution procedures and 26 had statutes requiring that incompetent prisoners'
executions be suspended).
74. Id at 406.
75. Id. at 407.
76. Id (citing 3 EDwARD COKE, FIRST INSTmJTE oF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *6).
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when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it."' Blackstone
explained that the insane should be spared execution lest they die
before having the chance to "[allege] something in stay of judg-
ment or execution."78 Justice Powell agreed with Justice Marshall
that executing the incompetent is cruel. 9 Both justices also con-
curred that the retributive purpose of punishment is ill-served by
"executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has
been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life."8
C. Perry v. Louisiana"
Although Ford holds that the execution of the incompetent is
constitutionally forbidden, the decision is silent as to how a con-
demned, prisoner, once ruled incompetent to be executed, should be
treated. In February, 1990, in Washington v. Harper,2 the Su-
preme Court recognized that prisoners had a limited right to refuse
psychiatric medications, and described minimal procedural safe-
guards for instituting involuntary treatment of prisoners. 3 Harper,
a ward of the Washington State Penal System since his 1976 rob-
bery conviction, was treated against his will for a manic-depressive
disorder. His treatment included forced administration of antipsy-
77. Id (quoting Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General in the Reign of King William the
Third, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman (1685), in 11 How. ST. TRIAL 474,
477 (1816)).
78. Id (citing 4 WHI.uAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25).
79. Id at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 409. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the criterion for
execution incompetence and the rationale for the ancient prohibition against executing the
"insane," see Ward, supra note 23, at 59-68. Ford died of natural causes on Feb. 28,
1991; at the time of his death he was still under a death sentence and had never been
judged incompetent. Heilbrum et al., supra note 40, at 598.
81. 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment to execute and remanding "for further
consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (1990), reh'g denied, 111
S.Ct. 804 (1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992 WL 296230
(La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly medicated to restored com-
petency for the purposes of execution)]").
82. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
83. Id, at 219-27. The Court found that the due process clause permits involuntary
treatment of a prisoner with antipsychotic medication "if the inmate is dangerous to him-
self or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." Id, at 227. Procedural
requirements for instituting involuntary treatment are met as long as the prisoner is given
a full and fair hearing and the decisionmaker is independent of those who would treat the
inmate. Id at 231. The Court determined that due process does not require a judicial
decisionmaker, stating that "an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps
better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals
rather than a judge." Id
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chotic drugs."4 However, Harper was not a prisoner whose invol-
untary treatment might restore his competence and thereby make
him fit for execution. This was precisely the situation that the
Court appeared ready to address when it granted certiorari in Perry
v. Louisiana."
Unlike Alvin Ford, Michael Perry's mental state figured prom-
inently in the trial proceedings leading to his conviction in 1985.
He was arrested in the summer of 1983 and charged with murder-
ing his parents and three other relatives. At the time of his arrest,
he told police that his family had harrassed him and had stolen his
property and that was why he had murdered them. 6
Perry was sent to a state psychiatric facility for evaluation and
treatment upon the recommendation of two psychiatrists who exam-
ined Perry several months after his arrest.87 On admission, he stat-
ed that he did not have enough blood; that he was hearing voices;
that robots, the President, and the CIA were telling him what to
do; that robots had told him to kill his family; that he was being
fed body parts; and that if shot, he would not be killed.88
Perry was found competent to stand trial in 1985 after he had
been hospitalized for six months and subsequently imprisoned for
one year. 9 Over the objections of counsel, he withdrew his insan-
ity plea and entered only a plea of "not guilty. " 90 He was con-
victed and sentenced to death.9' During the two years following
84. Id at 214.
85. 494 U.S. 1015 (1990).
86. Perry explained his murderous actions by stating "I just couldn't take it anymore."
State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 547, 549 (La. 1986) (affirming Perry's conviction and
sentencing and holding that the defendant had the burden of establishing incapacity to
stand trial), cert. denied, Perry v. Louisiana, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), judgment vacated and
remanded, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment -to execute and remanding "for
further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (1990)]"), reh'g
denied, 111 S.Ct. 804 (1991), affrd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992
WL 296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly medicated to
restored competency for the purposes of execution). When asked why he killed his two-
year-old nephew, Perry replied, "[tihe kid was evil, some sort of devil, witch of some
sort. ... He was a very smart kid ... too smart for his age. I had to make sure he
was dead." Id
87. Id. at 547-48.
88. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990)
(No. 89-5120) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
89. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 547-48. A competency hearing in September, 1983 resulted
in hospitalization. Perry was then returned to prison in March, 1984. A second compe-
tency hearing in March, 1985 resulted in a finding of competence to stand trial.
90. Id at 547, 550.
91. Id at 545. A twelve member jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as
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his conviction, he was treated almost continuously with haloperi-
dol, 2 but continued to have periods of psychosis.93
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Perry's conviction but
recommended that an assessment of his competency to be executed
"might be in order prior to execution."' Over the next nine
months, the trial court held four hearings at which medical records
and both oral and videotaped testimony were reviewed.95 In Octo-
ber, 1988, the court concluded that Perry was competent to be
executed.' The court then ordered that his competency was to be
maintained9 with medication prescribed by the penitentiary's med-
charged. During the sentencing phase, the jury recommended the death penalty, finding the
existence of aggravating circumstances. The jury found that the defendant knowingly creat-
ed the risk of death and that the crime was committed in a particularly heinous manner.
Id
92. "Haloperidol is the first of the butyrophenone series of major tranquilizers...
[and] is indicated for use in the management of manifestations of psychotic disorders.
PHYSIcIANS" DESK REFERENCE 1236 (1989).
The prevailing theory regarding the mechanism of action of antipsychotic drugs
is based on the observation that all of the currently available antipsychotic
drugs have a similar action on the dopamine system: the blocking of the bind-
ing of dopamine to the postsynaptic dopamine receptor in the brain . . . . The
theory that psychosis is a result of an excess of dopamine or the result of
abnormal activity of certain dopamine receptors has been confirmed by the
observation of increased dopamine concentrations and an increased number of
dopamine-2 receptors in the brains of some patients with schizophrenia ....
Jonathan M. Silver et al., Biological Therapies for Mental Disorders, in CLINICAL PsYcI-
AIRY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS 459, 462 (Alan Stoudemire ed., 1990). The effectiveness
of antipsychotic medication in preventing schizophrenic relapse has been amply document-
ed. If treatment is not continued after initial remission of acute psychotic symptoms,
schizophrenic patients have a relapse rate of 8-15% per month; with continued medication,
patients have a relapse rate of 1.5-3% per month. Id.
93. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 6-13. On December 20, 1985, after being sen-
tenced to death, Perry arrived at the penitentiary. From the time of his arrival, his docu-
mented behavior included confused thinking, acting out, disorientation as to person and
place, wild, uncontrollable rages, yelling, screaming, delusions, hallucinations, a belief that
he could not be killed by electrocution, memory impairment and paranoia. Id For a dis-
cussion of the psychiatric disorders that might engender execution incompetence, see
Heilbrum et al., supra note 40, at 598.
94. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 564.
95. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 16-23.
96. Id at 23. The trial court adopted the definition of execution incompetency offered
by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ford, who held that the Eighth Amend-
ment precludes the execution of inmates who are "'unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer iL*" APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 4
(quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Powell, J. concurring in part and con-
curring in the result)).
97. John M. Davis & Suzanne Andrinkaitis, The Natural Course of Schizophrenia and
Effective Maintenance Drug Treatment, 6 J. CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 25, 68-88
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ical staff, even if the medication had to be forcibly administered
over defendant's objection.9" After being ordered by the United
States Supreme Court to review its decision, the district court af-
firmed its ruling to forcibly treat Perry to restored competence so
that he could be executed; however, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
while affirming the lower court's holding that Perry was insane,
held that Perry could not be treated with psychotropic medication
without his consent."
D. The Medical Profession's Response
Perry's disposition emphasizes for psychiatrists - especially
those "who are in state employment and often under pressure to
conform their treatment to the needs of the state"'°° - the ambi-
guity and discomfort they face in confronting the prospect of eval-
uating and treating incompetent death row inmates.01 This ambi-
guity and discomfort has both legal and ethical dimensions. In an
effort to bring about a legal resolution of Perry that might also
relieve physicians of their moral dilemmas in treating death row
(1986) (concerning the role of maintenance medication and the treatment of schizophrenia).
98. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 23.
99. See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment to execute and
remanding "for further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210(1990)]-), reh'g denied, 111 S.Ct. 804 (1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-
KP-1324, 1992 WL 296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly
medicated to restored competency for the purposes of execution). See also supra notes 23-
24.
100. Howard Zonana, Keeping Death-Row Inmates Sane: Perry v. Louisiana, AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. NEWS., (Am. Acad. Psychiatry & Law, Baltimore, Md.), April 1991, at
5, 6.
101. See Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 599 (discussing the risk that disclosures
made by patients in treatment might be used to assess competency for execution). See
also Jerome J. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 ABA J. 1521
(1974) (recognizing the potential conflict of interest inherent in situations in which a
psychiatrist must serve not only a patient, but also a family, an institution, a state, or
self, and urging psychiatrists and lawyers to cooperate both in carefully identifying situa-
tions presenting a conflict of interest and in fashioning appropriate procedural safeguards);
Richard J. Bonnie, Introduction to PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSES
AND DEBATE xiii, xv (1977) (noting that clinicians are increasingly placed in a "double
agent" role where they are called upon to serve interests beyond the patient's health.); cf.
Seymore L Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry: A Utilitarian Ap-
proach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 279, 279 (1984) (concentrating on psy-
chiatrists involved in the civil commitment process as opposed to condemnee incompeten-
cy process, Halleck notes that psychiatrists employed by the government relate to the
patient for the government's purposes; consequently, the psychiatrists' allegiances are un-
clear, leading to possible harm to the patient as a result of the interaction during the
evaluation process).
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inmates,'02 the American Psychiatric Association and American
Medical Association joined in filing an amicus curiae brief in
Perry.103
The APA/AMA Brief noted that in Harper, the Supreme
Court had determined that a prisoner retains a liberty interest in re-
fusing unwanted medication under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.1°4 However, involuntary treatment of serious
mental illness is permissible "if the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." "
The APA/AMA Brief argued that the Louisiana trial court autho-
rized involuntary medication for Perry solely to preserve his com-
petence to be executed; Perry had not been shown to be dangerous
or gravely disabled."° The brief argued further that treatment of
Perry was not in his medical interest,"° so that neither the "dan-
102. The APA proposed commuting to life imprisonment the death sentences of prison-
ers who are found incompetent to be executed. See infra text at notes 110-15.
103. APAIAMA Brief, supra note 38.
104. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-27 (1990) (guaranteeing a right to refuse
medication under the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that this right can be sufficiently
protected by a hearing before prison officials if the state feels it has an interest in ensur-
ing prison safety).
105. AMA/APA Brief, supra note 38, at 12 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 227).
106. Id at 10-12.
107. The APA/AMA Brief does not specify what a "medical interest" is. "Medical" is
defined as "of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice of medi-
cine ... [;] requiring or devoted to medical treatment. .. ." WEBSTER's HD NEW
ITENATIONAL DICInONARY 1402 (3d ed. 1971). By this definition, the only strictly
medical issue under consideration in Perry was the nature of his symptoms and their
proper treatment; Perry's only strictly "medical interest" ought to have been the alleviation
of his symptoms. This view of Perry's medical interest seems consonant with Justice
Scalia's questioning, during oral argument, how one could justify withholding from Perry
treatment that would have been prescribed for him under any other circumstances. Zonana,
supra note 100, at 6. Zonana suggests that
[a] broader definition of medical interests requires looking at the overall goals
of management. For example, the use of antibiotics to treat an infection is not
always warranted if the patient is in a terminal condition from another disease.
The question here is whether to liken the death penalty to another disease (e.g.
cancer), or to decide that medical interests are not involved since the death
penalty represents a legally authorized judicial decision.
Id.
The question of whether part of a physician's overall goals of management should
include withholding medication so as to influence the course of justice is discussed infra
at text accompanying note 141. Leaving that issue aside, the physician who withholds
antibiotics for the pneumonia-stricken cancer patient is best thought of as managing two
medical conditions at once, whereas Perry's physician would know that Perry had other
pressing but non-medical interests. The death penalty is not a disease.
Medical treatment is undertaken not as an end in itself, but with a view to the non-
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gerousness" nor the "medical interest" requirements for involuntary
psychiatric treatment of prisoners (as set forth in Harper) had been
met. 
10 8
The brief recognized that, left untreated, Perry might remain
psychotic for an interminable period, and recommended that states
commute incompetent condernees' sentences to life imprisonment
and allow them to receive treatment."0 The APA/AMA Brief
viewed commutation as a solution to both the constitutional issues
raised by Perry, and the ethical problems faced by physicians who
might be asked to evaluate or treat an incompetent condemned in-
mate.1 The brief argued that "to allow a prisoner to languish
with a treatable psychosis would violate the Eighth Amendment
principle established in Estelle v. Gamble,"' which recognizes a
prisoner's right to treatment for known medical problems."'
Commutation would insure that antipsychotic medication would be
medical interests, such as happiness or well-being, that it promotes. "We feel, usually, that
we can cope with almost all ...states of vulnerability if we have our health. After all,
we perceive health as a means toward freedom and other primary values." EDMUND D.
PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
209 (1981). An important task for physicians is to help patients facing difficult decisions
to perceive and weigh their interests, interests which are affected by medical decisions but
which, physicians must humbly recognize, are not all medical. The recognition that justly
convicted individuals have a strong interest in receiving just punishment should greatly
assist psychiatrists to examine the issues raised in Perry's case. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 256-60.
108. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 10-12.
109. Id at 20-25. See MD. ANN. CODE § 75A(d)(3) (192 Repl. Vol.) (When an inmate
is adjudicated incompetent to be executed, his case is remanded to the sentencing court,
which automatically strikes the death sentence and enters a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole.). See also 1 NiGEL WALxER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENc-
LAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 205, 216 (1967) (Before England abolished the
death penalty in 1965, death sentences were commuted for life when prisoners were deter-
mined to be insane.); J.D. Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Crimi-
nas, 4 MMEn. U. L. REV. 434, 475 (1964) (proposing a mandatory duty to commute the
death sentences of insane prisoners as 'has been the invariable practice in England since
1840 .. . "). In Montana a court is allowed to suspend a death sentence of an incompe-
tent condemnee when "so much time has elapsed since the commitment of the defendant
that it would be unjust to proceed ...." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-202 (1991).
110. 1 argue below that, under the premises usually assumed by those who oppose
treatment of the incompetent condemned, the possibility of commutation (which, the
APA/AMA brief asserts, allows for ethical treatment) substitutes one set of ethical dilem-
mas for another. See infra notes 136 and 183.
Ill. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 20 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977)).
112. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 (concluding that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the [gratuitous cruelty] proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment").
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administered involuntarily only if an- underlying parens patriae
justification for medical treatment were established, and would not
be used solely for the purpose of making an inmate fit for punish-
ment M  The brief argued that governments have "a deep-seated
social interest in preserving medical care, in actuality and in public
perception, as an unambiguously beneficent healing art.... M he
use of medical treatment... in order to facilitate a patient's
death.., would threaten States' vital interests in the ethical
standards and the treatment function of the medical profes-
sion."" 4 This combination of constitutional obligations and State
interests favoring commutation and treatment outweigh any "interest
in allowing an incompetent inmate like Perry to suffer for lack of
needed medication.""
5
113. The constitutionality of this practice has been questioned. See Washington v. Harp-
er, 494 U.S. 210, 241 (1989) (Stevens, J., with Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Forced administration of antipsychotic medication may not
be used as a form of punishment."); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 385 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (The Supreme Court has never approved of either using psycho-
tropic medication to control behavior or using it "for reasons that have more to do with
the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy."); Pena v. New York State
Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Neither behavior control nor
punishment may be the objective of involuntary medication; rather, such medication should
be used only "as part of an ongoing treatment program authorized and supervised by a
physician.); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (behavior control
is an improper goal of involuntary medication), aft'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See also, e.g., Knechit v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th
Cir. 1973) (Involuntary administration of apomorphine, a drug that induces vomiting, is
cruel and unusual punishment); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973)
(administration of succinyIcholine, a drug that induces paralysis, might trigger "serious
constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment.").
In addition, Louisiana has explicitly forbidden this practice for civilly committed
mental patients. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 (West 1989) ("Medication shall not
be used for nonmedical reasons such as punishment or convenience of the staff.").
114. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 15-16.
115. Id. at 25. The APA/AMA Brief recognized only two state interests that might pre-
clude commutation: the possibility of spontaneous recovery and the possibility that a pris-
oner might feign psychosis (or another condition constituting execution incompetence) to
avoid execution. The Brief argued that a state might wait years for a spontaneous recov-
ery to occur, during which time an inmate would suffer substantial, but possibly treatable,
symptoms of psychosis. For many inmates, recovery might not ever occur without treat-
ment.
As for the possibility of feigning, the Brief argued that "psychiatrists now have at
their disposal a range of methods shown by empirical studies to be effective in the detec-
tion of malingering." Id. at 22. The studies cited in the Brief, see id., at 22-23 nn.24-27,
include reports evaluating prisoners, although none of these reports deals with prisoners in
Michael Perry's situation. See, e.g., David Schretlen & ltal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test
Battery to Detect Prison Inmates who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV.
Scr. & L 75 (1990); Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A
19921
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Psychiatrists asked to administer treatment to the condemned
are faced with "an excruciating ethical dilemma"'1 6 wrought by
the knowledge that the very symptoms that medication might di-
minish, symptoms that cause suffering which psychiatrists ordinari-
ly feel duty-bound to alleviate, are what stand between an inmate
and execution. To further bolster its case for commutation of death
sentences following determination of execution incompetence, the
Brief cited several Ford-inspired articles from the mental health
and legal literature offering a variety of ethical arguments against
physician participation in the execution competency process. The
following section critiques arguments that challenge the morality of
psychiatric assessment and treatment of incompetent condemned
inmates.
Hm. THE PROFESSION'S ETHICAL RESPONSE: AN INmrAL CRITIQUE
A. Arguments in Opposition to Assessment or Treatment
Although psychiatrists, on the whole, are divided about the
appropriateness of assessing and treating incompetent condemned
prisoners,117 the professional literature is generally critical of psy-
chiatric involvement in execution competency proceedings.1 18 The
criticism is directed both toward assessing inmates' competence
and, even more strongly, toward treating inmates judged incompe-
tent.1 9 A variety of arguments have been offered in support of
Validation Study with a Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 85 (1990). The Brief
does not mention that there is substantial professional disagreement about the ability of
psychologists and psychiatrists to detect malingering, and does not cite studies demonstrat-
ing professionals' failure to do so. For a review, see David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The
Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCIENcE 31, 35 (1988) (reviewing
studies of accuracy of mental health professionals' evaluations).
116. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 16.
117. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text
119. The National Medical Association's ("NMA") position represents a striking excep-
tion to this criticism. The NMA advises psychiatrists to evaluate and treat incompetent
condemnees. It considers inmates who are facing execution deserving of the same kinds
of psychotherapy that would be rendered to terminally ill patients. "The NMA views the
death penalty as a jurisprudential issue and not a medical one." Ward, supra note 23, at
86 (arguing on behalf of the NMA, that a psychiatrist's duty to treat includes a duty to
treat incompetent inmates whether or not they are condemned). Dr. Robert T. M. Phillips,
chairman of the NMA's psychiatry section, believes that justice will not be served if
psychiatrists withdraw from such work (particularly evaluating the inmates who are fight-
ing death sentences). "This work is going to be done. It must be done. And if it's not us
doing this work, I'm concerned about who it will be .... You cannot assume that
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the thesis that participation is unethical. In some cases, these argu-
ments are concerned with the anticipated psychological or practical
consequences of participation," ° but not with moral issues.
For example, in one of their amicus briefs, the APA and the
AMA argue that treating the condemned incompetent would have
the practical consequence of undermining the already-precarious
status of the doctor-patient relationship in prison settings.
12 1
Physicians, and especially psychiatrists, require the
trust of their patients ....
... Prisoners already have reasons to be suspicious
of psychiatrists, because psychiatrists in an evaluative role
often testify against prisoners in competency, insanity, and
death penalty proceedings. If psychiatrists are now required
to do harm to prisoners in their treatment role, the ability
of all physicians to maintain an effective patient-physician
relationship with prisoners will be significantly im-
paired ....
... [P]sychiatric care in the Nation's prisons and
jails leaves much to be desired .... Allowing involuntary
medication to be employed for the purposes of facilitating
capital punishment would exacerbate those problems."
Other authorities argue that assessing or treating the condemned
incompetent exposes mental health professionals to a high degree
of psychological distress."z Heilbrun and McClaren caution those
who are considering whether to participate in assessing potentially
incompetent condemnees to beware of the emotional cost of know-
[psychologists and social workers] can read the prison record, see an abnormal EEG, and
recognize there's something there that may need to be pursued." Bruce Jancin, Mitigating
Psychiatric Disorders 'Common' in Death Row Inmates, 18 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS,
October 1990, 1 at 24 (quoting Dr. Robert T. M. Phillips). "Psychiatry did not write the
laws, but it has an important role in the treatment and care [of capital defendants], even
if it leads to execution." K. Hansman, Psychiatry's Role in Capital Cases Important to
Ensuring Justice, PSYCHIATRIC NEWs 13 (August 7, 1992) (quoting Dr. Robert T.M. Phil-
lips).
120. Though these arguments are important, they are not the focus of this essay. I draw
attention to them here to distinguish them from those that are related strictly to ethical is-
sues.
121. See APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38.
122. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted). "The spectre of the physician donning the
executioner's hood inspires little confidence among people who receive medical treatment
from the same physician." Salguero, supra note 58, at 96.
123. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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hig that their opinions could have life-or-death consequences for
the evaluee124 Radelet and Barnard illustrate this concern by ex-
amining the case of Gary Alvord,1  a Florida convict who was
found incompetent for execution by a state-approved panel of psy-
chiatrists.126 Alvord was convicted of murdering three women in
spite of evidence presented that a Michigan court had found him
not guilty by reason of insanity for a previous rape of a ten year
old girl."2 The mental health staff who worked with Mr. Alvord
found the ethical conflicts they faced to be so upsetting that they
resolved never to participate again in the restoration of a
condemee's competency.2
The ethical objections voiced by critics of psychiatric involve-
ment in either the assessment of condemnees or their treatment to
a state of restored competency can be categorized as four different
arguments. The first type of argument equates psychiatric involve-
ment with participation in an execution. The second variety catego-
rizes involvement as a violation of normative principles of medical
ethics. The third set of arguments treats involvement as a violation
of informed consent standards. The final category criticizes psychi-
atric participation in a condemnee's competency proceedings as a
perversion of medical practice. Each of these arguments is de-
scribed below.
1. Psychiatric Involvement Constitutes Participation in an
Execution
If psychiatric involvement in execution competency proceedings
124. For example, Heilbrn and McLaren write:
"The idea that one consequence of a professional activity might be the
death of another human being can evoke confusion, guilt, [and] frustra-
tion .... A strong stomach, a thick skin, and a firm commitment to doing a
thorough job will prove useful, even necessary, for participating clinicians.
... A review of the arguments on participation, careful personal reflec-
tion, and consultation with colleagues who have done these assessments are
recommended .... Having carefully considered the arguments and his or her
own feelings at the outset, the clinician can more easily monitor ongoing feel-
ings and reactions and keep them from overly influencing the assessment."
Heilbrun & McClaren, supra note 29, at 207-08.
125. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1984) (denying the district
court's grant of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 956 (1984).
126. See Radelet & larnard, supra note 30, at 303-04.
127. Alvord v. Florida, 322 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923
(1976).
128. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 30, at 303-04 (reviewing responses of psychiatrists
and mental health staff at the institution where Alvord was being treated).
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is tantamount to assisting in an execution, then such involvement
clearly violates the ethical codes of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation.'29 Several writers interpret psychiatric assessment of exe-
cution incompetence in just this manner." Wallace, for example,
objects to psychiatrists making competency assessments because
such evaluations involve "the application of medical expertise to
induce death."' Participation in competency hearings, he be-
lieves, constitutes membership in a "tribunal" that makes "the legal
decision of readiness of the individual for death." 32 Such mem-
bership, Wallace argues, is "the ultimate form of participation" in
carrying out the prisoner's sentence to be executed.1 33 Ewing
notes that the opinions of psychiatrists often carry significant
weight in judicial hearings." 4 He argues that, for practical pur-
poses, psychologists and psychiatrists decide "whether a condemned
inmate is to live or die." 35 Sargent concurs: psychiatric evalua-
129. See AMERICAN PsYCHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 1, 4, (1989) [hereinafter
APA PRINCIPLES] (A psychiatrist may not be "a participant in a legally authorized execu-
tion.-).
130. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
131. Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for Execution: The Supreme Court Challenges
the Ethical Standards of the Mental Health Professions, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 272
(1987) (arguing that the decision of Ford v. Wainwright offends the healing ethic of the
mental health professional and proposing that psychiatrists assigned by the court to partici-
pate in the assessment of a condemnee ethically ought to demand a second psychiatrist's
opinion).
132. Id at 280. Wallace explicitly notes that he bases his choice of the word "tribunal"
generally on the plurality opinion of the Court in Ford v. Wainwright, and specifically on
Justice Powell's concurrence. Id at 266-67, 280. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
423 n.4 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[A]Ithough we need not decide the issue in this
case, the term 'State court' may well encompass an independent panel of psychiatric
experts who might both examine the defendant and determine his legal sanity."), reh'g de-
nied, Ford v. State, 522 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert.
denied sub nom. Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
133. Wallace, supra note 131, at 280.
134. See Charles P. Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal
and Ethical Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 177 n.14 (1987) (noting 'that most
state statutes require that physicians, psychiatrists and/or psychologists examine inmates
and pointing out that although sanity is a legal rather than an ethical issue, the required
presence of mental health professionals indicates that their opinions are essential to judi-
cial determinations).
135. Id, at 181 (1987). Entin points out that there may be a moral difference between
declaring, on one hand, that a death row inmate who initially claims to be insane is ac-
tually not, and, on the other hand, "certifying that a previously insane death row inmate
has regained sanity." Entin, supra note 1, at 224. In the latter situation, the prisoner has
been legally determined to be insane, has gone through psychiatric treatment, and now
awaits a reevaluation of his competence to be executed. Entin suggests that a reevaluation
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tion, in this context, asks the doctor to pronounce a prisoner "fit
for execution." l" Although the state of New York does not allow
capital punishment,l 7 its medical society recently took the step
of defining the ethical rules incumbent on physicians should capital
punishment ever be reinstated. 13  The society reiterated the cus-
tomary prohibition against physician participation in executions.
The society understood participation to include among other things
"[t]he determination of mental and physical fitness for execu-
tion."13
9
If assessment seems problematic, the treatment of the incompe-
tent condemned is, to most commentators, even more trouble-
some."4 Barbara Ward argues that a psychiatrist who treats in-
resulting in a finding of insanity by the participating psychiatrist "could be 'tantamount to
imposing a new death sentence.'" Id at 225 (quoting Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23,
at 49).
136. Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3. Elsewhere, Sargent likens the
psychiatrist's role in competency evaluations to the acts of Nazi physician Josef Mengele
("The Angel of Death"). Working in the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz, Mengele
decided which prisoners were healthy enough to work and would therefore be spared
death. See Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, HASTINGS CENT
REPORT, Dec. 1986, at 5, 6. Sargent addresses the AMA's proscription against physician
participation in execution by asking, "[b]ut what about making a diagnosis of competency
to be executed? If such a determination results in an execution that would not have taken
place otherwise, is diagnosis not also a proscribed medical act?" Id. Note that Ewing's,
Wallace's, and Sargent's argument, if correct, would apply with even more force were the
commutation-if-incompetent position of the APA/AMA Brief universally adopted. See supra
notes 131-136. Psychiatrists who found condemnees competent would not simply be losing
chances to delay executions; through giving testimony that supported a finding of compe-
tence, they would help prevent prisoners' lives from being spared.
137. See State v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (1984) (holding unconstitutional N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 60.06 because it failed to allow the sentencer to consider relevant individual cir-
cumstances, including the defendant's record and character and the circumstances sur-
rounding the offense).
138. Fred Rosner et al., Physician Involvement in Capital Punishment, 91 N.Y. STATE 3.
MED. 15, 18 (1991).
139. Physicians Participation in Capital Punishment in New York, 15 NEWSL AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., Dec. 1990, at 102.
140. The position of the Medical Society of the State of New York constitutes an ex-
ception. While its policy statement defines assessment of mental fitness as a form of
participation in executions, providing treatment to "[rielieve acute suffering of a convicted
prisoner while he is awaiting execution" is expressly permitted by the statement. Id.
Note that physicians often use the word "acute" to refer to a relatively sudden
change of condition or a condition requiring immediate intervention, in contrast to prob-
lems which may cause recurrent, intermittent, or "chronic" suffering which require
treatment over time. It is thus not clear whether this statement would permit only relative-
ly brief medical interventions or more extended courses of treatment as well. Recall that
psychiatrists felt that Michael Perry required continuous treatment with antipsychotic medi-
cation to maintain mental stability. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
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competent comdemnees helps "bring about an execution which
would not have occurred but for the treatment." 41 The APA and
the AMA distinguish psychiatric assessment from treatment of the
death row inmate who is already insane. 42 They argue that,
when testifying for the state in a criminal proceeding, the assess-
ment findings of a forensic psychiatrist are subject to adversarial
cross-examination and evidentiary refutation. Treatment of the
already insane condemnees, on the other hand, demands that psy-
chiatrists use their therapeutic skills "to maintain [their patient's]
competence so that [the] patient may be executed."143 Treatment
of the incompetent condemned, the AMA and the APA conclude,
is "only a small step away from participating in the execution
itself."1" Some commentators suggest that the physician could be
considered directly responsible for the inmate's death. After all,
there is but a negligible chance that the inmate, once sane, will
"articulate a heretofore unknown reason for a stay of execu-
tion ... ." thus, "[n]o intervening acts ... will prevent the execu-
tion that the physician.., made possible." '145 Because the psy-
chiatrist knows that execution is made possible by treatment, the
distinction between treatment and execution would be "meaning-
less.'"
141. Ward, supra note 23, at 85 (emphasis added). See also id. at 99 ("Modem medical
technology may now enable us to cure someone with medication and thereby send him to
the electric chair when a century ago he would have been incurable and would have
spent the remainder of his life in prisons or hospitals.").
142. APAIAMA Brief, supra note 38, at 17 n.19.
143. la
144. Id at 17.
145. Salguero, supra note 58, at 178 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 178 n.64. In fact, Salguero argues that treatment is tantamount to murder
An analogy can be made to the doctrine of causality in the criminal law with
regard to homicide. This doctrine is expressed in the MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.03 (1985), which states: "Conduct is the cause of a result when: (a) it is an
antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occure....-
Murder is defined as "purposely or knowingly" causing the death of another
human being, according to the MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.2 (1985). In
turn, this intent requirement is satisfied when death was within the purpose or
the contemplation of the actor.
Salguero, supra note 58, at 177 (citations omitted). Cf. Phillipa Foot, Ethics and the
Death Penalty: Participation by Forensic Psychiatrists in Capital Trials, in ETHIcAL
PRACrICE IN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (Richard Rosner & Robert Weinstock eds., 1990)
207, at 209 ("The psychiatrist knows that if he gives an honest opinion . .. he may, in
effect, be bringing about the death of a person whom he has examined and perhaps even
treated." [emphasis added]).
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2. Participation Violates Normative Principles of Medical Ethics
Critics' second major argument is that psychiatric participation
in execution competency proceedings violates normative principles
of medical practice.
For example, the principles of beneficence, autonomy, and
avoiding killing are among the normative principles involved in
psychiatric association with execution proceedings. The principle of
beneficence, that a physician should relieve suffering, would be
violated if the psychiatrist facilitates the state's execution process.
The principle of autonomy, that a physician's choices cannot over-
ride the patient's choices, would be violated if the psychiatrist
treated the inmate to retore competency against the inmate's will.
Finally, the principle of avoiding killing would be violated because
the psychiatrist's role in execution proceedings may cause the
offender's death. 47
Historically, competency was required at the time of execution
so that, among other things, the prisoner would suffer in anticipa-
tion of his death. '48 This goal seems antithetical to medicine's
traditional objective of relieving suffering. Sargent argues that
restoring the condemned to competency violates the physician's
obligation to assist "the patient to do what the patient wants to do
within the constraints of the law."' 49  He joins Radelet and
Barnard in believing that competency-restoring treatment would be
non-beneficial, harmful, and cruel.'S°
Some critics of psychiatric participation feel that, "fundamental
ethical principles of the[] healing professions" ' s prohibit assess-
ment and treatment, even if these principles do not explicitly pro-
hibit participation. Traditional norms also suggest that physicians
are duty-bound to act beneficently and nonmaleficently, to do no
harm, to preserve life, to promote health, and to alleviate suffer-
ing."' A state-employed psychiatrist, in particular, may be caught
147. See Salguero, supra note 58 at 168; see generally ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY
OF MEDICAL ETHICS 141-290 (1981).
148. See, e.g., Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 39-40; Henry Weihofen, A Ques-
tion of Justice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A. J. 651, 652 (1951).
149. Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3.
150. Compare id. ('That isn't the proper business of physicians - to go around killing
people or assisting people to kill people.") with Radelet & Barnard, supra, note 23, at 49
("[S]uccessfuxl treatment means the patient will die. This is a use of the state's limited
treatment resources that some [people] will find especially outrageous.").
151. Ewing, supra note 134, at 183.
152. See, e.g., id.; Salguero, supra note 58, at 168 ("The physician is bound by a fun-
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both ethically and legally between a rock and a hard place: where
refusing to treat incompetent condemnees could increase their suf-
fering, treating them could lead to their death." Ewing believes
that psychiatrists faced with these alternatives should withhold
treatment from an incompetent condemned inmate because the
ultimate purpose of such treatment "is not to heal or relieve suffer-
ing of that inmate, but to enable the state to take the inmate's
life. " "l Salguero takes the argument one step further: physicians
best serve society by placing the welfare of individuals ahead of
the state's interest in punishment. 55
damental ethical principle to do no harm and preserve life."). See also VEATCH, supra
note 147 at 22 (1981) ("Those who have stood in . . . [the Hippocratic] tradition are
committed to producing good for their patient and to protecting that patient from harm.").
153. For a discussion of the ethical position a psychiatrist faces when administering
antipsychotic drugs for nonmedical purposes, see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
222-23 n.8 (1990) ("[Wle will not assume that physicians will prescribe these drugs for
reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the patients; indeed, the ethics of the medical
profession are to the contrary .... This consideration supports our interpretation of the
state's policy as ensuring that antipsychotic medication will be administered only in those
cases where appropriate by medical standards."); APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 16
("[W]hen the State's purpose in medicating someone involuntarily has no connection to
either a parens patriae or dangerous principle, the directive to medicate creates an excru-
ciating ethical dilemma for treating physicians."). See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 107 (1976) ("[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners con-
stitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977).
154. Ewing, supra note 134, at 183.
155. Salguero, supra note 58, at 182.
Along similar lines, the American Psychiatric Association previously endorsed the
view that "a psychiatrist's primary obligation is to look out for the examinee's best inter-
ests even when they conflict with those of society." Ward, supra note 23, at 94 (citing
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 7
(1984)). However, the APA's position may have changed given its amicus brief for the
Perry case. There, the APA stated that a competency evaluation would not violate the
duty to do no harm because there is "no treatment relationship. Instead, the psychiatrist is
acting as a consultant in the adversary process, providing a professional evaluation that is
frequently subject to cross-examination or to refutation by contrary evidence." APA/AMA
Brief, supra note 38, at 17 n.19.
Appelbaum offers an eloquent elaberation of this position. He asks, "if psychiatrists
are committed to doing good and avoiding harm, how can they participate in legal pro-
ceedings from which harm may result?" Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 250. He
argues that "the evaluative function that forensic psychiatrists perform" is such that the
forensic psychiatrist in truth "does not act as a physician," but as someone who applies
"psychiatric expertise in legal contexts." Id. at 252 (emphasis added). Thus, "the argu-
ment that the principle of nonmaleficence will be violated if [psychiatric testimony yields]
harm[ful] results to the evaluee is irrelevant." Id. at 257. In treating an incompetent
condemnee, however, a psychiatrist would be acting as a physician, and thus should give
primacy to ethical principles of beneficience and non-maleficence. Appelbaum leaves open
the question of whether these principles would prohibit treatment, but emphasizes that "the
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3. Participation Violates the Right to Informed Consent
A third criticism of psychiatric participation is that it might
require psychiatrists to violate traditional standards of informed
consent. The APA instructs psychiatrists to begin competency eval-
uations with a full description of "the nature and purpose and lack
of confidentiality of the examination." se Moreover, it is arguable
that evaluations of execution competency require the same level of
voluntariness of consent as evaluations of competency to stand
trial.157 But as Ward points out, "a true incompetent will not un-
basis on which the question of treatment must be decided is clear: does treatment satisfy
the demands of beneficence and nonmaleficence?" Id. Salguero concurs: "[l]n performing
an evaluation, the role of the physician as a healer is not necessarily implicated ....
Further,... a diagnosis of incompetency presents the life-affirming possibility of a stay
of execution." Salguero, supra note 58, at 177.
There are several problems with this position, three of which deserve mention here.
First, "competency" is not a diagnosis, but a legal conclusion that courts, not physicians,
reach. The diagnoses that psychiatrists properly render, and about which they inform
courts, refer to medical conditions (such as schizophrenia). See infra notes 180-83 and
accompanying text.
A second problem derives from the contention that a psychiatrist who conducts a
forensic psychiatric evaluation is not acting as a physician. It simply strains credulity to
assert that a physician who interviews someone concerning symptoms, who assesses, and
who makes a diagnosis is acting as anything other than a physician. Indeed, Salguero's
argument itself actually invokes physicianly obligation - "preserving an inmate's life," by
justifying certain competency evaluations if there is hope of finding evidence of incompe-
tence, on the grounds that the evaluation would preserve the inmate's life. Id Salguero
might respond that there is an important distinction between physicians' acting as evalua-
tors and physicians' acting as healers. Foot's response is instructive: We should 'be wary
of arguments of those who seem to believe that a new role can be created by a differ-
ence of purpose, as if the legitimacy of setting aside the principle of nonmalificence were
not exactly what is in question. ... In spite of the other things that they are called on
to do, psychiatrists and other doctors must surely be seen primarily as healers, with
primum non nocere as their guiding light." Foot, supra note 146, at 210.
The third problem results from a failure to examine the notion of "harm" in context.
The maxim primum non nocere ("rust, do no harm") is usually invoked in customary
medical contexts, where the harms to be avoided are side effects or other adverse medical
events. Punishment is not a medical outcome and thus its implications for treatment deci-
sionmaking may require a different analysis.
156. APA PRINCIPLES, supra note 129, § 4 5. See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note
19, at § 7-3.6 (recommending that both defense counsel and the evaluating mental health
professional advise defendant of the purposes of the examination); DECLARATION OF HA-
wAuIfil (approved by the General Assembly of the World Psychiatric Association July 10,
1983), 1 WPA BULL. 23 (1989) ("If and when a relationship is established for purposes
other than therapeutic, such as in forensic psychiatry, its nature must be thoroughly ex-
plained to the person concerned.").
157. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466-69 (1981) (holding that, under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a prisoner must consent to a psychiatric evaluation before
the information can be used against him or her in court).
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derstand the process, nature, purpose, or consequences of an insani-
ty evaluation."
158
Treatment of the incompetent condemned appears even more
problematic. Restoring a defendant's competency to stand trial -
even over his objection - helps him pursue legal remedies such as
assisting in his defense.15 9 In this manner the government exercis-
es its parens patriae power through the psychiatrist to assist the
defendant-patient." However, arguably the condemned incompe-
tent has no interest in having his competency restored. According
to this argument, the principle of parens patriae should not ap-
ply. 6' In Salguero's words, "[t]he state is asking the physician to
treat an unwilling individual in order to change him to meet the
will of society , [sic] which is especially repugnant to medical
ethics."' 62 Bonnie imaginesthea situation of an incompetent pris-
oner, who, while competent, stated had that he would prefer to
stay insane rather than provide his consent to be treated. Bonnie
concludes:
In light of the prisoner's unequivocal preference for life, I
158. Ward, supra note 23, at 77.
159. Wallace, supra note 131, at 273-74 ("The treating mental health professional may
find some consolation that the use of professional skills at trial. . . allows the defendant
to pursue avialable legal remedies" (citations omitted)); see APA/AMA Brief, supra note
38, at 10-11 n.12 C(Mhe benefits of medication ...may be vital to the defendant's
ability to assist in his defense....). Cf. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, § 7-4.10
cmt. at 223 C(Mreatment is for the benefit of the criminal justice system ....- ).
160. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Perry v. Loui-
siana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120) (arguing that the sovereign has historically had
general custody and care for the insane (citing 3 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*247)).
161. See Wallace, supra note 131, at 276 (This situation is quite unlike the use of
medical skills to prolong the life of the terminally ill."). See also APA/AMA Brief, supra
note 38, at 9-10 ("It strains credulity to invoke the parens patriae power in this case.
Louisiana's efforts are aimed not at benefiting Perry as a ward of-the the State, but rath-
er at facilitating his death to serve separate state interests."). But see Heilbrun et al.,
supra note 40, at 597 (between 1972 and 1990, 1078 prisoners were removed from death
row;, "[t]he capacity to work with counsel on collateral appeals is thus more important
than it might seem") citing data from Death Row, USA (NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Jan, 21, 1991).
162. Saiguero, supra note 58, at 181. Note that psychiatrists are by no means invariably
opposed to treating patients involuntarily "to meet the will of society," id, so long as
they agree with society's will. See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb, Will We Save the Homeless
Mentally Ill?, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 649, 650 (1990) CIf homeless persons with major
mental illness are incompetent to make a decision with regard to accepting treatment ...
then I believe that outreach teams including psychiatrists should bring all of these patients
to hospitals, involuntarily if need be.").
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
see no way to justify treating the patient on the ground
that it is beneficial to him. If the prisoner is to be treated,
it will be for the sole purpose of serving the state's interest
in carrying out the execution ....
...Because the clinician's actions no longer have any
link to the prisoner's own interests... the clinician would
be serving a role that is ethically indistinguishable from the
physician who administers the lethal injection of barbitu-
rates. 
163
4. Participation is a Perversion of Psychiatric Practice
A fourth objection to psychiatric participation in execution
competency proceedings is that such participation constitutes an
immoral or perversion of psychiatric practice. Although this argu-
ment is often not regarded as distinct from the previous three argu-
ments, it nonetheless deserves individual consideration.
The Ford decision necessarily entangles psychiatrists in a high-
ly visible, symbolically-charged facet of the American criminal
justice system.1" Dr. Appelbaum suggests that the judiciary has
evinced "the universal desire for someone else to make the hard
decisions" 65 by increasing the use of psychiatric testimony in the
capital sentencing process. The psychiatrist's traditional therapeutic
role is to help others gain insight and make hard decisions. How-
ever, Appelbaum concludes, the demand for psychiatrists to play a
key role in sentencing decisions "may be serving as a substitute for
some hard thinldng about the purpose of punishment, and particu-
163. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85.
164. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986) (requiring neutral profession-
als to provide testimony as evidence of competency for execution), reh'g denied, Ford v.
State, 522 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom.
Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). "There can be little doubt that there will be
widespread dissemination of information about the actions of psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists in cases of incompetency for execution. The avid public interest in death penalty
cases, fueled by intense media scrutiny, is a potentially volatile situation." Heilbrun, et al.,
supra note 40, at 600.
For extensive reviews of the symbolic aspect of death penalty litigation, see
Barefoot's Ake, supra note 1, at 91 nn.1-3, passim ("There can be no question as to the
symbolic significance of capital punishment as a political, sociological or penological
issue, either historically or contemporaneously." Id at n.2); Doctrinal Abyss, supra note 1,
at 88-97 (arguing that the ambiguity of the Court's treatment of insane criminal defen-
dants reflects the public's ambivalence toward the psychological and social symbols in-
voked by mental incompetence and crime generally).
165. Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 762.
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larly about the role of the death sentence in the modem
world."1" Normal psychiatric practice is perverted when it allows
courts and society-at-large to avoid their responsibilities.
Several commentators urge psychiatrists not to participate in
execution competency proceedings because in doing so a psychia-
trist is taking on the criminal justice system's burden and thus
reinforcing society's ambivalence toward the death penalty. At the
American Psychiatric Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, Dr.
Appelbaum told listeners that psychiatric participation in execution
competency proceedings would give capital punishment an unde-
served "scientific veneer," and would tell society, "we'll do your
dirty work.., and this will make you all feel better."167 Others
criticize participation because they fear that a psychiatric presence
legitimizes the death penalty,"e or may aid society's "attempt to
improve the image of execution by cloaking it in the aura of medi-
cine."1" Arguably, psychiatric input is not required to determine
execution competency. Consequently, for retribution to be mean-
ingful, society, in the form of a jury,' 7° should evaluate the pris-
oner and make the ultimate determination of execution competen-
cy. 1
7 1
B. Critique of Arguments Against Participation
In sum, critics of psychiatric involvement in execution compe-
166. Id. See also Judge David L. Bazelon, Veils, Values, and Social Responsibility, Ad-
dress before the American Psychological Association, (August 24, 1981), in 37 Am. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 115, 118 (1982) (Stating "Public decisions are often so close to impossible
that those who are charged with making them are more than anxious to pass their burden
to unwitting experts" and arguing that the social expectations placed on mental health pro-
fessionals by the judiciary may lead the testifying professionals to make unfounded
conclusory statements).
167. Hansman, supra note 33, at 15, 21.
168. See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 46-47 (arguing that the official creation
of professional standards for execution competency will legitimize 'the whole process as
well as the death penalty itseli").
169. Barbara Bolsen, Strange Bedfellows: Death Penalty and Medicine, 248 JAMA 518,
519 (1982) (restating the opinion of Dr. Annand Stuart, medical director of the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections).
170. See Ewing, supra note 134, at 184 & n.57 ("Although the law has given mental
experts considerable responsibility for helping decide legal questions raised by crazy be-
havior, experts have less competence to assist in these decisions than is commonly be-
lieved. Moreover, much of the factual knowledge necessary for legal decisionmaking is
accessible to lay observers as well as experts.") (quoting Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behav-
ior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527,
602 (1978)); Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3.
171. Ward, supra note 23, at 89.
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tency assessment and psychiatric treatment restoring competency
assert arguments equating involvment with participation in the
execution, categorizing participation as contrary to principles of
medical ethics, treating participation as a violation of informed
consent standards, and criticizing participation as tainting the public
perception of the practice of medicine."7 Although these argu-
ments are plentiful, they are internally inconsistent and they contra-
dict our intuitions about proper conduct in other scenarios.
1. Psychiatric Involvement Does Not Constitute Participation in
Executions
By equating assessment or treatment of a condemned inmate
with participation in an execution, those opposed to these activities
over-state their case. Unlike administering a lethal injection, assess-
ing or treating psychosis does not directly cause death. The direct
causes of death in executions are those actions that physically
cause death, such as injecting the barbiturate or throwing the
switch on the electric chair. To argue that assessment or treatment
is an indirect cause of a convict's death - the "but for" argu-
ment"7  - would impugn a host of other commonly accepted fo-
rensic activities. These activities include testifying for the prosecu-
tion in a capital case174 and giving competency-restoring treat-
172. See supra notes 129-71 and accompanying text.
173. Cf. supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Ward, supra note 23, at 85
(arguing that the psychiatrist has assisted in an execution which would not have occurred
but for the treatment); Salguero, supra note 58, at 177 (suggesting that the but-for test is
an appropriate measure of causation). It seems odd to label customary medical treatment
for psychosis as the 'proximate cause' of a condemned prisoner's execution when it takes
a subsequent series of well-planned preparations and acts to effect a death penalty. By
contrast, to say that "but for his having committed a crime, psychiatric treatment would
have enabled the prisoner to resume a normal life" correctly focuses on the criminal's
responsibility for what are, in his case, the implications of treatment.
174. Bonnie makes this very point:
[Plarticipation in capital sentencing evaluations does not, in itself, offend any
ethical injunction, and the pertinent question ... is whether there is a princi-
pled basis for declining to perform execution competency evaluations while
participating in the capital sentencing process.
Both types of evaluation provide information and opinion ... that could
condemn or spare the prisoner. What seems to differentiate the two contexts is
the immediacy of the link between the evaluator's opinion and the decision
whether the person being evaluated will live or die ....
The emotional impact of this contextual difference cannot be doubted,
but I do not see its ethical significance. Indeed, ... the case against participa-
tion in a capital sentencing evaluation actually would seem to be stronger than
the case against participation in a routine execution competency evaluation.
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ment to a patient accused of a capital crime. 5 Many psychia-
trists regard these actions as ethical, even though death, although
not the purpose of the activity, certainly is "within ... the con-
templation of the actor."176 The indirect-execution argument might
also preclude ever treating a condemned inmate, even though his
execution is years away, since that treatment could prevent the
development of incompetence that would preclude execution.177
In... a sentencing proceeding, ... the expert's opinion may very well in-
crease the likelihood that the defendant will be sentenced to death. i... a
competency evaluation.., the expert can alter the prisoner's situation only by
extending his life.
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 80-81. Appelbaum agrees: "Mhe immediacy and degree of
harm to which the prisoner is subject heighten ethical concerns. But this may simply be a
case of being closer to the consequences of one's actions." Appelbaum's Parable, supra
note 17, at 257.
175. The parens patriae justification for giving an incompetent defendant treatment is
that the potential risk of recovering and being convicted is balanced by the potential
benefit of medication (e.g., being able to assist in one's defense and perhaps gain acquit-
tal). See APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 10-11 n.12 (discussing the balance of risks
and benefits associated with treatment of defendants). "Whether a particular treatment is in
a particular patient's medical interests, however, is always a question involving consider-
ation of risks and benefits. There may well be room for debate about that balance . . .
AL at 10. Few physicians, however, would think it proper to refrain from treating a pa-
tient with the intent of helping him avoid being tried, particularly if the patient desired
treatment.
The "immediacy" argument raised by Bonnie in connection with competency assess-
ments would seem to apply here as well: the psychological meaning of treating someone
who might be punished in the next few weeks seems greater than in the case where pun-
ishment may be years away, but ethically, the problem is identical.
176. Salguero, supra note 58, at 177; cf. supra note 124.
177. Appelbaum comments:
Does not any effort at treatment remove a potential obstacle to execution? I
think this argument fails since the evidence suggests that only a tiny percentage
of prisoners will become severely ill enough to meet the generally strict stan-
dards for incompetence. Thus, the balance of risks and benefits is very different
for a prisoner for whom the question of incompetence has not been raised, but
who may be in need of psychiatric care.
Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 257 (emphasis added).
There are three problems with Appelbaum's counter-argument. First, many, though
not all, efforts at treatment will remove potential obstacles to execution. Although psychia-
trists who treat condemned inmates may not know in advance which of their patients will
become incompetent, they do know that for some inmates their treatment will prevent
deterioration and thus be "responsible" for their execution. There seems to be no less
reason for criticizing psychiatrists who work under these circumstances, and who know
that they are making sure inmates do not get crazy enough to avoid execution, than there
is for terming psychiatrists who treat those judged incompetent for execution "the agents
of that punishment." L at 258.
Second, Appelbaum does not cite any evidence. While it is true that the question of
execution competency has been raised for relatively few convicts, this may reflect the
inadequacy of defense counsel usually afforded the mentally ill, rather than the true inci-
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Assessment and treatment should be further distinguished from
participation because they are neither performed for the purpose of
executing the prisoner, nor are they the reason for his death. If a
prisoner has been justly tried, and if capital punishment itself is
justified, then the reason for execution is that the prisoner was
found guilty of a crime and must be punished.178 Assessment and
treatment of the condemned serve the same purposes and offer the
same potential benefits as they do for other patients: restoring
sanity, relieving the torment of mental illness, and helping patients
cope rationally with their situation. These medical benefits to the
condemned inmate are not negated by one of the non-medical con-
sequences of sanity - eligibility for execution - though they may
be less welcome than they are for more typical patients. Moreover,
dence of serious mental disorders among death row inmates. See Michael L. Perlin, Are
Courts Competent to Decide Competency: Stripping the Facade from United States v.
Charters, 38 KAN. L. REV. 957, 996 (1990) (noting the generally "scandalous" quality of
legal assistance provided to the mentally ill), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); cf
Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 126 (1991) ("Traditionally, lawyers assigned to
represent state hospital patients have failed miserably in their mission"). See also supra
notes 54-56 (discussing rates of severe mental illness among condemned prisoners).
Third, even if the majority of death row inmates are not likely to develop mental
disorders severe enough to render them incompetent for execution, psychiatrists may be
able to recognize a sub-group of inmates whose medical histories or presenting symptoms
make the possibility of execution incompetence quite high. Michael Perry would appear to
be a case in point: even the trial court recognized his competency was -achieved through
the use of... antipsychotic drugs." APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 4 (quoting Pet.
App. 62). For prisoners like Perry, the "risk" of being treated and remaining sane are
clear long before the scheduled execution date. As Professor Bonnie explains:
As legal challenges for death row prisoners proceed through the courts,
those who are mentally ill become well known to the mental health profession-
als responsible for providing services. As a prisoner's likely execution draws
near, the potential legal significance of his questionable competency - and the
enabling effect of continued treatment - will be apparent, even in the absence
of any formal adjudication. Thus, ethical objections to treatment can arise in
many cases other than those in which the condemned prisoners have been ad-
judicated incompetent for execution - indeed, the problem is discernible when-
ever a death row prisoner becomes psychotic. The slope of the "no treatment"
argument is very slippery indeed.
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 84-85.
178. Cf Salguero, supra note 58, at 178, n.64: "On its face, the purpose of treatment is
to cure the patient, and the consequence of the care is to enable to state to execute.
However, ... the distinction [between purpose and consequence] is meaningless." Even if
the first sentence were correct, it is not clear why the distinction is meaningless. The law
does not authorize the state to execute someone because he is competent, but because he
has been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. Execution is a consequence
of criminal conviction and of nothing else.
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these benefits are not necessarily outweighed by the prospect of
execution.
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2. Normative Principles of Medical Ethics Do Not Prohibit
Psychiatric Participation
Ethical codes often provide physicians with general behavioral
directives (e.g., "preserve life," "alleviate suffering," "do no harm")
which are useful in the typical medical contexts in which they
were developed, but which may fail physicians who attempt to
apply them in novel circumstances."a To use a well-worn exam-
ple, the exhortation to "preserve life," which has guided and in-
spired modem physicians for two centuries,"' is no longer an
adequate guide to late twentieth-century decisionmaking, when
medical technology enables physicians to indefinitely prolong the
agony-filled lives of terminally-ill patients."8
179. See infra text accompanying notes 305-26.
180. Veatch argues that, in general, physicians will go astray if they simplistically -ap-
peal to some parochial set of ethical rules or code of ethics to decide what is morally
right in any medical ethical dilemma." VEATcH, supra note 147, at 74 (emphasis added).
What Veatch terms "the dangerous Hippocratic principle," id. at 147, which simply pre-
scribes benefiting patients, is consequentialistic, paternalistic, and individualistic. Id. More-
over this principle lacks validity because it "has never involved pledges or promises made
with or accepted by those outside the professional group." Id. at 90. Veatch utilizes con-
tract theory to establish a sounder foundation for medical ethics. Id. at 108-38. Veatch's
theory recognizes that physicians and patients "are members of a common moral commu-
nity of responsible people endowed with reason, dignity, and equality of moral worth." Id.
at 327. In thus placing respect for individuals' humanity and autonomy at the center of
his conceptualization of ethical issues, Veatch's arguments correspond closely to those of
this paper, infra, Part IV, concerning the justification of punishment.
181. "The Hippocratic Oath does not require a physician to use his skill to preserve
life. It does require the Hippocratic physician to avoid giving 'a deadly drug to anybody
if asked for it,' but that is certainly quite different." VEATCH, supra note 147, at 166.
The notion that physicians have a duty to preserve life seems connected with ideas of
progress that gained prominence by the seventeenth century. See Amundsen, The
Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty without Classical Roots, 8
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23, 28 (August, 1978) (noting that the duty to preserve life was not
developed until the seventeenth century); GERALD J. GRUMAN, A HISTORY OF IDEAS
ABOUT THE PROLONGATION OF LIFE 83-90 (1966) (discussing the contemporaneous devel-
opment of the duty to preserve life and the progress of the eighteenth century).
182. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDI-
CINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAIN-
ING TREATMENT (1983) (suggesting that the changing context of death and dying in the
modem age requires a different moral framework). Many commentators would suggest that
holding the preservation of life to be an absolute duty was never a satisfactory guide to
decisionmaking. See, eg., Talcott Parsons et al., The "Gift of Life' and Its Reciprocation,
39 Soc. RES. 367, 395 (1972) (arguing that traditional medical ethics has tended toward
"absolutizing . .. the value of preserving life" which has "strongly insulated medical
ethics from any ethical system or complex that did not place a commensurate emphasis
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In the context of capital punishment generally, the directive to
"preserve life" could be read as asking physicians to interfere with
the determination or imposition of death sentences whenever they
have an opportunity to do so. In the particular context of execution
competency, such interference could take the form of testifying
falsely that a convict is incompetent, or of manipulating medical
treatment so as to delay recovery from psychosis. The knowledge
that physicians would behave in these ways would undoubtedly
give prosecutors and prison officials ample incentive to limit
doctors' activities in legal arenas. But leaving this consequence
aside, for physicians to feel that their professional ethics afford a
special justification for interfering with the execution of the law in
ways that other citizens may not would be arrogant.
183
upon the value of preserving life"); VEATCH, supra note 147, at 169 (The putative duty
always to preserve life lacks a broad moral consensus, and "either reduces to a more
general Hippocratic principle of benefiting the patient" or is "a careless expression of a
more narrow and sophisticated role-specific duty ... to avoid knowingly and actively
killing human beings."). For example, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985) involved
the decision to remove a nasogastric (feeding) tube from an eighty-four year old terminal-
ly ill woman who suffered from severe organic brain syndrome, urinary tract infection,
gangrene, and arteriosclerotic heart disease. Id. at 1217. It was only through technology
that the woman's life was extended at all. However, the physician still faced ethical con-
cerns; obviously the goals of alleviating suffering and preserving life clashed mightily.
183. One might raise the point that the duty to preserve life - like other physicianly
duties - is activated only by the establishment of a doctor-patient relationship, which
does not obtain in forensic contexts: "psychiatrists operate outside the medical framework
when they enter the forensic realm." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 258. "When
professionals function as either evaluators or consultants, they establish no therapeutic or
habilitative relationship with defendants and thus owe them no loyalty." ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 19, at Standard 7-7.1 cmt. Even if psychiatrists are in fact outside the medical
framework and do not establish therapeutic relationships with evaluees, psychiatrists are
not precluded from seeking out relationships with defendants and prisoners with the intent
of saving lives, even if they interfere with legal outcomes by doing so. Thus some clini-
cians, for example, will conduct capital sentencing evaluations only for the defense, with
the intent of finding mitigating evidence. Cf. Foot, supra note 146, at 216 (suggesting
that psychiatrists might "work against capital punishment from the inside"). My purpose is
not to criticize these clinicians, but to point out that the urge to use one's clinical prow-
ess to preserve life frequently enters the minds of clinicians who engage in forensic activ-
ities.
Were the APA/AMA Brief's commutation-if-incompetent position adopted, see supra
text at notes 110-15, psychiatrists who wished to work in opposition to the death penalty
would have an enormous temptation to seek opportunities to testify that condemnees ae
incompetent; the duty to "preserve life" - if accepted at face value - would appear to
place all psychiatrists under enormous pressure to find reasons to suggest that prisoners
are incompetent. The potential conflict between the duty to preserve life and the duty to
tell the truth in court would be at least as troublesome as the ethical conflicts faced by
psychiatrists whose treatment might restore execution competency. Even if one felt that
psychiatrists were not obligated to individual prisoners with whom they have evaluative,
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Ewing and Wallace conclude from their reading of the codes of
conduct that professional organizations should officially declare
most involvement in execution competency proceedings to be un-
ethical.'" But if the psychiatrist refuses to evaluate a prisoner, he
forfeits a chance to preserve life.
The ethical codes' outcome-oriented prescriptions appear to
conflict with one another."l Codes of ethics direct physicians to
preserve life, avoid harm, heal the sick, and prevent suffering.
They do not answer the question of which is more harmful, treat-
ing psychotic condemned inmates with the knowledge that they
could then be executed, or leaving them psychotic for months or
years. The codes give no guidance as to how they apply when
healing the sick and preventing suffering may not preserve life.
Psychiatrists who use only the codes' directives to choose a course
of action "cannot make an ethical choice.""'
Assessment and treatment of incompetent condemned prisoners
are not clear violations of professional codes of ethics. Codified
directives often may produce laudable results in "typical" circum-
stances in which physicians find themselves. These directives are
ill-suited to prescribe psychiatrists' behavior in atypical doctor-
patient relationships, as when the patient is an incompetent
condemnee. In the novel or atypical context, the psychiatrist must
but not treatment, relationships, the APAIAMA Briefs argument about the desirability of
regarding psychiatrists as practitioners of a beneficent healing art would provide the basis
for psychiatrists' having a moral obligation to prisoners in general APA/AMA Brief,
supra note 38, at 13. This general moral obligation would only be satisfied by finding
condemnees incompetent The Brief's position thus seems to entail physicians' working to
subvert the capital punishment process.
Clinicians unambiguously have advocated subverting strict civil commitment laws
when these would prevent involuntary hospitalization of someone who very much needs
this type of care. See, eg., Louis McGarry & Paul Chodoff, The Ethics of Involuntary
Hospitalization, in SIDNEY BLOCH & PAUL CHODOFP, PSYCHIATRIC ETmcs 203, 211-212
(1981) (suggesting that psychiatrists not "acced[e] too readily to current trends" nor "suc-
cumb to prevailing fashion when they are convinced that it is not always in the best
interests of those patients"); see also R. Michael Bagby & E. Leslie Atidnson, The Effects
of Legislative Reform on Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 45, 58 (noting that there is little evidence to suggest that psychiatrists
adhere to tightened commitment requirements; some psychiatrists ignore restrictive laws
and commit those "whom they believe should be committed").
184. See Ewing, supra note 134, at 185 (recommending that the American Psychiatric
Association prohibit members from treating or assessing condemned prisoners); Wallace,
supra note 131 at 278 (arguing that professional organizations should explicitly deem un-
ethical any member's treatment or asessment of persons sentenced to capital punishment).
185. Salguero, supra note 58, at 168.
186. Id.
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make an effort to abstract general principles187 of conduct to
guide decisionmaking and to explain, for example, why physicians
are often obligated to alleviate suffering and preserve life, yet
sometimes obligated not to do so. For example, a cancer patient
may prefer to endure pain rather than be unconscious from pain
medication so that he may put his affairs in order during the last
weeks of his life. An AIDS patient may wish to forego life-pro-
longing respirations and drugs in order to die a peaceful death. In
these situations it is clear that the physician's primary obligation is
to do other than relieve suffering or save lives.
Physicians are dedicated to, and have special skills to under-
take, healing and life-saving activities. But ethical directives to
alleviate pain or save lives are always limited by the prior context
of a doctor-patient relationship. Without the relationship, in this
and all other medical contexts, individuals have a fundamental right
to be left alone."'8
3. Participation Does Not Violate Informed Consent
The physician's contractual duty to the patient is normally
created when the patient gives informed consent. Usually these
contractual agreements between doctor and patient create a duty on
the part of the doctor to perform activities for the patient who
seeks their benefit."9 When dealing with an incompetent con-
denmed prisoner, however, the psychiatrist must infer what the
reasonable prisoner would want in order to determine what duties
accompany the relationship."9
187. The process is analogous to Dworkin's description of how an ideal judge would
decide hard cases. See RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 81, 105-130
(1977) (suggesting that an ideal judge would decide difficult cases by initially constructing
broad legal theories). For a neurologically-based account of how general theories, explana-
tions, and moral principles are developed from a series of particular experiences, see PAUL
S. CHURCHLAND, A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE, 153-230, 297-303 (1989).
188. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (N.Y. 1914)
(holding that the doctor's duty to the patient supersedes the duty to uphold the Hippocrat-
ic Oath); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding the
patient's right to accept or refuse treatment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
189. See Robert M. Veatch, Models for Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, 2
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5, 7 (June 1972) (discussing the contract model of doctor-
patient relationships). See also VEATCH, supra note 147, at 108-30, 327-30 (proposing a
draft for a nested "triple contract" to guide the creation and boundaries of physician-pa-
tient relationship).
190. Cf. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (describing the "reasonable patient" standard of
informed consent).
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Professor Bonnie emphasizes the importance of sensitivity to
the patient's wishes in a scenario exploring the ethics of treating
the incompetent condemned.191 This scenario suggests that psychi-
atric practice might be perverted most by a position that absolutely
forbids treatment. Bonnie asks us to "consider the possibility of a
'living will' in which the condemned prisoner - contemporaneous-
ly determined to be competent - states that if he becomes incom-
petent while awaiting execution, he wishes to be treated."192 To
categorically reject a competent prisoner's requests for treatment
would deprive him of his autonomy "and thereby erase[] [his]
human dignity."" Bonnie offers as plausible motivations for a
prisoner's request for treatment the prisoner's preference for death
over the ravages of psychosis. Some prisoners prefer execution to
life-long imprisonment following commutation." In addition, it
is not difficult to imagine a treatment request being made by a
prisoner who accepts his guilt and deems execution his just desert. 195
191. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 83.
192. Id
193. Id. at 84.
194. Id. at 83. Bonnie's discussion here assumes the existence of a clause such as that
existing in Maryland, which calls for commutation of death sentences when condemuees
are found incompetent to be executed. See supra note 109. Gary Gilmore was one person
who preferred execution to imprisonment. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
Convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a hotel clerk, id., he found execution
preferable to imprisonment. .See NORMAN MAILER, TM EXECUTIONER'S SONG 484 (1979).
He told a Mormon chaplain of his preference for execution, stating "I'll be honest with
you. rve been in for eighteen years and I'm not about to do another twenty. Rather than
live in this hole, I'd choose to be dead." Id. But see infra note 195 (quoting Gilmore's
statement that his punishment was proper and was the result of a fair trial).
Gilmore instructed his attorneys, who believed they had strong grounds upon which
to mount an appeal, to forego any appeal of his death sentence. MAILR, infra at 489.
He explained, "I've been here for three weeks and I don't know that I want to live here
for the rest of my life ... ." Id. Gilmore fired his counsel and withdrew his motion for
a new trial. Id. He continued to resist efforts to postpone or vacate his death sentence,
and was ultimately executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. Id.
195. Socrates provides an important historical example; see infra note 247 and accom-
panying text. Gary Gilmore may represent another such case. In speaking to the Justices
of the Utah Supreme Court in November, 1976, he stated:
Your Honor, I don't want to take up a lot of your time with my words.
I believe I was given a fair trial and I think the sentence is proper and I am
willing to accept it like a man. I don't wish to appeal .... I desire to be
executed on schedule, and I just wish to accept that with the grace and dignity
of a man ....
MA R, supra note 194, at 534. See also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976)
("Mhe Court is convinced that Gary Mark Gilmore made a knowing and intelligent waiv-
er of any and all federal rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sen-
tence was imposed.. . ."). Of course, only a minority of convicts view their punishment
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One possible counterargument is that problems in obtaining
proper consent arise in many other forensic situations without re-
sulting in prohibitions against psychiatric participation. It seems
appropriate for psychiatrists to respond to calls for execution com-
petency evaluations in the same way they do in these other cir-
cumstances. For example, Halleck and colleagues offer sentencing
evaluation guidelines that should also provide ample safeguards
against a psychiatrist's improper evaluation of a prisoner's execu-
tion competency when the prisoner is unable to give consent."
They recommend that "the psychiatrist should stop the examination,
inform the party who requested the evaluation [of the prisoner's in-
competence] . . . , and allow the legal system to arrive at a solu-
tion to the problem."1'9 Following this suggestion could produce
at least two possible outcomes. First, a court may rule that the
state's interest in carrying out sentences, or the loss of liberty en-
tailed by conviction, render unnecessary the usual requirements for
prisoner consent. Second, a court might rule that it is reasonable to
assume that if the prisoner is incompetent to consent to be inter-
viewed he is incompetent to be executed.19
4. Participation is Not a Perversion of Psychiatric Practice
While treating an incompetent prisoner might carry with it all
the emotional burden1" of treating a condemnee who had ex-
pressed no preferences about competency restoration, it is hard to
see how such treatment could be criticized as doing "society's dirty
work" or as a perversion of medical practice. Nor can a competen-
cy evaluation of a consenting prisoner, under these circumstances,
be dismissed as an unwise appropriation of the duty of society to
this way. "According to the NAACP Legal Defense fund, of the first 100 executions in
the United States after 1976, 11 were consensual." Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at
307 n.20. These examples are intended primarily to expose certain features of our ethical
predilections, rather than prepare us for a particular (and unlikely) exigency.
196. Seymour L. Halleck et al., Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, in AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, IssUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 181, 201 (1984).
197. Id.
198. 'While competency for execution and competency to give informed consent are not
the same, under many execution competency standards they are similar." Ward, supra note
23, at 78.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28. See also Radelet & Barnard, supra
note 23, at 303-04 (discussing emotional impact on Chattahoochee Florida State Hospital
staff involved in caring for Gary Alvord, who was adjudicated incompetent for execution
in 1984).
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judge an inmate's fitness for execution.2"e One purpose of the
evaluation would be to determine whether the inmate needs a type
of treatment that he has requested - an eminently medical under-
taking. Even where the condemnee consents, many psychiatrists
might wish, for emotional reasons, to shun the evaluation and
treatment of condemned prisoners. But psychiatrists have little basis
to absolutely condemn their colleagues who choose to evaluate and
treat condemned prisoners201 unless these psychiatrists adopt the
position that there is never any justification for the death penalty,
so that all psychiatrists must be absolutely enjoined from treating
the condemned. 2
This article characterizes the "participation as perversion" ob-
jectiona 3 as having three' components: (a) psychiatrists have no
special expertise in assessing execution competency; (b) society,
represented by a judge or jury, not a psychiatrist, has the responsi-
bility for determining execution competency; and, (c) psychiatrists
should not abet society's refusal to accept its responsibility for
addressing problems associated with capital punishment or its un-
willingness to confront matters about which it is profoundly ambiv-
alent. "Participation as perversion" is an important objection be-
cause it deals with psychiatrists' roles in a highly visible and sym-
bolically important arena. The role psychiatrists play in forensic
matters, and how they think about that role, says a great deal
about how they perceive themselves and their patients general-
ly.2" Psychiatrists can respond to this objection, however, in
ways that fall short of complete abstention from involvement with
incompetent condemnees.
200. But see text accompanying note 145; Ward, supra note 23, at 89.
201. Note that I leave open the possibility that psychiatrists who felt the death penalty
was always immoral might logically object to fellow physicians' acting in ways that allow
the machinery of capital punishment to work. However, none of the published objections
that I discuss in this article explicitly call upon psychiatrists to refuse to participate be-
cause capital punishment is wrong or unjusL
202. Limited condemnations, e.g., that the evaluating or treating psychiatrists were not
impartial, were misdiagnosing, or were using poor therapeutic technique, would, of course,
still be reasonable.
203. See Mossman, supra note 23, at 400-01, 403-04 (discussing 'psychiatry's 'social
function' in the capital punishment process" and "role conflicts").
204. See Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, offering an elegant, succinct discussion of
this issue. One of the most frequently-cited defenses of psychiatric participation in forensic
matters is Richard 3. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427
(1980) (justifying participation and offering guidelines for psychiatrists). See infra text
accompanying notes 293-302.
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Attorneys, philosophy professors, and other well-educated per-
sons could probably assess the ethicality of competency evaluations
as well as psychiatrists. In fact, only a minority of psychiatrists can
be expected to have enough understanding of the complex legal
and philosophical issues at stake to perform an adequate evaluation
of execution competency. However, psychiatrists do have unique
expertise concerning the disorders that cause incompetence. With
special training, psychiatrists can explain to fact-finders how those
disorders impair thought processes, understanding, and judg-
ment. 5 There is, therefore, reason to presume that the lack of
psychiatric input in execution competency judgments might entail
"a serious loss to the pursuit of justice."2 °'
No matter how valuable their expertise may be, when psychia-
trists participate in execution competency proceedings they must
avoid usurping or being thrust into the roles of the other "players."
It is properly only the judge's or jury's task to decide whether a
convict is competent to be executed. Wallace's concern about
psychiatrists' participation in a competency tribunal21 seems jus-
tified in view of the actions of psychiatrists evaluating Alvin Ford.
Those psychiatrists submitted unchallenged written conclusions that
Ford was competent to be executed.0 8 Psychiatrists need proce-
205. Gutheil and Bursztajn describe methods for assessing uncooperative patients and for
showing courts how subtle forms of psychosis and mood disturbance affect competency to
refuse treatment. Thomas G. Gotheil & Harold Bursztajn, Clinician's Guidelines for As-
sessing and Presenting Subtle Forms of Patient Incompetence in Legal Settings, 143 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1020 (1986). Psychiatrists with proper training might offer analogous kinds
of services to courts charged with adjudicating execution competency.
206. Compare Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 255 with Ewing, supra note 134,
at 184 (Psychiatric input, though desired by courts and legislators, is not necessary; com-
petency decisions "could be made just as well - if not better - on the basis of lay
evidence provided by those who know the inmate best and have had the greatest opportu-
nity to observe him.-). Professor Stephen Morse feels that mental health testimony in
general has little courtroom value:
Although the law has given mental experts considerable responsibility for help-
ing decide legal questions raised by crazy behavior, experts have less compe-
tence to assist in these decisions than is commonly believed. Moreover, much
of the factual knowledge necessary for legal decisionmaking is accessible to lay
observers as well as experts.
Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law,
51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 602 (1978).
207. See supra text accompanying note 132; see also Wallace, supra note 131, at 280.
208. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 522
So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert denied sub nom. Ford v.
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). This circumstance was not unique:
[A] team of three psychiatrists was appointed by the Governor [of Florida] io
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dural regulations that clarify the psychiatrist's role and the proper
scope of expert testimony. Professional guidelines for conducting
evaluations and providing testimony' might reduce the likeli-
hood that a psychiatrist would decide the ultimate legal conclusions
about execution competency.
210
Society may be trying to ignore the problems associated with
capital punishment, but that fact, by itself, does not argue against
psychiatrists' participation in the process. Execution competency is
only one problem area in which the legal system uses psychiatry in
an attempt to resolve awkward situations or avoid "hard thinking."
Psychiatrists should remain aware that society often asks them to
make uncomfortable decisions in a variety of forensic situations,
including the determination of competence for decisionmaking,
child custody determinations, the need for involuntary commitment,
and the prediction of long-term future dangerousness for sentencing
purposes. Psychiatrists therefore must guard against assuming re-
sponsibilities that properly belong to judges or juries.
While psychiatrists are not responsible for making decisions
about legal status, they do routinely make decisions about whether
to provide treatment. The psychiatrist must answer the difficult
question of whether providing treatment for an incompetent, psy-
chotic condemnee-treatment that, were he not condemned, he
might receive as a matter of course-is necessarily a perversion of
assess [Gary] Alvord's competency, and [on November 26, 1984,] three days
before the scheduled execution, the prisoner was evaluated. After the psychia-
trists dictated a five-sentence report in the prison parking lot stating their belief
that Alvord was indeed incompetent to be executed, the governor stayed the
execution. . . .We note in passing that the psychiatrists" report simply offered
the conclusion that Alvord was incompetent for execution; no details were
given as to how the examination was conducted or what medical impairments
were found. In short, it was really the psychiatrists, not the governor, who
made the decision that Alvord was incompetenL As in every other case in
which the issue of competency has been raised in Florida death penalty cases,
the physicians in the Alvord case acted as both experts and judges.
Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 301.
209. See supra note 29 (citing guideline sources).
210. The APA offers similar guidelines for psychiatrists involved in trials where legal
sanity is at issue, and recommends that psychiatrists not testify as to the ultimate legal
conclusion. See Insaity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement
on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983). In practice, it is often diffi-
cult for courtroom experts to make a clear statement about the results of their evaluations
without at least coming very close to commenting on the ultimate legal issue. Cf
Heilbrum & McClaren, supra note 29, at 212-13 (discussing strategies for commenting on
a patient's mental state without reaching a conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue -
competency).
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medical practice. This article suggests that ff such treatment had
been competently and explicitly requested by the inmate prior to
his becoming psychotic, withholding it might seem more offen-
sive.211 If such explicitly-requested treatment seems justifiable, it
must serve some interest of the inmate. Is it possible that another
condemnee who became psychotic without having made an explicit
prior request for competency-restoring treatment would have the
same interest in being treated? I believe he would, and that this
interest derives from a paramount interest in receiving punishment.
Section IV explains this position, which has substantial implications
for physicians who work with patients who have committed crimes.
C. Illustrations of Psychiatrists' Dilemmas
To appreciate physicians' need for an approach to treating
prisoners that acknowledges the justification of punishment, consid-
er the following three scenarios in which the ethical issues facing
physicians seem analogous to those raised by execution competency
proceedings. But in these scenarios the typical or expected actions
of physicians do not generate immediate or vigorous denunciation.
(1) Inmates convicted of non-capital crimes can be transferred
to mental hospitals if they develop psychiatric disorders,2 2 and
returned to prison once they have recovered. Suppose a psychiatrist
is asked to evaluate or treat a convict who has been serving a life
sentence in a particularly nasty prison prior to being transferred to
a hospital for psychiatric care. The psychiatrist knows that the
convict understandably prefers living in the mental institution
(which in this case is a relatively pleasant place) to being returned
to the prison. All of the arguments cited above against evaluating
or treating the incompetent condemned apply to the psychiatrist
involved with a convict who faces non-capital punishment. A psy-
chiatric evaluation would determine whether the prisoner is "fit" to
211. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
212. Such inmates are entitled to a number of due process protections before they may
be subjected to involuntary treatment. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980). In
Vitek, the Supreme Court distinguished criminal confinement from involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization on grounds that the latter can result in a distinct social stigma and
"[c]ompelled treatment," which are not associated with mere imprisonment. Id at 492. A
prisoner retains a liberty interest in not being committed to a psychiatric hospital without
appropriate due process safeguards because of "the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer
to a mental hospital ... . coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory be-
havior modification as a treatment .. . ." Id. at 494. See MENTAL DISABUMrY LAW,
supra note 1, § 3.66, at 394-403 (discussing transfer rights and procedures).
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resume punishment."3 The treatment can be expected to allow
punishment, which would otherwise not continue, to proceed. Eval-
uation and treatment might violate informed consent requirements
and the psychiatrist might be viewed as an ally or agent of the
state, "an instrument of punishment," 2 4 rather than as an advo-
213. Note that transferring a prisoner to a hospital is not equivalent to punishmenL
Even though time spent in-hospital prior to or following sentencing may be counted as
part of a prisoner's total sentence, persons who are not convicted also spend time in
hospitals, so hospitalization cannot be equated with punishment. See, e.g., Frankin v.
Berger, 544 A.2d 650, 653 (Conn. App. 1988) (denial of credit for pretrial confinement
denied defendant equal protection), cernijcadon granted in part, 546 A.2d 282 (Conn.
1988), rev'd, 560 A.2d 444 (Conn. 1989); State v. Tal-Mason, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla.
1987) (prisoner entitled to credit for "precommitment coercive detention"), appeal granted,
596 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992) (second habeas corpus appeal); Matter of
Knapp, 687 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Wash. 1984) (equal protection violation to deny defendants
credit for time spent in hospital as part of probationary term and for presentence evalua-
tion); and ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at Standard 7-10.10(a) (prisoner hospitalized
in psychiatric facility "is entitled to earn good time credits on same terms as prisoners in
adult correctional facilities").
Suppose a prison has an infirmary which, arguendo, is relatively pleasant when com-
pared with the rest of the institution and the prisoner has requested treatment and is re-
ceiving it voluntarily. Because the infirmary is part of the penal institution, the convict
would still be "in prison" while treated in the infirmary. In this situation, a return to a
regular cell technically would not entail a resumption of punishment. Yet, the ethical
issues faced by a physician who must decide whether the convict is ready to leave the
infirmary are similar to those faced by a physician who must decide whether a hospital-
ized convict is ready to return to prison. Although these morally awkward positions are
faced regularly by prison psychiatrists - albeit in less dramatic contexts than when the
death penalty is involved - psychiatrists have not been exhorted to abjure treating con-
victs. See American Psychiatric Association, TASK FORCE REPORT 29: PsYCIIIATRIc SER-
VICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS (1989) (discussing the issues facing psychiatrists who treat
convicts). For a discussion of the procedural rights available to prisoners who might be
compelled in treatment, see MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 3.66 (discussing
Baugh v. Woodward, 604 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (Prisoners have "a pro-
tected constitutional liberty interest in not being transferred to an inpatient prison mental
health facility."), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 808 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1987) (vacating
the judgment that a hearing must be provided before a prisoner is physically transferred
to a mental health facility and holding that a hearing promptly after physical transfer does
not raise constitutional concerns)).
214. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 18. The Brief continues, "lds concern is at its
greatest with respect to patients in prison. Prisoners already have reasons to be suspicious
of psychiatrists, because psychiatrists in an evaluative role often testify against prisoners in
competency, insanity, and death penalty proceedings." Id. The Brief argues for preserving
psychiatrists' evaluative role in execution competency cases, but states that competency-
restoring treatment should not be imposed on inmates contrary to their "medical interests."
Id. at 12. Psychiatrists, however, regularly treat non-capital patients and restore their abili-
ty to return to prison, and may do so over their objection. Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990) (upholding the state's right to treat an inmate against his will). While
the emotional impact of psychiatrists' activity may be greater where the death penalty is
involved, the ethical issue raised by psychiatrists' dual role as treaters and as state em-
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cate for the patient's "medical" interests. Yet psychiatrists often un-
dertake evaluations and treatment under such controversial circum-
stances, with far less concern that their functions violate ethical
norms.215 In fact, a psychiatrist might feel some obligation to ad-
minister treatment; helping a prisoner avoid treatment might be
viewed as collusion with his desire to avoid punishment.
(2) A physician who is asked to evaluate and/or treat an un-
conscious inmate whose execution is imminent but who has devel-
oped a potentially fatal medical disorder (for example, a myocar-
dial infarction, or respiratory suppression caused by the inmate's
intentional ingestion of a surreptitiously-obtained barbiturate) faces
a difficult ethical problem. Suppose that the physician believes that
without treatment the inmate stands a good chance of dying a
peaceful death; but with pharmacologic interventions and other con-
ventional supportive measures, there is a high likelihood that his
condition can be stabilized. The physician knows that if he elects
to treat the convict, there will come a point where he will be
asked to determine whether the convict is ready to be returned to
prison, where the convict's execution will be scheduled and carried
out.
2 16
Clearly, the decision whether to treat is an awful one. What is
not clear is whether the physician would either appear or feel
worse for treating rather than withholding treatment. The physician
who treats an unconscious prisoner wrestles with the same ethical
problems that accompany psychiatric assessment or treatment of the
incompetent condemned. Most physicians would choose "instinc-
tively" to evaluate and treat the convict. In fact, most physicians
would feel tempted to reproach a colleague who refrained from
providing medical care, allowing the convict to die. Such
evaluation and treatment probably would not raise criticisms that
the physician was indirectly participating in an execution, violating
ethical codes, vitiating the requirements of informed consent doc-
trine, or perverting the profession. It is unlikely many physicians
ployees seems no different in the case of persons convicted of non-capital crimes.
215. "To our knowledge, nobody has cited ethical difficulties in treating" to restore
competency to stand trial, "even though treatment might again facilitate the administration
of punishment. . . ." Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 601.
216. Note the grim irony involved in the case of the potentially-fatal barbiturate over-
dose: in a state where convicts are executed with lethal injections, saving the convict's
life would make it possible for the state to administer another lethal overdose in order to
bring about the same result sought by the prisoner.
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would criticize such treatment even though the ethical consider-
ations raised by the inmate's physical disorder are identical to
those raised by mental incompetence.
(3) One final scenario further illustrates the ethical complexity
of psychiatric treatment of the condemned. Suppose a psychiatrist
had available a medication that would safely induce a pleasurable
psychosis but would render a prisoner permanently incompetent to
be executed.217 Such a medication would have the potential for
saving the lives of condemned prisoners, and many prisoners might
desire it. If psychiatrists felt that their obligation to save lives were
of paramount ethical importance, they would have an obligation to
offer this medication to competent death row inmates and could be
remiss in withholding it.
Understandably, these hypothetical scenarios produce ambivalent
reactions. The purpose of examining them is only to emphasize the
importance of thinking about execution competency dilemmas in a
much broader framework that reflects different perspectives about
the role and justification of punishment itself. My contention is that
psychiatrists can resolve such dilemmas only if they acknowledge
the moral basis for criminal sanctions described in the next section.
IV. THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT:
HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT
If the death penalty itself is immoral,218 physicians may have
a powerful ethical justification for spurning involvement in many
aspects of the capital punishment process.21 9 Yet most of the lit-
217. Many legal (as well as illegal) pharmaceuticals induce psychosis, particularly in
overdose. "Overdose with psychostimulants [e.g., amphetamines] results in marked sympa-
thetic overactivity ... often accompanied by toxic psychosis or delirium." STEVEN E.
HYMAN & GEORGE W. ARANA, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUG THERAPY 141 (1987).
Usually, stimulant-induced psychoses are not pleasant; fortunately, they are usually self-
limited.
218. A full discussion of the morality and constitutionality of capital punishment lies
beyond the scope of this article. For a concise introduction to the case against capital
punishment, see, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punish-
ment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (1986) (arguing that the capital punishment system as-
sumed by death penalty proponents does not exist; capital punishment is rarely inflicted,
often spares the most vicious killers and exists primarily in former slave-holding states
against killers of whites). For a succinct defense of the death penalty, see, e.g., Ernest
van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1986)
(arguing that maldistribution of capital punishment cannot be an argument against its
morality, since guilt is individual and that the tendency to apply death sentence to killers
of whites suggests an injustice to black victims who receive lesser vindication).
219. There is no reason to assume that physicians markedly vary from the rest of the
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erature discussing the propriety of psychiatric participation in exe-
cution competency proceedings is silent on the morality of the
death penalty itself, preferring to separate the legal issue of punish-
ment from the medical issue of treatment.2" The psychiatric liter-
ature on execution competency is also largely silent on the issue of
the morality of punishment in general. Punishment is often recog-
nized as an evil or a form of "harm,"22' but the justification for
punishment is a subject which this literature ignores. m Many of
the ethical issues generated by the psychiatric problems of
condernnees are also present in the evaluation or treatment of pris-
American public in their views about the death penalty. If, however, physicians were
unanimous in the view that capital punishment is immoral, or if their professional organi-
zations declared involvement in the evaluation and care of capital defendants and
condemnees to be unethical, physicians' reluctance to assess or treat these classes of pris-
oners might constitute a powerful and effective method of attaining legislation against the
execution of those who become insane while awaiting the death penalty. See, e.g., Ewing,
supra note 134, at 185 (arguing that, if medical professionals refused to treat incompetent
condemned inmates, the United States legislature may be led to exempt insane
condemnees from execution).
A number of writers have commented that a psychiatrist's reluctance to participate in
execution competency proceedings is an implicit rejection of the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Ward, supra note 23, at 99 ("If we shudder at the thought of an inmate who would have
been spared the gas chamber but for an injection of Prolixin [an anti-psychotic medica-
tion], our uneasiness reflects a more basic abhorrence of the death penalty itself.").
Weinstock and colleagues note, "If one opposes capital punishment one might con-
sider it unethical to evaluate the sanity of a death row prisoner if such evaluation were to
be used to certify that he it fit to be executed." Robert Weinstock, et al., The Role of
Traditional Medical Ethics in Forensic Psychiatry, in ETHICAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 31, 38 (Richard Rosner & Robert Weinstock eds., 1990) (citing personal
communication from Bernard Diamond (April 25, 1988)). While I am not sure that the
view that the death penalty is immoral entails an obligation to abstain from evaluation or
treatment of condemned inmates, such a view seems implicit in the argument that physi-
cians should abstain lest they absolve jurors' guilty consciences or inadvertently give
capital punishment a "veneer" of respectability. See, e.g., Appelbaum's Parable, supra note
17.
220. This is not surprising. It would be very difficult for the leadership of the American
Psychiatric Association to take an official position against a punishment the use of which
a substantial portion of its membership may favor. However, the APA is not totally op-
posed to taking stands on controversial political or moral issues. See, e.g., Commission on
AIDS, American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement Opposing Mandatory Name
Reporting of HIV-Seropositive Individuals, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 541 (1990).
221. Appelbaum, for example, discusses the potential conflict between physicians' cus-
tomary obligation to "do no harm" and the potential results of psychiatrists' participation
"in criminal proceedings, especially on behalf of the prosecution, when their testimony
may result in a defendant'[s] . . .punish[ment]." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at
254. Arguably, this conflict arises out of a failure to analyze the peculiar moral status of
punishment. See supra note 155.
222. See Mossman, supra note 23, at 404-07, for a brief discussion of this issue.
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oners accused or convicted of non-capital crimes.' The prospect
of assessing or treating a possibly-incompetent condemned inmate
thus forces the psychiatrist to come to grips with his own views
about the morality of both capital punishment and the justification
of criminal sanctions in general. 4
This section sketches out a theory of punishment which ad-
dresses concerns central to general principles of ethical medical
practice. More precisely, it presents a perspective on punishment
that accords with the respect for autonomy and dignity that are at
the core of medical ethics.' Although this theory could help
psychiatrists sort out their duties and obligations toward most indi-
viduals who have been accused or convicted of either capital or
non-capital crimes, this article focuses on the obligations befalling
psychiatrists who might be asked to evaluate or treat incompetent
condemnees. This discussion assumes the truth of a number of
propositions which, although entirely consistent with published
viewpoints objecting to psychiatric participation,2 6  are all, to
some degree, controversial.22 This article argues that disagree-
223. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
224. For perhaps the best-known discussion by a psychiatrist of the morality of pun-
ishment, see KARL MENNINGER, THE CRuIE OF PuNIsHmENT (1968) (arguing that the
desire to punish arises from sadistic and vindictive feelings). See also infra notes 263 and
375 and accompanying text for a discussion of Menninger's views.
225. See VEATCH, supra note 147, at 22. See also supra note 166. Presenting an argu-
ment for a general theory of punishment is well beyond this article's intended scope. Yet
some discussion of this issue seems unavoidable given the connection between the morali-
ty of psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings and in non-capital pro-
ceedings.
226. Bonnie is in favor of abolishing the death penalty. See Richard J. Bonnie, The
Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1364, 1390-91 (1988) (arguing that the
law should override an incompetent condemnee's wish to die because doing otherwise
would subordinate the societal interest in the integrity of the legal process to the individu-
al interests of the prisoner). However, his ideology does not enter into his considerations
about how psychiatrists should deal with requests to evaluate or treat the incompetent con-
demned; his recommended grounds for abstention have other bases. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying note 163. I suspect other writers share my opposition to the death penalty,
but, like Bonnie, they argue for abstention on other grounds.
227. This is an understatement. But, to review, even briefly, the scholarly argumentation
justifying punishment in general, capital punishment, or the fairness of the criminal justice
system would take me far beyond this article's scope. This article's modest goal in dis-
cussing these points is only to flesh out a moral context and framework for considering
the ethical status of psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings. The
purpose of listing these propositions is to emphasize that psychiatrists must recognize
these issues before they can adopt a coherent conclusion about the morality of participa-
tion. This article suggests that opponents to participation really disagree with one or more
of these propositions.
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ment on these propositions underlies the moral controversy about
psychiatrists' interactions with incompetent condemnees.
Proposition 1: Punishment is an appropriate and moral-
ly-justifiable response by society to criminal wrongdo-
ing.2
Proposition 2: The criminal justice system metes out
criminal sanctions in a reasonably fair manner. 9
228. Psychiatrists confronted with the dilemma of treating or evaluating the incompetent
condemned cannot resolve the ethical controversy without understanding and accepting the
moral justification of punishment. Efforts to understand the moral justification must be
kept distinct from those that attempt to elucidate historical or emotional roots for our
notions about punishment. For a summary of the literature on the historical, emotional,
cultural, and theological roots of American society's approach to punishment, see Michael
L. Perlin, Mental Illness, Crime, and the Culture of Punishment (manuscript in preparation
at 51-79, on file with the author).
229. Stipulating that the criminal justice system be only "reasonably fair" allows for
such human imperfections as occasional wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions,
failures to detect and detain the perpetators of a substantial number of crimes and the
inevitable level of inequality that results from the fact that not all criminals can be appre-
hended, tried, and sentenced by the same court at the same time. Despite a fairness re-
quirement that punishment must be proportional to the offense, it is very difficult to as-
sign punishments with perfect proportionality. Reasonably fair criminal justice systems,
while humanly imperfect, must not tolerate persistent or systematic injustices. In addition
reasonably fair systems must, at a minimum, satisfy constraints of Hobbesian political
theory. See GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLmCAL THEORY 245-54
(1986) (reviewing the effect of power on crime and punishment in the Hobbesian state).
For a discussion of Hobbesian constraints on social justice, see infra, note 280 and ac-
companying text.
In his defense of the death penalty, Professor van den Haag comments "that irra-
tional discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional require-
ments [for just administration of capital punishment]. But I am satisfied that the Supreme
Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as
much as is possible." van den Haag, supra note 218, at 1663-64. There is ample reason
to believe that a host of unconscious, cognitive errors influence a variety of aspects of
the legal process, from the formulation of laws to the adjudication of constitutional issues.
For example, after John Hinckley was acquitted of the attempted assassination of President
Reagan in 1981, some state legislatures changed their statutes regarding the insanity de-
fense to add a guilty but mentally ill option. Salvador C. Uy, From the Ashes of Penry
v. Lynaugh, The Diminished Intent Approach to the Trial & Sentencing of the Mentally
Retarded Offender, 21 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 580 (1990). The Model Penal Code
had two requirements for culpability, volition and cognition, but the public was not sup-
portive of the idea that mentally ill defendants were not acting of their own volition. Id.
When prospective jurors who admit they could not vote to impose the death penalty
are excluded the result is a death-qualified jury more likely to convict. For a sample of
the research showing that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict and impose
death sentences, see George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualfied"
Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971) (presenting find-
ings of a survey showing that jurors* beliefs about capital punishment affect verdicts
through a process involving belief in authoritarian or conservative legal positions); Robert
Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification
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Proposition 3: Capital punishment is administered in a
reasonably fair manner and is a just and moral punishment
for some crimes.23
Proposition 4: The death penalty is morally the same
as other punishments; all punishment, when ethical, in-
volves a justified infliction of harm sanctioned by a moral
and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) (presenting findings of a demo-
graphic survey showing, among other things, that greater proportions of blacks and women
are excluded by death qualification process); Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qudlification on Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) (present-
ing findings of a simulated trial showing that diversity of death - qualified and non-
qualified jurors leads to jury deliberations which are more vigorous, thorough and accu-
rate); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death -
Qualification. Process, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984) (arguing that certain psycho-
logical features of the death qualification process may account for the bias that death -
qualified jurors have toward conviction). For a discussion of the role of cognitive errors
in legal decisionmaking, see Michael 1. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Pro-
cessing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 123 (1980-81)
(addressing the effect of quantitative evidence on the truth-finding process in adjudication
and concluding that mathematical evidence may be necessary to prevent jurors from think-
ing intuitively as opposed to rationally). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsis-
tent application of medical and social science data, see Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 346
(1987) (concluding that a majority of the Court may be vulnerable to misreadings of
statistical analysis). For a discussion of how one segment of the American criminal justice
system really operates, see DAvID HEILBRONNER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF
A YOUNG D. A. (1990).
230. A "reasonably fair manner" of application would include, among many other
things, assurances that such decisions do not reflect beliefs based on inflammatory or
unreliable testimony. It also assumes that capital punishment can be fair and just in
principle.
The Supreme Court appears to accept capital punishment decisions that fall outside
these bounds. For example, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed in a death sentence case on
the basis of the testimony of experts who had not examined the defendant. The Court
deemed such testimony to be acceptable despite unanimous psychiatric opinion that such
testimony is of little or no probative value. See Barefoot's Brief at 11-18, (82-6080),
supra note 10. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that psychiatrists are
able to predict violence with no greater ability than laymen, and that it was "crystal
clear" that the witnesses "had no expertise whatever" in making predictions of violence.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He concluded, "when the Court
knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be
no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on the pain of his life, the heavy burden of
convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud.- Id. at 935-36. The subsequent commentary on
Barefoot is summarized in MENTAL DISABILIY LAW, supra note 1, § 17.14. Cf. D. Mi-
chael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The
Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise, " 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 780 n.215
(1989) ("[W]e have yet to find a single word of praise for, or in defense of, Barefoot in
the literature of either science or law.").
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legal system. The kinds of arguments legitimizing punish-
ment in general (i.e., those that would justify Proposition
1) are the same types of arguments that legitimize capital
punishment.231
Proposition 5: As physicians, psychiatrists owe their
evaluative and treatment obligations to the individuals they
evaluate and treat, and should not color their evaluations or
231. Both abolitionists and supporters of the death penalty have endorsed the assertion
that "'the penalty of death is qualitatively different' from other forms of criminal punish-
ment." Bonnie, supra note 226, at 1363 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality)). Proposition 4 merely as-
serts that the death penalty is morally justified in the same way that other punishments
are. In general, punishment has been justified as a means to restrain and/or deter the
wrongdoer from committing further offenses, to deter other individuals from wrongdoing,
to rehabilitate the offender, and/or to indicate society's general, vindicative condemnation
of the wrongdoer. Punishment has also been explained as the community's symbolic
means of judging and regulating behavior through "proportional deprivation" of personal
liberty. Perlin, supra note 228, at 52-53. Of course, that the death penalty is as morally
justified as other punishments leaves open the possibility that its administration might
require special legal procedures, despite its moral similarity to other punishments. such
procedures could be justified without reference to a moral difference from other punish-
ments, but in reliance on notions of "severity and irrevocability." Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, the harshness of capital punishment may provide an unsatisfactory justifica-
tion for special legal proceedings. For example, it is far from clear that, for a 20-year-old
man, the prospect of execution is a fate more horrible than the prospect of spending the
rest of his life in prison. Although Kant wrote that retribution requires the execution of
murderers because "[t]here is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive
even under the most miserable conditions . . . . . IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTIcE 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965) [hereinafter KANT's METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS], other writers have viewed life imprisonment as a worse fate than death. See,
e.g., van den Haag, supra note 218, at 1669 ("Does not life imprisonment violate human
dignity more than execution, by keeping alive a prisoner deprived of all autonomy?");
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, 62-70 (1764); Jacques Batzun, In
Favor of Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY iN AMERICA 154, 161-63 (Hugo
A. Bedau ed., 1964) (arguing that, given prison conditions and the pace of change in the
outside world, life sentences produce more suffering than execution).
The finality of the death penalty provides the clearest reason why "courts in virtually
every state have abandoned the traditional rules on direct appeal of death sentences," and
have ruled "direct review of death sentences to be obligatory," even over the defendant's
objections. Bonnie, supra note 239, at 1368. Capital punishment places a special kind of
pressure on courts to vindicate society's interest in the integrity of its institutions of crim-
inal punishment. This moral interest is, however, also expressed in requirements of non-
capital cases (e.g., that the actions of a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense must
satisfy the factual predicates for sentencing). Id. at 1369-71. For a recent analysis of the
nature and importance of retaliation in punishing murderers, see Jeremy Waldren, Lex
Talionis, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 25, 41-42 (1992) (arguing that what is unique about murder is
not necessarily the victim's death, but the crime's radical disruption of an autonomous
life).
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use the treatment of their patients to achieve either particu-
lar social outcomes (e.g., abolition of the death penalty) or
particular legal outcomes (e.g, acquittalf2 or clemency).
If these propositions are true, then it is ethically permissible for
physicians to participate in the evaluation and treatment of an
incompetent death row prisoner, with the full awareness that such
participation might make possible the prisoner's execution."
Caring citizens should regard even a "reasonably fair" system
of criminal punishment with ambivalence; such a feeling is conso-
nant with a sober acknowledgement of the inevitability of and
necessity for such a system. Criminal conviction in a just legal
system marks a failure by a fellow citizen. Caring citizens should
share a sense of sadness about (as well as disapproval of) this
failure, and perhaps some empathy for the criminal who, however
guilty, must suffer for his wrong-doing.? Physicians (among
232. Cf supra note 183 and accompanying text. For a discussion that favors
psychiatrists' restricting their forensic services to uses that serve only defendants, see
Bernard L. Diamond & David W. Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some
Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335 (1965). Positions like this may
form the basis for what is often perceived as psychiatrists' "peculiarly tolerant attitude
toward criminal behavior." Manfred S. Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime
and Correction, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 633, 633 (1958). See also Benjamin Karpman,
Criminality, Insanity and the Law, 39 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 584, 584 (1949)
(Karpman is a psychiatrist who believes that "criminality is without exception symptomatic
of abnormal mental states and is an expression of them."). A decision to serve only de-
fense interests has been criticized as an attempt by mental health professionals to impose
their views on society in GARY B. MELTON et al., PsYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR
THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS §
3.05(b) (1986) (asserting that a function of mental health professionals is to balance the
needs of the individual and society and that this function would be subverted if mental
health professionals were only allowed to represent the individual). The notion that psy-
chiatrists consistently are biased toward acquittal of criminal defendants may be mistaken.
See JONATHAN ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 24, 389-404 (1980) (arguing
that most psychiatrists are prosecution-minded and project the values of their traditional
upwardly-mobile class backgrounds into their practice and into their testimony at criminal
trials).
233. This article also contends - both as a logical consequence and as an important
heuristic device - that the contrapositive contention is true: If participation seems unethi-
cal, then one or more of the above propositions is false. See infra notes 375-76 and
accompanying text.
234. Punishment also presents all citizens with a moral dilemma insofar as it imposes
suffering on our fellow human beings. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 63 (1968). Hegel recognized this as a powerful indication that
consequentialist views of punishment are morally flawed-
If crime and its cancellation... punishment are regarded only as evils in
general, one may consider it unreasonable to will an evil merely because anoth-
er evil is already present. This superficial character of an evil is the primary
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them, psychiatrists) may have special reason to view punishment
with some measure of "gut-level" antipathy. Physicians frequently
begin their careers with oaths in which they profess their dedica-
tion to the alleviation of suffering; ideally physicians' training
engendered emotional as well as ethical aversions to the notion of
intentionally-imposed suffering.
Physicians' training also acquaints them with the grounds and
justification for intentionally-imposed suffering. Most of the proce-
dures physicians undertake involve varying degrees of intrusion and
discomfort; even the questions they ask often make their patients
uncomfortable. Physicians believe that the medical benefits justify
the intrusions and discomfort. For example, the intense distress
caused by chemotherapy for cancer is outweighed by the chance
this treatment offers for prolonged life. Physicians encourage pa-
tients to choose the violent intrusion and risks of coronary bypass
surgery in the belief that they will survive with a higher quality of
life. While this type of 'cost-benefit' judgment may influence both
a physician's decision to recommend a course of treatment and a
patient's acceptance of treatment, the justification for the treatment
derives from the patient's consenting to it.235 Without such con-
sent, treatment, however beneficial it may be, is morally impermis-
sible. 6
assumption in the various theories of punishment as prevention, as a deterrent,
a threat, a corrective, etc .... mhe objective consideration of justice ... is
the primary and substantial point of view in relation to crime .... The vari-
ous considerations which are relevant to ... [punishment's] relation to the
particular consciousness, and which has its effect on representational thought (as
a deterrent, corrective, etc.) . . . take it for granted that punishment is and for
itself is just.
G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B.
Wisbet trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821) (citation and original emphasis
omitted). For a discussion of the value of our emotional reaction to crime in guiding our
appropriate moral and punitive response, see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 179, 198-217 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (discussing the epistemic rele-
vance and virtuous nature of some emotions in guiding our moral judgments).
235. "If the normative principles of ethics are articulated by reasonable people ... then
no reasonable person would be foolish enough ... to contract with medical professionals
authorizing them to do simply whatever they think will benefit patients." VEATCH, supra
note 147, at 11.
236. For a discussion of the ethical primacy of consent over anticipated benefits of
treatment, see id. at 192-213. Veatch's views appear to derive from Kantian consider-
ations, particularly Kant's "affirmation that 'every rational being exists as an end in him-
self not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.'" Id. at 193 (quoting
IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 95 (H. J. Paton
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There is an important and extensive homology 7 between the
justification of medical treatment and the justification of punish-
ment. Medical care often requires the imposition of pain and sacri-
fice, which would be unconscionable for physicians to inflict with-
out the prior consent of the patients who suffer them. These pa-
tients must base their decision to accept care on the view, shared
with their physicians, that the pain and sacrifice are justified by the
benefits obtained through treatment. Punishment involves coercion
and deprivation, which would be prima facie wrongs for society to
inflict?" were it not for the consentP9 of the criminals who
suffer them. Prior to committing crimes, criminals shared with their
fellow citizens important moral and practical reasons for wanting
all citizens who committed crimes to be justly punished.
The homology between the justifications of medical treatment
and punishment extends further. By requiring that the justification
of medical treatment include the physician's and patient's consent,
we place medical care amidst a broad array of human interactions
that protect and affirm persons' mutual respect, dignity, and au-
tonomy. Accordingly we view the practice of medicine from the
standpoint of a broader ethical theory that governs inter-individual
obligation in the largest sense.2' Similarly, a justification of
criminal sanctions based on the consent of those who are punished
trans., 1964 2d ed. 1785) [hereinafter KANT's GROUNDWORK]. Veatch writes:
From the standpoint of one committed to the principle of autonomy, consent is
required independent of the calculations of consequences if a person is to be
touched (as in assault and battery), if privacy is to be invaded, or if the person
is to be used in research. Whether the context be research, therapy, or preven-
tive medicine, if a person is to be treated as an end and not as a means only,
then permission is needed when that person is brought into, the professional
medical nexus.
VEATCH, supra note 147, at 201.
237. That is, a close correspondence in structure and origin. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNAIIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 107, at 1085.
238. Cf. Waldron, supra note 231, at 27 C'A justification of punishment is required in
all cases because punishments usually have features that, in general, make actions
inpennissible.").
239. This article argues for a contractarian justification of punishment. See infra at text
accompanying notes 241-59. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85 n.50, argues that a comparison
between the justifications of treatment and punishment is flawed because the consent given
by medical patients is paradigmatically explicit, while the consent given by criminals - if
one accepts contract theory to begin with - is implicit and/or hypothetical. For a discus-
sion of the implications of this "hypotheticality," see notes 328-37 and accompanying text.
240. For a discussion of the relationship between basic, general principles of inter-in-
dividual obligation and the obligations incumbent upon the medical profession and indi-
vidual physicians engaged in treating patients, see VEATCI, supra note 147, at 324-27.
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sets punishment in the broader context of a general theory of polit-
ical obligation, the centerpiece of which is the implicit consent of
all citizens who, to secure their basic rights, establish governments
among themselves.241
The notion that legitimate government derives its authority
from a hypothetical contract binding all citizens to obedience to
law appears repeatedly in the political theories of the last four
centuries.242 In all these theories, just social arrangements are
those to which free and equal rational people would agree, were
they to find themselves in a situation where no laws or sociopoliti-
cal organizations had control over individuals. Hobbes, 243 among
others, termed such a situation a "state of nature," where individu-
als, lacking civil governments, relied solely on themselves for
protection. He imagined this state to be a dismal anarchy, a war of
all against all, which he describes in this famous passage from
241. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... .
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
242. Because contractarian political theory forms the basis for my justification for
psychiatrists' participation in the capital sentencing process, I note a few of the histori-
cally-important works on the philosophy: John Locke, The Second Treatise of Governmen
OF Crm GOvERNmENT AND LEmrER ON TOLERATION 3 (J.W. Gough ed., 2d ed. Basil
Blackwell 1956) (1698); HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) (Fredrick Pollock, ed.,
1957) (10th ed. 1884); and J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRAT: A CRITICAL STUDY
OF rrs DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1957). Contractarian theory justifies punishment by arguing
that citizens have agreed to accept state coercion in exchange for the benefits and
protections of a society ruled by law. Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice:
An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J.
1787, 1790 (1992) (noting that individuals consent to state-imposed restrictions on liberty).
Although its roots may be traced to antiquity, contractarian theory "first came to promi-
nence in the seventeenth century", i. at 1791 n.24, through such influential writings as
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press 1991)
(1651); and 3 (J.W. Gough ed., 2d ed. Basil Blackwell 1956) (1698) and JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SocIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (1762).
Contractarian theory remains a powerful influence which forms the basis of important
modem works. E.g., JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965).
243. The Hobbesian version of contractarianism allows for a partial defense against what
have been termed "Marxist" critiques of other versions (e.g., Kant's theories). Marxist cri-
tiques argue that crime is caused primarily by economic conditions; and that since society
is responsible for these conditions, to claim that the individual has either chosen to com-
mit a crime or to accept the conditions and contract imposed by society is inaccurate.
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified
42 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 276-97.
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Leviathan:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre,
where every man is Enemy t6 every man; the same is
consequent to the time, wherein men live without other
security, than what their own strength, and their own in-
vention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there
is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncer-
tain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Naviga-
tion, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving,
and removing such things as require much force; no
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time;
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life
of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.2'
Hobbes believed that rational individuals would want to extricate
themselves from this dismal state. 45 To achieve this end, they
would surrender their individual power and right of absolute self-
government to a sovereign,2  who would then have the power to
defend them from the injuries of each other. This sovereign would
retain the right to punish subjects "as he should think fit, for the
preservation of them all."247
244. HOBBES, supra note 242, at 89.
245. Residents of inner cities provide an obvious example. Nicholas Lemann described
the conditions that existed in the mid-1970s in the Robert Taylor Homes, a public hous-
ing project in Chicago:
After... [Larry Haynes, son of Ruby Haynes] left, there were no adult men
permanently in residence on Ruby's floor in 5135. The unemployment rate in
their section of the project rose during the seventies from 18.6 per cent to 31.4
per cent. Several times in the late 1960s and early 1970s police were fired
upon by snipers in the windows of high-rise public-housing projects; in 1975, a
policeman was killed by a sniper in [another project] .... visitors to the
project from the outside world - firemen, emergency medical technicians, poll
takers, bill collectors, delivery men, salesmen, social workers, maintenance
workers, truant officers, sociologists - were often robbed or roughed up, and
as a result most of these people found excuses not to go there any more.
When gang members and other vandals incapacitated the elevators, they
weren't speedily repaired .... Problems with the heat, water, electricity, and
fire alarms were also slow to be fixed. The project was becoming a world unto
itself, completely cut off from the institutions and mores of the wider society.
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMIsED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT
CHANGED AMERICA 266 (1991).
246. HOBBES, supra note 242, at 117-21.
247. Id at 214.
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Hobbes's account is one of many versions of the thesis that
justifies punishment on the basis of benefits (such as self-preser-
vation or the opportunities available in well-developed civil society)
that accrue even to those who are punished. Socrates was perhaps
the earliest proponent of the notion that citizens make a bargain
with the polity, receiving its benefits in exchange for a commit-
ment to, among other things, accepting punishment as a cost of
breaking the law.248
Notwithstanding differences in intellectual temperament (as well
as differences in historical setting), the 18th century philosopher
Rousseau arrived at justifications for punishment quite similar to
those offered earlier by Socrates and Hobbes.249 Punishment is
the price we pay for self-preservation: "[i]t is in order that we may
not fall victims to an assassin that we consent to die ourselves if
we ourselves turn assassins."2- 0 Each of us willingly consents to
punish murderers and thieves, since not doing so would establish
the freedom of others to kill or rob us.2 '
Kant, a great admirer of Rousseau, 2  adapted Rousseau's
conception of the proper subordination of individuals to a "general
will" 3 to his own moral philosophy. Rousseau's notion of the
248. See, e.g., Plato, Crito, in SOCRATES, THE MAN AND HIS TEACHINGS 54 (FJ.
Church trans., R.J. Mason et al., eds., 1955) (discussing the death of Socrates). Socrates'
followers encouraged him to flee Athens to avoid the death sentence, his punishment for
corrupting the city's youth. Socrates argued that gratitude and a sense of fairness required
that he accept punishment, for he had benefited for seventy years from the protection of
the laws of Athens. If he had fled the city to escape execution, he would have broken
his bargain with the Laws, a bargain that he had made willingly and with knowledge of
its implications, a bargain that he could have revoked at any time he wished by leaving
the city.
249. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
250. ROUSSEAU, supra note 242, at 32.
251. ROGER D. MASTERS, THE POLmcAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU 331 (1968).
252. For example:
[Kant] maintained throughout his life a severe regimen. It was arranged with
such regularity that people set their clocks according to his daily walk along
the street named for him, 'The Philosopher's Walk." Until old age prevented
him, he is said to have missed this regular appearance only on the occasion
when Rousseau's tOmile so engrossed him that for several days he stayed at
home.
10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 390, 393 (1979).
253. Rousseau stated-
If... we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall
find . . . the following terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power
in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corpo-
rate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
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universalization of the "maxims"' governing action plays a cen-
tral role in determining whether conduct is permissible. Kant's
approach to the exploration of the justification of criminal sanc-
tionsF' has received its most prominent modem expression in the
writings of John Rawls' Both Kant and Raws believe that a
system of just laws and criminal sanctions rationally would be
chosen by criminals themselves if they were freed from their idio-
syncratic preferences,' and were asked to develop social regula-
ROUSSEAU, supra note 242, at 15.
[What makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common
interest uniting them; for, under this system, each necessarily submits to the
conditions he imposes on others .... [Tihe social compact sets up among the
citizens an equality of such a kind[ ] that they ... bind themselves to observe
the same conditions and should therefore . . . enjoy the same rights ....
[E]very authentic act of the general will[], binds or favors all the citizens
equally ....
Id. at 30.
254. "Mhe conformity of actions to universal law . . . must serve the will as its prin-
ciple. That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that
my maxim should become a universal law." KANT'S GROUNDWORK, supra note 236, at
70.
255. For a general discussion of Kant's political theories, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, KANT:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1970) [hereinafter THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
256. See, e.g., John Rawls' magnum opus, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (Although not
primarily concerned with punishment, the book outlines Rawis' views on punishment's
justification as a stabilizer of just social relationships.). For a discussion of the relation-
ships between Kant's and Rawis's theories of punishment, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RET-
RIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAY. ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 77-92 (1979)
[hereinafter RETRmBurIoN].
257. Being freed from "idiosyncratic preferences" is implicit in Kant's universalization
test. It is also an explicit feature of Rawls's philosophy, embodied in his notions of the
"original position" and the "veil of ignorance." Rawls argues that the conditions needed
for making objective decisions are contained in an imaginary situation where hypothetical
individuals convene to choose principles to govern themselves. The parties are aware of
the nature of the world, but are ignorant of their own particular status in it. See RAWLS,
supra note 242, at 17-22, 136-42.
An oft-repeated critique of Rawlsian contract theory is that it ignores one of the
major benefits of civil society: the moral upbringing from which comes our sense of what
morally acceptable political agreements would be.
In a world where people raise children, live in communities, and value friend-
ships, a moral theory that demands rational cognition to the degree that Rawls's
does is little help and may well be a burden. It teaches people to distrust what
will help them most - their personal attachments to those they know - and
value what will help them least - abstract principles that, for all their
philsophical brilliance, are a poor guide to the moral dilemmas of everyday
life .... Having sacrificed their affective and known bonds for abstract
principles, and having yielded their capacity to empathize and interpret in favor
of a capacity to reflect, how would such principled individuals govern their
moral obligations in a thoroughly secularized society?
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ions to govern their community. Punishment is justified as a logi-
cally-required institution, the necessary outcome of rational, moral
relations among rational, moral beings. It would be chosen as a
form of sacrifice by all citizens as part of their "hypothetical ratio-
nal consent" to the requirements of justice."8 Criminal sanctions
are justified by the criminal's implicit, rational promise to submit
himself "along with everyone else to those laws which, if there are
any criminals among the people, will naturally include penal
laws." 5
9
Hypothetical consent theory prescribes schemes of punishment
that are, in the literal sense of the word, retributive: the wrong-
doer, through punishment, fulfills his obligation to "pay back"
society as the cost of his disobedience. 26° By committing a crime,
ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER?: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 125 (1989).
See also DWORKIN, supra note 187, at 173-77 (arguing that Rawls' position is too ab-
stract and removed from the real world). However, Rawls's theory is neither intended as
a comprehensive or exclusionary psychological technique, nor as social psychology; it is a
philosophical account of what considerations people should have when they contemplate
the requirements of a just polity:
The conception of the original position is not intended to explain human con-
duct except insofar as it tries to account for our moral judgments and helps to
explain our having a sense of justice .... So while the conception of the
original position is part of the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that
there are actual situations that resemble it. What is necessary is that the princi-
ples that would be accepted play the requisite part in our moral reasoning and
conduct.
RAWLS, supra note 242, at 120-21. Note, finally, that the "veil of ignorance" is not a
feature in Hobbesian contract theory; on Hobbes' account, those in a "state of nature"
need not see themselves as perfect equals to appreciate the benefits that accrue from civil
government. This aspect of Hobbesian theory is discussed further. See infra note 282.
258. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 509, 516-17 (1987) [hereinafter Does Kant Have a Theoyy?] (summarizing and ques-
tioning the consistency of Kant's view of punishment as necessary for individuals to
enjoy a maximum amount of liberty compatible with similar liberty for others).
259. KANT'S METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 231, at 105.
260. Hypothetical consent theory does not require that society punish each and every
criminal; rather, it tells us why punishment in general is justified, why there are good
reasons ordinarily to punish criminals and why, in a just legal system, the commission of
a criminal offense is a sufficient reason to subject a guilty person to a punishment that is
(one would hope, at least roughly) proportional to the magnitude of his crimes. Retribu-
tion, in this literal sense, refers to the basis of a criminal debt to society. In judging an
individual's guilt, however, there is room to draw distinctions among criminals, to consid-
er individual situations, to consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances in assigning
particular punishments and even to consider "forgiving" some "debts." The criminal law
allows those who commit crimes to adduce a variety of mitigating circumstances and
recognizes that each case brings with it a host of unique factors that may be relevant to
sentencing. It also allows wrongdoers to obtain immunity via agreements to testify against
others, and to be excused from punishment when procedural or constitutional rights are
[Vol. 43:1
THE PSYCHIATRIST AND EXECUTION COMPETENCY
the criminal has selected an alternative means, undergoing punish-
ment, rather than the usual method, obedience, of repaying his
fellow citizens for the benefits he receives by virtue of their sacri-
fices in upholding the law.261 To those citizens who choose to
obey the law, the expectation that those who disobey will be pun-
ished provides assurance that their sacrifice will be acknowledged
by a society that expects reciprocation even from those who choose
not to obey.
Legal texts?' commonly list, among the justifications of pun-
ishment, the three future-oriente 263  goals of 1) incapacitating
those whose acts threaten society (special deterrence), 2) providing
disincentives for potential offenders (general deterrence), and 3)
offering offenders the potential for rehabilitation. In addition, these
texts discuss a fourth goal, the past-oriented goal of retribution.
Retribution is a troublesome justification because of its historical
association with the view that punishment offers society emotional
satisfaction, and provides a socially-acceptable means for citizens
violated. See generally YALE KAMIsAR Er AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed.
1989).
Consequently, what Morawetz terms "the weak form of retributivism which merely
asserts that only the guilty should be eligible for punishment" seems most in accord with
our collective sense of what justice requires. Thomas H. Morawetz, Retributivism and
Justice, 16 CONN. L REV. 803, 814 (1984). For a general discussion of this point, see id.
at 812-15. This "weak form" is consistent with Kant's notion of a social obligation to
punish criminals, although Kant is typically associated with a "strong form" of
retributivism that always requires punishment of all guilty persons. Kant himself may have
been somewhat inconsistent in his writings about'what conditions except society from this
obligation. See Does Kant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 509, 512-13. See also
infra notes 285-88 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to punish).
261. See THE PHIOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 255, at 142-143 (discussing Kant's
theory of punishment as an obligation to be analyzed in terms of reciprocity).
262. See, eg., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)
(2d ed. 1986), and PACKER, supra note 234, at 35-61.
263. "Future-oriented" parallels Morawetz's term "forward-looking" to describe what are
also called "utilitarian" goals of punishment. See Morawetz, supra note 260, at 818. He
feels that "utilitarianism" is a "tainted" term because of its association "with the notion
that happiness or satisfaction is only contingently or accidentally related to the moral
features of a social context. A context in which the greatest happiness is gained by the
greatest number may or may not be a just society; its justice remains to be demonstrat-
ed." Id. Morawetz cites Hart's recognition that utilitarianism ignores of what we usually
take to be "uncontroversial" values. Id. (referring to HERBERT L A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 195 (1968)). The utilitarian's response to this critique should be that moral fea-
tures are definitionally related to happiness. If there is a conflict between our utilitarian
calculus and conventional values, either the calculus was wrong (and the "arithmetic"
should be "checked") or the values need revision. The term "future-oriented" focuses
attention on utilitarian defenses of a practice, ie., the practice's consequences.
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both to express their disgust and to experience a sense of re-
venge.2" Retribution can be distinguished logically from revenge
on grounds that, whatever our individual feelings about an offender
may be, the goals of retribution are the collective goals of justice.
Justice requires us to direct our attention to a rational and dispas-
sionate determination of what kind of punishment a criminal de-
serves.
265
Retribution remains problematic, however, even when distin-
guished from revenge. Retribution authorizes punishment for com-
mitting a crime simply because the criminal deserves punishment,
regardless of whether any other clear benefit will occur as a result
of the punishment. Retributive thinking is pointless to those who
fashion and justify punishment practices with a view to how they
will make the future better.26 But as Michael Moore points out,
264. This idea has been seen as both a defense of punishment and a reason for
criticizing it.
We punish and blame people to express our resentment and disapproval of their
deeds and our detestation of the ugliness of character that their crimes bespeak.
Both in praising and in blaming we intend the deserved treatment to hit home
and to sink in deep, to mark our judgments of the person in virtue of the
deed.
Stanley C. Brubaker, In Praise of Punishment, 97 THE PUBLIC INTEREsT 44, 49 (1989).
See also JAMES F. STEPHEN, LmERTY, EQUALriy, FRATERNITY 161 (1873) (punishment is
undertaken "for the sake of gratifying the feeling of hatred - call it revenge, resentment,
or what you will - which the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily con-
stituted minds"); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1623, 1647-57 (1992) (retributive theories of punishment are associated with the legiti-
mation and even glorification of anger and hatred); MENNINGER, supra note 224, at 190:
[B]ehind what we do to the offender is the desire for revenge on some-
one . . . . We call it a wish to see justice done, i.e., to have him 'punished."
But in the last analysis this turns out to be a thin cloak for vengeful feelings
directed against a legitimized object.
Personal revenge we have renounced, but official legalized revenge we
can still enjoy.
265. 'Criminals should get what they deserve, but their deserts are determined by fair
enforcement of the principles of right, and not by a counting up of the public outrage."
Alexander E. Rawls, Of Rawls, Responsibility, and Retribution, 99 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
130 (1990). In a similar vein, Morawetz notes Strawson's comparison of resentment and
justified disapproval.
Unlike resentment, justified disapproval carries with it a claim to be able to
justify or demonstrate that the disapproved conduct violates shared norms of
mutual respect and dignity. Resentment is a personal responsive attitude toward
actions affecting oneself, while disapproval is a responsive attitude backed by
reasons and concerned with actions affecting oneself or others.
Morawetz, supra note 260, at 816 (emphasis added); see also P. F. STRAWSON, FREEDoM
AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-25 (1974) (arguing that different views of deter-
minism are actually expressions of different moral attitudes).
266. Morawetz, supra note 260, at 804. As Murphy points out, this is not a valid
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retributivism underlies the societal sense of right and wrong and
who should be punished.2  We do not condone punishing a per-
son whom we know is innocent,26 even if doing so would keep
him from committing future criminal acts, would deter genuine
criminals or would provide him the opportunity for moral improve-
ment. We do condone punishing a justly-convicted person (e.g., a
Nazi found guilty of crimes committed nearly five decades ago)
simply because he deserves it, even when it produces no clear
social benefit.
Hypothetical consent justification of criminal sanctions reinforc-
es our moral intuitions about whether punishment of an individual
is defensible. Consent theory reconceptualizes retributive punish-
ment as serving the common good. As Hobbes and other contract
theorists point out, our hypothetical consent to subject ourselves to
rules of law stabilizes and secures for us the opportunities of civil
society. This stability and security allow us to make plans and act
with the expectation that our lawful treatment of others will be
reciprocated to everyone's mutual advantage. A system of punish-
ment that reflects shared notions about acceptable conduct provides
a public mechanism for both expressing those notions and affirm-
ing the law's relationship to shared moral values, even if it does
not deter or reform criminals.
The "good" that is served by imposing retributive punishment
is not a utilitarian good. Retributive punishment does not yield any
particular, specific, tangible, or expected social benefits. The mutual
advantage supported by a criminal justice system that stabilizes
fair, reciprocal arrangements among persons merely allows them to
criticism of retributivist theory. 'If 'pointless' is to be analyzed as "disutilitarian', then the
whole question is being begged. You cannot refute a retributive theory merely by noting
that it is a retributive theory and not a utilitarian theory. The circle here is not large
enough even to be interesting." THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 255, at 141.
267. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
233-243 (1984) (positing that retribution, utilitarianism and a combination of the two
theories are the only prima facie justifications of punishment. Retribution is an integral
element in both utilitarianism and the combination theory).
268. Laws governing the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill may constitute a
partial exception. These authorize detaining persons who are not charged with or convicted
of violent acts, but who are believed to represent a substantial risk of harm to others.
Although such individuals are incarcerated in hospitals rather than in prisons, they may
not necessarily receive any treatment - indeed, they have a right to refuse treatment.
Hospitalization for such persons is little different from being jailed from the standpoint of
individual liberty interests. See Paul S. Appelbaum, 7e New Preventive Detention:
Psychiatry's Problematic Responsibility for the Control of Violence, 145 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 779 (1988).
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act as rational beings, to organize their lives around rational plans,
and to have reasonable expectations about the fulfillment of those
plans.269 Retributive punishment in this way ultimately preserves
the opportunity for rational action. This opportunity is essential to
any conception of the good that includes individual dignity, self-
respect, and autonomy.
Punishment thus affirms and respects an individual's humanity
in the same way that ethical medicine does. Medical treatment
generally2 .. is permissible not because it will benefit others or
society, or even because the doctor knows treatment would benefit
the patient himself, but because the patient has consented to it.
Punishment is permissible neither because it will deter others or the
criminal himself, nor because it will rehabilitate and thus confer a
concrete expected benefit to him, but because the criminal has
implicitly consented to it.27 Medical treatment may further prac-
tical goals (just as may punishment), but it is constrained by re-
spect for individuals' humanity and autonomy, and is justified only
by virtue of the non-consequentialist reason that the patient and
doctor have consented to its undertaking. Medical treatment and
criminal punishment share the central ethical imperative that per-
sons must not be regarded as means to the fulfillment of societal
goals, but as ends in themselves - "self-originating sources of
claims who also have moral power to develop and change their
own conceptions of the good."2"
269. Rawls explains why this "mutual advantage" should be recognized by everyone in
his "thin" (or minimal) theory of the good. This theory stipulates that persons, as rational
individuals, seek to organize their activities around rational plans, and thus require those
minimal things necessary to the fulfillment of any rational plan. These minimal require-
ments include self-respect and a modicum of possessions. See RAwLS, supra note 242, at
62, 92, 396-99, 433-39, 447.
The law clearly addresses itself to persons who organize their lives rationally and
thus should be interested in the minimal requirements for doing so. See MoOR, supra
note 267, at 44-112 (discussing "the legal view of persons") and infra notes 306-27 and
accompanying text.
270. There are exceptions, but these should be recognized as "proving the rule." Persons
with tuberculosis, for example, can be confined and treated so long as they are conta-
gious. But a legal theory that places the highest value on individual freedom will recog-
nize that individuals must co-exist; thus, such quarantining is allowable in a society that,
to use Rawls' words, guarantees "an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty com-
patible with a similar liberty for others." RAWLS, supra note 242, at 60.
271. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
272. Samuel J.M. Donnelly, The Goals of Criminal Punishment: A Rawlsian Theory
(Ultimately Grounded in Multiple Views Concerned with Human Dignity), 41 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 741, 747 (1990) (discussing John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,
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The crucial thrust of Kant's claim that society is morally obli-
gated to punish criminals is that criminals are ends in themselves.
A person's humanity generates the obligation to treat him as an
end in himself, and prohibits a just system of criminal punishment
from invoking societal goals when determining who is to be pun-
ished.2'3 If respect for the humanity of others prescribes that pun-
ishment be rendered if and only if someone is guilty 274 it also
prohibits ignoring the humanity of those who are guilty; refraining
from punishing a criminal does not respect his humanity.2 5 Hu-
manity entitles us to experience the logical consequences of our
acts. We implicitly, 'communally promise to obey the law and to
punish the disobedient. Failure to punish a criminal is failure to
give him what his humanity entities him to.
276
Kantian contractarianism 27 has some problematic features,
77 J. PHIL. 515, 520-522 (1980)).
273. Kant's theory thus would prohibit imposing harsh punishment on a criminal for the
purpose of 'sending other criminals a message.' Of course, if a criminal's (deservedly)
harsh punishment incidentally were to deter other would-be criminals from wrongdoing,
this would be acceptable on Kant's theory. "Judicial punishment can never be used merely
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has commit-
ted a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the
purposes of someone else." KANT'S METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 231, at 100.
274. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text (summarizing necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for punishment).
275. Note that this argument only establishes a prima facie obligation to punish. It does
not preclude adducing mitigating circumstances, which might allow a person to escape
punishment but still allow his humanity to be respected.
276. Hegel provides a succinct version of this argument: punishment vindicates the
individual's will and freedom, and affirms "the formal rationality of the individual's voli-
tion." HEGEL, supra note 234, at 71. Respect for the criminal entails a right to be pun-
ished, for by being punished "the criminal is honoured as a rational being .... He is
denied this honour ... if he is regarded simply as a harmful animal which must be
rendered harrless, or punished with a view to deterring or reforming him." Id
277. Although the above discussion has relied heavily on Kant's moral and judicial -
philosophy, I should point out that I view differences between Kant's theories and those
of other contract theorists as more or less reconcilable.
Kant theorizes that the motivation for punishment arises as the logical consequence
of an appreciation of the individual's autonomy and rationality. Hobbes and Rawls believe
punishment stabilizes a system of relationships - a "social fabric" - that makes it pos-
sible to pursue otherwise-unavailable opportmities to achieve happiness. Hobbes' and
Rawls' theories speak to opportunities, rather than specific consequences of punishment
(e.g., deterring someone). These later theories focus on and elaborate the purpose of pun-
ishment. Kant's theory, on the other hand, focuses on punishment's logical and moral
justification.
As Donnelly points out, one can incur an obligation to repair the fabric of society
only
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however. Hypothetical consent theory presumes that there can be
no objection in principle to social arrangements that would be
established by free, rational, uncoerced parties to an original social
contract. But how does hypothetical consent theory affect our
thinking about arrangements in the world as we actually find it?
Among those convicted of crimes, willingness to undergo punish-
ment is unusual. Unlike Socrates,27 criminals typically retain
lawyers to help them avoid conviction, and once convicted, they
rarely ask to be punished.279 Why should anyone, especially crim-
because one is a free, equal, and moral person engaged in social cooperation
with others. In that context one respects others as persons by repairing the fab-
ric of society. Those imposing punishment respect both the criminal, by punish-
ing him in a manner consistent, with his obligation as a free, equal, and moral
member of society, and other persons in society, by repairing the fabric of
society.
Donnelly, supra note 272, at 765. Donnelly and Rawls see punishment as limited by
desert, but also require that punishment repair the fabric of society. Donnelly, id., and
RAWLS, supra note 242, at 313-15. If the "damage" done by an individual criminal to the
"fabric of society" were an empirically-verifiable entity (a "rip" or a "tear" or some "fray-
ing around the fabric's edges"), I could accept this "damage" as an important consequence
of crime, and thus see an important difference between, for example, Rawls or Donnelly
and Kant.
Of course, it may be the case that widespread criminal activity would have socially
deleterious consequences. But the "damage" done by an individual criminal to the "social
fabric" of a generally law-abiding society seems to be appreciable only by those who
maintain a sense of fairness and a concern that justice be done. The "damage" creates a
logical duty to repair the "fabric" of social cooperation. This duty is logically grounded
in implicit promises or a hypothetical contract. The only way to measure such damage is
to determine the trangressor's level of criminal guilt. I do not see how, as Donnelly
claims, "[t]he repair of social relations" achieved through punishment has any concrete
effect on social circumstances "and thereby reaches out to Utilitarian thought and crime
control goals of criminal punishment." Donnelly, supra note 272, at 792. My analysis,
therefore, suggests that the practical difference between RawIDonnelly and Kant is mini-
mal.
Another approach to reconciling apparent differences between Kant and Rawls is
contained in Murphy's writings. For example, he sees both as analyzing political obliga-
tion in terms of reciprocity and the fair distribution of benefits:
In order to enjoy the benefits that a legal system makes possible, each man
must be prepared to make an important sacrifice - namely, the sacrifice of
obeying the law even when he does not desire to do so .... Now if the
system is to remain just, it is important to guarantee that those who disobey
will not thereby gain an unfair advantage over those who obey voluntarily.
Criminal punishment thus attempts to maintain the proper balance between
benefit and obedience by insuring that there is no profit in criminal wrongdo-
ing.
RETRIBUTION, supra note 256, at 77.
278. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing Socrates' acceptance of his
death sentence).
279. There are exceptions:
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inal wrongdoers ° be concerned, motivated, or obligated by what
they would consent to under counterfactual circumstances?"'
From his death-row cell, [Martin] Rojas [convicted of rape and murder
in 1988] filed a motion with the [Ohio Supreme Court Thursday [November
15, 1991], asking it to... "direct the state of Ohio to carry out the sentence
of... death by electrocution."
Rojas said after his trial and death sentence in 1988 ... that he wanted
to be executed. "If the death sentence is not imposed, then justice will not be
completed," he told the judges.
Dave Beasley, Murderer Requests Own Electrocution, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Novem-
ber 16, 1991, at Cl. See also supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing Gary
Gilmore).
While criminals try to evade punishment, they do so through plea bargains, grants of
immunity in exchange for testimony, protestations of innocence, claims of extenuating or
mitigating circumstances, or pleas for mercy. Rarely do criminals claim that the law's
prescribed consequences for disobedience simply ought not apply to them. Even if this is
simply because the law assumes its own validity and constrains the claims they may
make, it reflects criminals' awareness of the general expectation that punishment follow
crime.
280. Kant's legal theory, on its face, seems to have little to do with reality. In what he
has characterized as a "Marxist" objection to Kantian retributivism, Murphy writes:
The retributive theory really presupposes what might be called a "gentlemen's
club" picture of the relation between man and society - i.e., men are viewed
as being part of a community of shared values and rules. The rules benefit all
concerned and, as a kind of debt for the benefits derived, each man owes
obedience to the rules. In the absence of ... obedience, [each man] deserves
punishment.. . . For, as a rational man, he can see that the rules benefit ev-
eryone (himself included) and that he would have selected them in the original
position of choice.
Now this may not be too far off for certain kinds of criminals - e.g.,
business executives guilty of tax fraud. .... But to think that it applies to the
typical criminal, from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of social and
political fantasy .... [These criminals] certainly would be hard-pressed to
name the benefits for which they are supposed to owe obedience.
RErRmUTION, supra note 256, at 107. Decency, Murphy writes, demands that we object
to punishing "those who, in a socially uneven community, always get the short end of
the stick." Id. at 80. See supra text accompanying note 245 (discussing this problem fur-
ther).
281. Rawls's answer to this question is that the duty of justice is a fundamental natural
duty.
Now in contrast with obligations, it is characteristic of natural duties that they
apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts ....
... Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is
reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do
his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent
of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. Thus even though the princi-
ples of natural duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not
presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in
order to apply. The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles
for institutions are those that would be acknowledged in the original position.
RAWLS, supra note 241, at 114-15. While this argument is both intellectually and emo-
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There are a variety of reasons to assume that most individu-
als2 2 ought to be motivated to accept conditions of a social con-
tract that obligates them to undergo punishment should they be-
come criminals. Some people can really be motivated by hypothet-
ical consent theory's appeal to our sense of justice and fair-
nesS, 2 3 which suggests that we abjure illegitimate social advan-
tages such as those achieved through criminal acts. A purely egois-
tic view would lead others to consent to fair social arrangements
because these are in everyone's long-term self-interest.'
Hobbes's arguments about the dangers and misery of anarchy, and
the benefits to all persons of stable governments and social ar-
rangements, 285 "appeal to enlightened long-run prudence as a mo-
tionally satisfactory, its opponents would argue:
[Hypothetical consent] theory says that someone ought morally to do something
if and only if an ideal unbiased observer would approve of his doing it; but
the theory does not say how the reactions of such a hypothetical unbiased ideal
observer give a typically biased actual person a reason to do anything, because
the theory does not say why anyone should care about the reactions of this
imaginary person.
GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALTr 91 (1977). Rawls would direct the
skeptic's attention to a sense of fairness. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 242, at 18, 21,
587 (stating that principles of justice should not favor any specific individual).
Zimmerman argues that the force of hypothetical consent theories derives from its appeal
to "second-order" desires for impartiality, rationality, and consistency; these second-order
desires put constraints on, among other things, what kind of political arrangements we can
support. See generally David Zimmerman, The Force of Hypothetical Commitment, 93
ETMICS 467 (1983).
282. In Rawls's theory, the social contractors are unaware (by virtue of the "veil of
ignorance") of their own endowments, but in reality, we know who we are. As Kavka
points out, however, Hobbesian political theory - which assumes contractors are aware of
who they really are and are motivated essentially by egoistic considerations - explains
why our real individual differences do not undermine the validity of a hypothetical social
contract. Individuals of very different endowments all can expect to benefit from the
mutual constraints characteristic of civil society, for these restrictions are far preferable to
life in a "state of Warre;" in this sense, they would "operate essentially as equals, and
the social arrangements they [would] select may properly be regarded as reasonable and
morally justified." Kavka, supra note 229, at 404. See also HOBBES, supra note 242, at
86-90 (discussing the essential equality of men in the state of nature). As the following
discussion elaborates, "predominant egoism" elaborates motives for cooperating with just
social arrangements. See KAVKA, supra note 229, at 405-07, for a fuller exposition of
"predominant egoism."
283. See Rawis, supra note 242, at 453-512 (discussing our "sense of justice.")
284. Egoism is consistent with appeals to justice and fair play. See generally KAVKA,
supra note 229, at 357-84 (explaining that egoism gives preference to the well-being of
the actor and, like utilitananism would ensure that all persons would be treated as fairly
as possible).
285. Reich suggests that these kinds of considerations historically have appealed to
Americans. He cites de Tocqueville:
[Vol. 43:1
THE PSYCHL4TRSTAND EXECUTION COMPETENCY
tive of obedience" to the dictates of a reasonably fair legal sys-
tem.8 6 Prudence also suggests, to those unmoved by any of the
previous reasons for acquiescence to the law, that anyone who
refuses to make sacrifices along with the vast majority will be
regarded by their fellow citizens as an enemy of the state. The vast
majority would be inclined to treat recalcitrants in a very hostile
manner. 
2V
Criminals (along with everyone else) accept political obliga-
tions in exchange for the benefits they receive as citizens. "In
particular, it may be argued that a citizen in a stable law-governed
society receives from his fellow citizens numerous important bene-
fits following from their general compliance with the civil law and
therefore owes them similar compliance on his own part as a mat-
ter of fairness. 2 8 In other words, those who benefit when their
fellow citizens accept social burdens and constraints on personal
liberty must be expected to accept similar burdens and constraints
themselves.28 9 Particular criminals may not always realize they
benefit from social cooperation and general obedience to law, but
'The Americans,' Tocqueville noted, 'are fond of explaining almost all the
actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest rightly understood, they
show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly
prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a
portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state.'
It is an important insight. Americans have willingly sacrificed for the
nation's well-being because - Americans have repeatedly claimed - such
sacrifices are ultimately in their own best interests.
ROBERT B. REICH, TIHE WORK OF NATIONS 23-24 (1991) (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQJEVMLL, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMEIUCA 122 (Henry Reeve trans., Francis Bowden et
al., eds., Alfred E. Knopf 1945) (1840)).
286. KAVKA, supra note 229, at 406.
287. Id. at 416. See also HOBBE , supra note 242, at 121-29. Kavka discusses the prob-
lem of how a satisfactory legal system may treat those recalcitrant independents
who refuse to acknowledge an obligation to obey the laws ....
On grounds of peace and self-defense ('f nothing else), the State and its
citizens may justifiably enforce . .. the fundamental rules of conduct necessary
for civil peace. Thus, independents can rightly be prevented and deterred from
killing, assaulting, stealing, ... and so forth, so long as they are provided
with similar protection from others (should they wish it). Further, on grounds
of fair play they may be required to pay their full share of the costs of these
fundamental protections .... [B]ecause there are moral grounds of political
obedience besides hypothetical consent, independents in the satisfactory State are
not morally free to do as they please.
KAVKA, supra note 229, at 416-17 (citation omitted).
288. I4 at 409.
289. See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 255, at 142 (arguing that Kant's theo-
ry of punishment is based on reciprocity).
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they do, and their ignorance or ignorement of this fact does not
excuse them from the requirements of fairness and justice. 9°
Most criminals, if asked prior to their own arrests, would want and
expect protection from being murdered, assaulted, or robbed, and
would want and expect those who committed crimes against them
to be prosecuted and punished. Of course, some criminals do not
have this expectation, and others might legitimately doubt whether
a particular criminal justice system would do this reliably and
fairly; but these expectations and doubts are not sufficient to un-
dermine the principle of requiring punishment for those who fail to
adhere to just laws.
A final argument for the force of hypothetical consent derives
from the common experience that "the homely challenge 'How
would you like it if someone did that to you?' is frequently an
effective way to get someone to see that he is in fact committed to
an impartial point of view."29 It is a central feature of normal
moral development" that one becomes capable of recognizing
that one's own individual interests are set within a social context
where multiple, competing interests have equal claim to satisfac-
tion. As Zimmerman explains,
It is a mistake to think that the desire to act impartially is
easily escapable just because it is a feature of one's empiri-
cal self and thus contingent .... I do not decide to take
seriously the interests of persons qua persons. It is a deep
feature of my psychological makeup which I encounter in
myself as motivational rock bottom. 93
290. This source of obligation is discussed more fully in KAVKA, supra note 229, at
409-13. Kavka concludes that "a carefully developed fair-play account of political obliga-
tion might actually apply to a large number of people, including some citizens of
nonsatisfactory States." Id at 413.
291. Zimmerman, supra note 281, at 481.
292. Jean Piaget, the pioneering developmental psychologist, writes:
The ethics of mutual respect, which is that of good (as opposed to duty), and
of autonomy, leads, in the domain of justice, to the development of equality,
which is the idea at the bottom of distributive justice and of reciprocity ....
As the child grows up . . . unilateral respect [for adults and the authority they
represent] tends of itself to grow into mutual respect and to the state of coop-
eration which constitutes the normal equilibrium.
JEAN PIAGET, Tim MORAL JUDGMENT op TmE CHILD 324 (Maujorie Gabain trans., Free
Press 1966) (1932).
293. Zimmerman, supra note 281, at 482 (emphasis added). Zimmerman concludes that
anyone who merely tries "to monitor his beliefs and desires in accordance with principles
of epistemic rationality" is committed to acknowledging the force of hypothetical coin-
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V. WHY Is PARTICIPATION PERMISSIBLE?
Contractarian theory supports the prima facie assumption that
individuals are bound by a reasonably fair criminal justice system's
rules concerning obedience to the law and infliction of punish-
ment.2  If citizens would give their rational consent to these
rules from an antecedent position of choice, a citizen who breaks
the law is presumptively obligated to undergo appropriate
punishment.2  This obligation provides guidance to psychiatrists
for fording the murky, ethically-treacherois waters swirling around
execution competency proceedings.
Prisoners who are so ill that they lack execution competence
would likely fail to meet competence standards to give informed
consent for evaluation or treatment"' However, present legal and
ethical doctrine advises physicians dealing with incompetent pa-
tients to defer to what those patients' wishes would be if they were
competent, provided those wishes can be determined." Assuming
that a just conviction implies that the criminal met minimum stan-
dards of rationality at the time of the offense, hypothetical consent
theory posits that the criminal, in committing the offense, made a
valid choice to be punished.29 From a choice to be punished one
can reasonably infer a choice to accept the lawful means to bring
about punishment. In the case of the incompetent death row in-
mate, the means would include psychiatric evaluation and treat-
ment.
In addition to providing general rules to govern decisionmak-
mitment; 'there is little... point is making moral judgments about the obligations of
creatures who cannot take up any practical attitudes toward their own desires." Id. ai 482-
83.
294. See supra text accompanying note 257 (deriving the justification for punishment
from political obligations to which an individual consents).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59 (discussing contractarian political theory
and the binding obligations this theory imposes on citizens).
296. See supra text accompanying note 158 (discussing the incompetent person's in-
ability to comprehend).
297. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infir-
mities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L REv. 373, 376 (1986) (analyzing the
substituted judgment standard to determine what an incompetent patient would choose if
competent); Elias Baumgarten, Patient Autonomy and the Refusal of Psychotropics Medica-
tions, in DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 13, 21-26 (1983) (finding conscious-
ness is not a prerequisite to autonomy and, therefore, wishes expressed by a competent
person should be respected if that person becomes incompetent).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 248 and 259 (presenting the theory that a
criminal offense is the willing breach of a citizen's bargain with the polity).
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ing, moral reasoning helps resolve apparently contradictory intu-
itions about the right course of action in specific situations.2 As
suggested earlier, a ban on participation would preclude a
psychiatrist's involvement with a condemned inmate who had sin-
cerely and competently requested evaluation and treatment should
he become incompetent.3 'o This ban contradicts society's intuitive
sense that such involvement would be ethical.'ol Banning compe-
tency-restoring evaluation or treatment of a death row inmate runs
counter to sentiments about the psychiatric evaluation or treatment
of a non-capital inmate,' which most would condone 3  even
though it would enable the inmate to face punishment he would
otherwise avoid.
If the criminal justice system and the death penalty are justified
and administered reasonably fairly,' the contractarian argument
that punishment is an appropriate and morally justified response by
society35 resolves these contradictions. The condemned prisoner's
"living will ''3°6 can be honored without breaching medical ethics,
not because the prisoner has given explicit prior consent,3' but
because the prisoner has incurred an obligation. The fulfillment of
this obligation both vindicates his autonomy and confirms his free-
299. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text (describing scenarios that generate
mixed feelings about the proper course of action).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 192-95 (asserting that it is not a perversion of
medical ethics for a psychiatrist to treat a condemned prisoner who made a 'living will"
requesting treatment should he become incompetent).
301. See id.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
303. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (finding that treating an in-
mate with a psychotropic drug to control his manic depression disorder did not violate his
due process rights). It is important to recognize that society condones treatment even if
the prisoner enjoyed being mentally ill, and especially if the prisoner's only reason for
wanting to remain ill was to avoid returning to prison. It would be wrong for a physician
to withhold treatment in collusion with somenne's desire to avoid his obligations. See
supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (explaining that failure to punish a guilty per-
son denies the person's humanity). If Propositions 3-5 (see supra notes 230-32 and ac-
companying text) are correct, then there is no ground for making a distinction between
obligations to undergo capital as opposed to non-capital punishments.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 229-32 (Propositions 2-5).
305. See supra text accompanying note 228 (Proposition 1).
306. See supra text accompanying note 199; see also Bonnie, supra note 30, at 83.
307. Psychiatrists working with prisoners may be emotionally reassured when those pris-
oners have given previous explicit consent for treatment, especially if the prisoners' state-
ments of consent included explicit acknowledgement of the prisoners' duty to undergo
punishment. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (establishing consent as the
basis for treatment and punishment).
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dom. °8 Wrongdoers who are justly convicted find themselves
with a peculiar interest, an interest in undergoing the sacrifice of
liberty attendant upon receiving just punishment A political theory
that holds liberty to be the highest value can tolerate such a sac-
rifice only "for the sake of liberty itself."3o9 The only acceptable
justification of punishment, therefore, must be that the criminal, in
an antecedent position of choice, rationally would have consented
to it because it presents the greater liberty of receiving the benefits
of civil society.310 Respect for the criminal's dignity and freedom
demands that society honor his liberty-enhancing commitments
above all other competing commitments (such as a physician's
commitment to preserve life).311 Honoring those commitments,
psychiatrists ethically can evaluate and treat both capital and non-
capital prisoners, even when psychiatric intervention might lead to
further punishment, not because of some state interest31 in mak-
ing sure punishments are carried out, but because such intervention
furthers prisoners' paramount interest in having the law respect
their dignity and autonomy.
313
308. See supra text accompanying notes 242-43 and 275-76 (describing both the process
by which an individual implicitly consents to punishment and how the failure to give this
punishment deprives the individual of the consideration due him under his contract with
society).
309. RAWLS, supra note 242, at 241.
310. See supra text accompanying note 248 (discussing hypothetical consent theory as a
willing exchange of commitments for benefits).
311. See supra ndtes 235 and 275-76 and accompanying text (admonishing physicians to
acquaint themselves with justifications for intentionally imposing suffering and to uphold
their obligation to preserve the convicted person's dignity).
312. In the exercise of their physicianly skills, doctors ordinarily owe their allegiance to
individual patients and direct their efforts toward treatment interventions that are consistent
with their individual needs. The American Bar Association suggests that the same obliga-
tions apply when physicians engage in decisionmaldng about the psychiatric treatment of
prisoners:
When providing treatment or habilitation for a person charged with or convicted
of a crime, the mental health or mental retardation professional's obligations to
the person and to society derive primarily from those arising out of the treat-
ment or habilitative relationship. Consistent with institutional security require-
ments, correctional and mental health or mental retardation facilities should not
interfere with that traditional professional relationship ....
. . . If therapists or habilitators are to play a helping role, their rela-
tionships with defendants should be structured as far as possible as if it were
an ordinary therapist-patient or habilitator-client relationship. Thus, professional
obligations to patients or clients undergoing treatment or habilitation within the
criminal justice system should be, to the greatest extent possible, identical to
those governing any treatment or habiliation relationship.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standard 7-1.1(d) and cmt. (citation omitted).
313. Professor Bonnie views these considerations as central to the prohibition against
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Another reason to respect the criminal's interest in undergoing
punishment above all other interests comes from a fundamental
societal obligation to respect others' humanity.314 In a discussion
that elucidates the connections between rationality, autonomy, and
personal accountability,315 Moore explains how society's determi-
nation of criminal responsibility establishes the legal and moral
personhood 316 as well as the rationality of the lawbreaker.317
Necessary condition[s] of personhood ... [are] rationality
and autonomy, defined as the ability to perform actions in
response to valid practical inferences .... It is only per-
sons like us - practical reasoners - who are obligated by
moral norms and thus have the capacity to be responsible
(culpable) when we breach them.318
The statement that a criminal "deserves to be punished" is ordinari-
ly a critical one. It is associated with overtones of emotional harsh-
ness and an unwillingness to tolerate human fallibility, to under-
stand difficult circumstances, and to empathize with someone's
misfortune.3"9 Saying that someone deserves punishment seems,
executing the incompetent
[A] contemporary justification for [this] prohibition ...must be found in the
dignity of the condemned.
The prisoner has a right, even under imminent sentence of death, to be
treated as a person, worthy of respect, not as an object of the state's effort to
carry out its promises .... He should have the opportunity to decide...
whether he will repent or go defiantly to his grave. A prisoner who does not
understand the nature and purpose of the execution is not able to exercise the
choices that remain to him. To execute him in this condition is an affront to
his dignity as a person.
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 88.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89 (finding citizens owe each other com-
pliance with the law and the corresponding benefits which result from that compliance).
315. MOORE, supra note 267, at 44-112.
316. Moore argues that the legal and moral guilt of individuals are contingently con-
nected. "We could have laws that assign rights and liabilities in ways that have little
resemblance to moral theory, and they would still be laws. As it happens, however, our
laws do reflect underlying moral theories." Idk at 49.
317. Only entities that are, in Moore's terminology, "practical reasoners" can be eligible
for criminal conviction. Id at 61. A practical reasoner, among other things, is an entity
for whom actions are interpretable as the outcome of valid practical syllogisms, i.e., for
whom explanations are the appropriate means for discussing why they did something. Id.
at 13-14. Moore argues that logically, in order for legal standards to be binding, the
standards must address "practical reasoners capable of forming belief/desire sets around
such laws, and then acting accordingly. If persons were not like this, . . . laws
would have no point." 1d. at 61.
318. Id. at 62.
319. See Dolinko, supra note 264, at 1647-57 (lamenting "harshly punitive attitudes- of
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in a word, uncaring; but there is no logical contradiction between
caring about someone and passing judgment on him. 2 Kant,3 21
Hegel,3n and Moore' remind us that moral and legal
denunciation implicitly affirm our belief in, and paramount concern
for, someone's worthiness as a rational being and his interest in
being respected as a moral agent
If capital punishment is moral and just, one cannot invoke an
incompetent condemned prisoner's "medical interest"32 to oppose
his execution; one cannot adduce any medical concern more impor-
tant than a prisoner's humanity.3' Even if execution is mistaken-
those who would not excuse criminals who have suffered social and economic privations).
320. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (recognizing caring citizens should
share a sense of sadness and empathy when they realize that a system that induces suffer-
ing is necessary).
321. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text (discussing Kant's belief that pun-
ishment is not designed to serve society's ends but the individual's ends, namely
recognition of and respect for the individual's humanity).
322. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (continuing the discussion of punish-
ment as a reaffirmation of an individual's power of choice).
323. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
324. The phrase "medical interest" is taken from the APA/AMA Brief. See supra notes
103-08 and accompanying text (requiring "medical interest" to justify giving involuntary
psychiatric treatment to prisoners).
325. What about life itself? Courts have consistently recognized that "[n]o right is held
more sacred ...than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding a court
cannot order a plaintiff to submit to a surgical examination when the injuries form the
basis of a negligence claim against defendant). The interest an individual or a state may
have in the preservation and sanctity of life is outweighed by an individual's "much
stronger personal interest in directing the course of his life." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (discussing how the right to self-determination ordinarily out-
weighs any competing state interest in decisions concerning refusal of medical treatment).
The Supreme Court recently affirmed this interest (often termed the "right to die") in
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the liberty
interest of a competent person to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition, but requiring
clear and convincing evidence of the vegetative patient's desire to withdraw treatment).
Physicians would commit a legal as well as a moral error if their dedication and their
traditional commitment to preserving life were to prevent them from recognizing that the
ultimate justification for the use of their skills is in the service of higher values. Id. at
267 (stating the corollary of the informed consent doctrine, informed refusal, that can
subject a physician to tort liability for treating a patient against his will). "Living will"
legislation is evidence of the public's need for assurance that physicians will respect the
fundamental and constitutional right to be left alone. See generally, MENTAL DIsABILITY
LAW, supra note 1, § 18.12 & Supp. 1991 (discussing the emergence of legislation that
allows a competent patient to direct doctors to withold life-saving treatment without judi-
cial intervention).
Although most "right to die" cases and ethical discussions deal with the right to
refuse treatment, the rationale for honoring someone's refusal of treatment (even if death
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ly2 viewed as a consequence of competency-restoring treatment,
respect for the prisoner's humanity dictates that restoration to ratio-
nality is his paramount need.
327
If contractarian theories of punishment do provide a basis for
asserting an incompetent condemnee's hypothetical consent to psy-
chiatric evaluation and treatment,328 how may a psychiatrist re-
spond to an incompetent prisoner whose actual, pre-incompetence
sentiments, behavior, or pronouncements indicate329 that he does
might follow) should be the same as the rationale for honoring someone's acceptance of
treatment (even if death might follow). See, e.g., id., supra note 1, §§ 18.07-18.12 (sur-
veying cases, commentary and legislation on right to refuse treatment); Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 273 (recognizing the individual's liberty interest as the underlying rationale for deci-
sions regarding medical treatment).
Bonnie makes a similar argument where a competent condemned prisoner requests
that appeals cease and that his execution be carried out. Bonnie, supra note 239, at 1376-
80. Bonnie believes that society's interest in preserving the integrity of the law precludes
a prisoner from refusing mandatory appeals that determine whether the prosecution proved
"a legally sufficient predicate for a death sentence.- Id at 1377. The prisoner should
consent, hpwever, before the procedures leading to his death sentence are reviewed. Id. at
1378. Bonnie notes:
A convicted prisoner does not become a pawn of the state. Even a prisoner
sentenced to death retains a constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy - of
belief, expression, and, to a limited extent, action ....
As long as the prisoner is competent to make an informed and rational
choice, the argument for respecting this choice would appear to be a powerful
one.
Id. at 1376 (citation omitted).
326. Punishment is a consequence of violating the law. To ignore this invites moral
confusion. See supra note 276 (quoting Hegel in support of the proposition that punish-
ment results from an individual's own volition), and notes 178-83 and accompanying text
(finding that punishment is a result of a decision to commit the crime and not a direct or
indirect result of competency-restoring treatment).
327. A variation of the argument that psychiatrists' ethical issues are similar in cases
involving the treatment of capital and non-capital offenders emphasizes this point: psy-
chiatrists have not argued that treatment should be withheld from incompetent, psychiat-
rically-hospitalized, non-capital convicts in order to prevent them from being able to return
to prison. See supra notes 196-98; Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990)
(treating with antipsychotic drugs did not violate the due process rights of a non-capital
offender). Arguably, psychiatrists who withold treatment from non-capital criminals inter-
fere with the workings of the law and tacitly encourage criminals to avoid their legal
responsibilities. This action would violate Proposition 5: a psychiatrist's obligation to treat
should not be used to achieve particular social or political outcomes. See supra note 250
and accompanying text. Propositions 3 and 4 leave no room to argue for different atti-
tudes toward the obligations of capital and non-capital inmates. See supra notes 230-31
and accompanying text. Objectors to participation in evaluation and treatment of incompe-
tent condemnees are really objecting to either Proposition 3 or 4, unless they also ap-
prove psychiatric assistance in non-capital prisoners' efforts to escape imprisonment by
refusing psychiatric treatment.
328. See supra notes 241-60 and accompanying text.
329. The condemned prisoner, for example, might have expressed an intense desire ei-
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not want treatment? Ordinarily, past explicit acts or utterances
provide proof of the sorts of treatment an incompetent patient
would have consented to were he still competent. 3 Hypothetical
consent's effect on the actual refusal of treatment has two parts.
First, to be meaningful in general, hypothetical consent to
undergo punishment must outweigh the actual desire to escape
it.33' If a person, justly convicted of a capital crime, says, "I
know that I gave my hypothetical consent to being executed under
these circumstances, but I've changed my mind,"332 we would
likely respond, "We're sorry, but you already promised."333 Sup-
pose the prisoner says, "I know I gave my hypothetical consent,
but in spite of that, I don't - in actuality - wish to be pun-
ished." We would explain how hypothetical consent theory, espe-
cially in this circumstance, establishes a general obligation to un-
dergo punishment. The obligation stems from a rational pre-convic-
tion wish that logically overrides the post-conviction wish to avoid
punishment. More precisely, hypothetical consent theory delimits
what wishes can be honored or have weight in determining how
we treat others and how others treat Us. 334
ther for having his life spared if at all possible or for having his execution delayed as
long as possible (sentiments consistent with a preference to remain psychotic); or he
might have been intensely involved in filing of legal motions to prevent execution; or he
may have stated, "If I go crazy, don't let me get treated - I want to live as long as
possible."
330. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (upholding the state's requirement of clear and convinc-
ing evidence to establish that an accident victim would not wish to live in a vegetative
state before terminating her hydration and nutrition).
331. Murphy comments,
The test for an illegitimate interference with freedom cannot . . . be that the
interference thwarts the particular empirical wishes or desires that a citizen
might have at the moment. (If this were so, we could never punish at all, for
what criminal wants to be punished? . . . ) The test, rather, must be this: a
law's interference with freedom is justified (or, if you prefer, is not a genuine
interference with freedom), even if it thwarts desires, so long as it does not
thwart the rational will of any citizen. ... Consent is required for justice,
but it is hypothetical rational consent - a consent to be modeled in social
contract terms.
Does Kant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 528.
332. I am indebted to James C. Ballenger, M.D., for this succinct formulation of this
problem.
333. See supra notes 241-59 and accompanying text.
334. Does Kant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 528. Kant characterizes justice as
"the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be united with
the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom." Kant, supra note 245,
at 34. The purpose of the law, in other words, is to insure that one's choices (expressed
in actions) can be reconciled with the choices of others.
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Second, in certain situations medical treatment without explicit
consent is justified.335 In ordinary medical practice, obtaining ex-
plicit consent is more the exception than the rule. When we go to
a doctor's office with a complaint, the doctor ordinarily neither
asks for our consent to be evaluated or ,examined, nor is he likely
to obtain our formal, explicit consent for the treatment he pre-
scribes. We tacitly accept evaluation and treatment by going to the
doctor and filling the prescription.3  In emergency circumstances,
physicians also ethically evaluate and treat both unconscious pa-
tients, who cannot consent, and delirious patients who reject evalu-
ation and treatment, yelling "no, no," on the grounds that most
reasonable people would want such care if they were conscious
and found themselves in such circumstances. 337 Competent pa-
tients also may waive their right to be informed and consulted
about treatment by informing their physician, "I've sought your
help believing that you're the doctor and know what's best for me;
give me whatever treatment will benefit me."338
Again assuming that the criminal justice system and capital
punishment are morally justified and fair,339 hypothetical rational
consent provides the grounds for evaluation and treatment of the
incompetent prisoner. The prisoner's consent is implied because he
accepts the benefits of civil society and because he rationally
would have consented in an antecedent position of choice. The
condemnee has waived the right to avoid suffering in exchange for
the benefits of civil society.'
Evaluations of execution competency should be conceptualized
as attempts to determine whether a prisoner needs treatment."
Ordinarily, people consult a physician because they believe they
335. HARRY I. GRAYSON, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT LEGAL RELATiONSHIPS, §§ 5-1 to 5-
49 (1971) (While explicit consent is desired, most treatment is based on implied consent
- actions and behaviors that demonstrate consent for treatment. Most commonly, bases
for implied consent are emergency care and the treatment a patient receives when he
submits to a physician for diagnoses and care.). See also THOMAS GUTHEIL & PAUL S.
APPELBAUM, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 159-162 (2d ed. 1982).
336. See MARC FRANKLIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 608-9 (2d ed. 1979) (dis-
cussing implied consent theory).
337. See GRAYSON, supra note 335, at §§ 5-1 to 5-49.
338. Id. at 165.
339. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (Propositions 1-5).
340. See supra notes 241-58 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text (inferring that treatment is needed
when a prisoner is incompetent for execution).
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have a problem the physician can somehow remedy. Patients have
little reason to seek a doctor's diagnosis absent a belief in the
possibility of gaining relief or some other form of help with their
problems.2 Justifying evaluation of the incompetent condemned
on the condition that treatment is needed places evaluation in its
typical context within medical practice. Regarding evaluation as
subsidiary to treatment not only reinforces customary roles and atti-
tudes in medical practice," it also addresses the moral problems
associated with the position that evaluation of the condemned is
ethically permissible while treatment to restore competency is
not.
44
First, those who draw an ethical distinction between evaluation
and treatment point out that evaluation is potentially life-sav-
ing.345 But attention to this outcome alone dictates that psychia-
trists adjust their testimony to maximize the possibility that a court
would rule that the prisoner is incompetent.' However, such a
342. "Remedies" for medical problems include providing emotional support for patients
suffering incurable diseases, reassuring patients that nothing serious is wrong, and inform-
ing patients that the illness will get better on its own. Information, even if it does not
change treatment (e.g., being told that one has an untreatable, incurable disease), allows
for rational planning of one's life, and thus is a remedy for the very important problem
of medical uncertainty. See David A. Asch et al., Knowing for the Sake of Knowing: The
Value of Prognostic Information, 10 MEDIcAL DECtsION MAKING 47, 48 (1990) (discuss-
ing the role of prognostic tests and how these tests allow patients to view themselves dif-
ferently, even if the tests do not directly alter the course of medical treatment).
For a succinct discussion of the essence of the doctor-patient encounter, see George
L. Engel, The Clinical Application of the Biopsychosocial Model, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
535, 535-36 (1980) (recognizing doctor-patient relationships as human encounters character-
ized by assigned roles and expectations).
343. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (asserting the distinction between
treitment and evaluation of condemned prisoners is that an evaluating "professional" does
not act as a physician and therefore, is not bound by a physician's ethical standards)..
344. See, e.g., supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting the conflict that exists
between a physician's duty to "preserve life" and thde duty to tell the truth in court.).
345. See, e.g., Salgnero, supra note 58, at 177 (asserting evaluation can only preserve
an inmate's life because the evaluation affirms the sentence, changing nothing, or delays
the sentence, thereby saving the inmate's life). Competency evaluations would have this
life-saving potential, especially if a subsequent court determination of incompetence were
to lead to commutation of a death sentence. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying
text (discussing state statutes that either automatically commute a death sentence to life
imprisonment, or suspend the sentence, based on a finding that the inmate is incompetent,
as well as recommendations contained in the APAIAMA Brief, supra note 38, at 20).
346. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. The physician is more likely to offer
false testimony that the prisoner is incompetent if he or she believes a determination of
competence to be "tantamount to imposing a . . . death sentence." Radelet & Barnard,
supra note 23, at 49 (discussing the implications of an initial assessment of incompetence
and a subsequent assessment of competence). See also supra notes 129-38 and accompa-
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strategy, even if not deemed perjury, removes any pretense of
scientific accuracy that the psychiatrist might claim. The
psychiatrist's testimony would be relatively valueless to the fact-
finder.' 7
Second, placing evaluation in its usual relationship to treatment
obviates the need for the counter-intuitive argument that a psychia-
trist who is evaluating a potentially-incompetent prisoner is not
acting as a physician but as a "forensicist;" in this alternate role
the duty to do no harm is suspended."8 Evaluation and treatment
offer potential benefits to prisoners, even if punishment follows
efficacious treatment. This position is counter-intuitive 9 only un-
til one recognizes that all benefits are context-specific. Those ac-
cused or convicted of crimes find themselves in a peculiar context
with what would otherwise be peculiar desires.35° Those desires
are governed by what we would want if we viewed possible life
situations from an antecedent position of choice. From an anteced-
ent position of choice, all of us rationally would decide to accept
punishment should we become criminals ourselves.351 We would
know that if we were mentally impaired and accused or convicted
of a crime, the availability of psychiatric competency evaluations
and treatment to restore competency would fulfill our decision to
be punished. Psychiatric participation thus would be a desirable
feature of a fair legal system.352 The integrity of the legal sys-
tem, and our hypothetical, rational desires, would be compromised
unless psychiatrists were constrained to conduct objective evalua-
tions, to testify truthfully, and to help us fulfill our rationally-deter-
mined obligations and promises. We would see the opportunity for
having courts know our mental status to be a benefit that furthered
our wish in attaining just results; and we rationally would request a
nying text (declaring competency determinations are tantamount to participation in execu-
tion because these determinations render an inmate fit for punishment).
347. See supra note 153 (asserting professionals who evaluate in the adversary system
act as consultants whose function it is to apply expertise in the legal context).
348. Physicians can "foregol] primary adherence to the principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence when they act as other than physicians." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note
17, at 252. See also supra note 153 and accompanying text (asserting a lower ethical
standard for evaluating physicians who act as consultants).
349. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (proposing that a person's view of
punishment depends on whether he is facing it).
351. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 347-48.
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psychiatrist's help in presenting evidence about our mental status.
We would utilize appropriate psychiatric treatment in furtherance of
our paramount desire to have our humanity respected.
These are general justifications of competency evaluation and
restoration. They also justify psychiatric participation in non-capital
contexts and in situations where punishment is not imminent. Ap-
plying the justifications in all contexts rebuts the argument that
participation in execution competency proceedings violates the
physician's duty to avoid harm.353 As Professor Bonnie explains:
It is sometimes argued that the principle of
nomaleficene ... is fundamentally contradicted by any
professional interaction with a client that might elicit infor-
mation or opinion that could be used to support a death
sentence. However, this same premise could be deployed
against professional participation in any criminal case,
when information elicited during the evaluation.. . could
be used to support a criminal conviction and imprison-
ment .... [I]t would seem that clinical participation in
capital cases is, in principle, no more (or less) problematic
than forensic participation in any criminal case.3"
The problem is solved if we recognize that, for an accused or
convicted individual, exposing the truth is a hypothetically, ratio-
nally desired benefit. In the context of being tried, sentenced, or
punished, this benefit outweighs many others, including the "bene-
fit" of avoiding the "harm" of being punished. Truthful psychiatric
input into the determination of the various competencies associated
with trials, sentencing, and administration of punishmen 55 helps
assure that the rationality and humanity of the accused or convicted
individual is respected.356 Insofar as an individual's humanity is
353. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
354. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 75-76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "It would
seem difficult to sustain the argument... that forensic testimony that might lead to
execution offends the tenet of norunaleficence even though the presentation of testimony
that might lead to profoundly debilitating imprisonment does not." Id. at 76. Cf.
Appelbaum's position, supra notes 155, 174 (asserting that the immediacy and degree of
harm facing the prisoner heighten the ethical concerns associated with execution compe-
tency evaluations).
355. Such competencies include competency to stand trial, to waive counsel and to pro-
ceed without assistance of counsel, to plead guilty, to waive appeals, etc. These issues
implicitly concern the personhood of an accused or convicted individual at a variety of
points in criminal proceedings. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standards 7-5.1 to
7-5.4 and cmt.
356. See supra notes 238-59, 273-76 and accompanying text (asserting that contracts
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of paramount interest to him, a psychiatrist is bound to respect that
interest above all others.37 A psychiatrist thus fulfills his physi-
cianly duty to avoid harm by conducting honest and objective
forensic evaluations, even when the information obtained supports
criminal conviction or punishment.
This section concludes with a reconsideration of the four sce-
narios discussed in Section ]][. 358 The four hypothetical situations
will be examined from the perspective that punishment is justified
by hypothetical rational consent and by society's paramount interest
in vindicating its citizens' autonomy and humanity - the thesis of
this article.
In the first scenario an incompetent condemned prisoner, prior
to becoming incompetent, expressed a wish to be evaluated and
treated to restore his competency so as to allow him to be execut-
ed. 59 His expressed consent provides a substantial source of
emotional support for those involved in his care.36° Given his sta-
tus as a convicted prisoner, the treatment's potential for helping
him regain his legal personhood and his moral status as a re-
sponsibility-fulfilling human being provide the ethical justification
for psychiatric care.361
The second scenario describes an inmate who, while serving a
life sentence in a nasty prison, had deteriorated mentally.' 6 The
inmate was transferred to a relatively nice psychiatric hospital for
care; he then recovered, and faced being returned to prison.'
The evaluation and treatment of this prisoner raise many of the
result from individuals' rational free choices; therefore, punishment based on these choices
affirms the rationality of the individual). See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at
266 (declaring that competency tests must focus on rational choices among alternatives
when the tests are performed on a person who has pled guilty).
357. Professor Bonnie points out that "the paramount ethical obligation in the forensic
setting is objectivity. This is not to say, however, that the principle of nonmaleficence is
irrelevant, only that it is subsidiary to the search for-truth." Bonnie, supra note 30, at 76,
n25 (citation omitted). This is the case only because not having the truth available would
be a greater harm to the humanity of an accused or convicted individual than would his
receiving just punishment.
358. See supra notes 191-94, 211-17 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Bonnie's
concept of a "living will" to permit psychiatric treatment).
360. See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 301-05 (noting the conflict faced by
professionals requested to treat mentally incompetent death row prisoners).
361. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
362. See supra part mH.C.
363. See id.
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same ethical problems raised by assessment and treatment of pris-
oners for execution competency."' Yet psychiatrists perform such
services for non-capital inmates without generating extensive ethical
debate 65 This article's contractarian argument suggests that the
issues for capital and non-capital inmates are similar: in both cases,
assessment or treatment allows the prisoner to receive punishment
and vindicates the prisoner's humanity."
A similar argument justifies evaluation and treatment by physi-
cians confronting the third scenario.3" In this situation, the physi-
cian must decide whether to administer life-saving medical treat-
ment to a condemned inmate whose execution is imminent.se
Here, the obligation to "preserve life" seems futile, given that a
potentially more painful and grisly death looms in the near future.
Most physicians would "instinctively" treat the prisoner
anyway.3 69 Their instinct would serve the ailing prisoner well, for
it would offer him the opportunity to fulfill an obligation of para-
mount importance - the obligation to accept punishment. 7
The last scenario involved the ethics of administering a drug
that would induce a pleasant, permanent, and competency-de-
stroying psychosis. 71  This drug would save a condemned
prisoner's life but would destroy his rationality.372 Even if he de-
sired such treatment, respect for the prisoner's personhood and
humanity would preclude its administration.3" The psychiatrist
364. See supra notes 213-14 (including determination of the inmate's fitness for pun-
ishment, allowing the punishment to proceed, and operation as "an instrument of punish-
ment").
365. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 213-14 (listing various reasons why psychiatrists should face the
same ethical dilemmas regardless of whether the prisoner is facing the death penalty or a
non-capital sentence).
367. See supra part m.C.
368. Seesupra note 215 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (declaring that the physician who re-
fused to treat in this situation would be reproached).
370. See supra notes 242-59 (asserting citizens bargain with society to receive benefits
and accept the corresponding responsibilities of punishment as the cost of those benefits).
371. See supra part II.C.
372. This imaginary drug scenario is ethically distinct from the use of real medications
to induce death in competent individuals who are suffering excruciating, terminal illnesses.
While this article does not deal with the ethics or merits of euthanasia, it is important to
consider the argument that euthanasia can, in situations where the natural course of death
is degrading or gruesome, convey the utmost respect for someone's humanity. See gener-
ally JOHN LADD, ETHICAL IssUEs RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH (1979) (discussing thed
ethics of euthanasia and individual autonomy).
373. This argument also shows why treatment with such a drug should not be consid-
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must honor those ethically-prior wishes that are consistent with the
prisoner's hypothetical, rational consent to just punishment 374
VI. CONCLUSION: THEORY AND REALITY
If capital punishment is just and is administered fairly,375
psychiatrists ethically may both evaluate condemned prisoners'
competency to be executed and treat incompetent condemnees in an
effort to restore their rationality. This conclusion avoids the incon-
sistencies in published arguments which oppose psychiatric partici-
pation while remaining silent on the morality of capital punishment
as administered in the United States. Anyone who rejects this
article's conclusions must either reject its assumptions about capital
punishment or object to some aspect of its argument concerning
the morality of punishment. As I have noted above, the assump-
tions are entirely consistent with published arguments opposing
psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings. For
example, no one has suggested that organized psychiatry should
oppose participation because the legal system is unfair or because
capital punishment is immoral. However, there may be valid
grounds for disagreeing with at least some of these assump-
tions.
376
In the course of defending a contractarian theory of punish-
ment, this article tried to anticipate some of the answerable objec-
ered as an acceptable substitute for capital punishment (assuming capital punishment is
just) or life imprisonment. Such treatment is, we have stipulated, not cruel and is even
pleasant. It might even render individuals forever docile and harmless. But this "chemical
lobotomy" would undoubtedly vitiate the prisoner's humanity, which is something that just
punishment must never do. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (insisting that
respect for humanity is a condition for imposing punishment).
374. See supra notes 241-67 and accompanying text.
375. This phrase is intended as a brief encapsulation of Propositions 1-5. See supra
notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
376. Although some might disagree with Proposition 1, I would argue that such views
either lack coherence or misunderstand punishment. Menninger seems to be guilty of the
latter type of error, which arises in part from a conflation of attitudes and justifications.
'Punishment is in part an attitude, a philosophy. It is the deliberate infliction of pain in
addition to or in lieu of penalty." MENNINGER, supra note 224, at 203. Of course, some
have praised this conflation. See supra note 264. Expressed views or feelings about crimi-
nals that may be morally unsavory and- may taint legal proceedings do not imply that
punishment is unjustified. In fact, Menninger endorses Platonic and Kantian justifications
for retaliatory or retributive punishments. MENNINGER, supra note 224, at 205-06. Howev-
er, he prefers to call these punishments "penalties" in order to avoid the vindictive conno-
tations. "Penalties should be greater and surer and quicker in coming. I favor stricter
penalties for many offenses, and more swift and certain assessment of them." Id. at 202.
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tions to the theory. I believe that contractarian arguments support
the view that most Americans should be presumed accountable for
their crimes because they are obligated by the dictates of the im-
perfect but reasonably fair legal system under which they live.
Citizens can be punished because they benefit from others' obedi-
ence, from others' expectations that obedience will be reciprocated,
and from the social arrangements made possible by these expecta-
tions. The hypothetical, rational choice between citizens' current
situations and those that they would experience in a "state of na-
ture" is an obvious choice. Most citizens, therefore, can be pre-
sumed to be obligated by that choice.
But there is a substantial fraction of citizens - .e.g., many
residents of inner cities - whose lives are not much different from
a Hobbesian "state of Warre," and who benefit little from current
social arrangements; these groups account for a disproportionate
number of those convicted of serious crimes.' A substantial
number of citizens may legitimately claim that their "bargain with
the Laws" to undergo punishment for committing a crime is nulli-
fled when their fellow citizens fail to provide the reciprocal bene-
fits of a civil society. They may also point to the racial and class
biases that characterize criminal sentencing, especially in the appli-
cation of the death penalty,37 as reasons to feel less-than-obliged
by court decisions.
An equally important problem in the practical application of
contractarian theories of punishment is that a considerable fraction
of incarcerated individuals suffer from genetic and environmental
influences which limit their ability to plan and act responsibly. 379
In this regard, death row inmates are especially stigmatized. Many
of them, when examined, are found to suffer from brain damage
377. "The [Justice] [D]epartment's Bureau of Justice Statistics said that as of Dec. 31,
1990, 40% of the prisoners awaiting death penalties were black. The 1990 Census found
that the U.S. population is 12.1% black." ASSOCIATED PREss, supra note 53, at AS. The
Supreme Court ruled that statistical evidence demonstrating racial discrimination in Georgia
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty and juries' decisions to impose it does
not render an individual's execution unconstitutional unless that individual shows "that the
decisionmaker in his case acted with discriminatory purpose." McClesky v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 292, 313 (1987), aff'd, III S. CL 1454 (1991) (denying the second habeas cor-
pus petition).
378. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PREss, supra note 53.
379. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See generally JAMES Q. WLSON &
RIcHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATuRE, 69-285 (1985) (providing an in-
depth discussion of both environmental influences such as schools and families and genet-
ic factors such as gender, age, intelligence, personality and psychopathology).
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and severe neuropsychiatric disorders; most of them had appallingly
traumatic childhoods."'
These two objections - unequal class and racial distribution of
punishment, and punishment of persons unable to act responsibly
- actually strengthen the case for a contractarian approach to
justify punishment. Kant's theory particularly reinforces the
contractarian model.31 His vision of roughly equal, intelligent,
reflective, and responsible individuals who create a system of laws
for their mutual benefit3u establishes a frame of reference from
which to judge the fairness of our society. The Kantian "Kingdom
of Ends" appears so different from the actual character of society
that it seems inapplicable to many real-life criminals, especially
those who find their way to death row. Kant's theory tells us the
source of our urge to protest the punishment of those who suffer
from disabilities or grossly unjust disadvantages in an imperfect
society. Kant argues that just punishment rests on reciprocal agree-
ments among equals, but often the conditions of reciprocity are not
met in our society, particularly when the criminal justice system
tolerates erratic arrest patterns or sentencing practices that favor
certain racial or socioeconomic groups.
To the extent that a condemned inmate has suffered unfair
social disadvantages or has been treated unfairly in the capital
sentencing process, it should be hard to regard the inmate as hav-
ing made a rational choice to be executed. Even those psychiatrists
who find the death penalty morally acceptable should struggle with
the idea that the inmate's humanity and rationality are honored by
holding him responsible. Participation in execution competency pro-
ceedings may thus be deemed unethical because the death penalty
is wrong or because the legal system is unfair to those whom it
wishes to execute. But this is not an argument that psychiatric
participation is immoral per se, but an argument that psychiatrists
should refuse to participate because the criminal justice system's
use of capital punishment itself is offensive.
If my thesis is correct organized psychiatry is left with two
coherent alternatives. First, it could officially oppose participation
in execution competency proceedings based on an opposition to the
380. See, e.g., Characteristics, supra note 55, at 840 (discussing the histories of 15
death row inmates).
381. See RETRIBUrrION, supra note 256, at 79-80.
382. Id.
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death penalty. 38 3 Second, organized psychiatry could support ef-
forts by mental health professionals to develop appropriate evalu-
ation procedures and standards of thoroughness for competency
evaluations. It could also suggest limits and restrictions on forensic
testimony.3 4  Clear and authoritative legal opinions385  would
greatly assist psychiatrists by defining execution competence more
precisely, specifying proper procedures when the issue of incompe-
tence is raised, insuring that judicial procedures will maintain and
distinguish the psychiatrist's role vis-a-vis those of judicial and
executive authorities, 316 and clarifying how the treatment of the
383. An official ban on evaluation and treatment has been proposed by Ewing, supra
note 134, at 185. He does not suggest that capital punishment is wrong, but rather that
evaluation and treatment have "the practical effect of authorizing ... [an] execution,]"
id at 182, or "result[img] in the death of an otherwise healthy human being." Id. at 184.
Further, Ewing feels that traditional clinical ethics preclude mental health professionals'
participation in capital sentencing proceedings. As a result, he proposes an official ban on,
these activities. See Charles P. Ewing, Psychologists and Psychiatrists in Capital Sentenc-
ing Proceedings: Experts or Executioners, 8 Soc. ACMION & L. 67, 70 (1982). Donald H.
Waliace also proposes an official ban "based on the healing ethic of the mental health
professions," Wallace, supra note 131, at 278, but suggests an alternative posture, in
which "the ethical mental health professional could ...refuse to provide ... [a compe-
tency] assessment if the prisoner is not provided the adversary assistance of a mental
health professional." Id. at 279. Foot argues that, if capital punishment is immoral, "then
something will follow for anyone who has anything to do with it. .. .A special duty
will also belong to those actually asked to participate in the business. ... Psychiatrists
are asked to make significant contributions to legal proceedings involving the death penal-
ty, and this is the reason that they, as psychiatrists, have a special obligation to consider
the ethics of capital punishment" Foot, supra note 146, at 214.
384. For examples of proposed procedures and standards for evaluation of execution
competency, see Heilbrun & McClaren, supra note 29; Iowa Comment, supra note 29, at
1480; Radelet and Barnard, supra note 23, at 46-48. For a discussion of the clinical,
ethical, and legal pitfalls associated with efforts to assess execution incompetence, see
Ward, supra note 23, at 79-87.
385. Data from a national survey showed that,
prior to the Ford decision, few states had even formally addressed the issue of
competency for execution; and that there is significant ignorance at the attorney
general level of what actually happens when inmates raise the issue of incom-
petency ....
The major reason for the lack of procedural specificity appears to be
lack of experience with the problem .... [O]nly four states have had (at the
time of my survey [1987]) any cases ....
Robert D. Miller, Evaluation of and Treatment to Competency to Be Executed: A National
Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. PsYCIATRY & L. 67, 71 (1988). The problem perists.
See Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 599 (discussing ambiguity and inconsistency in
statutory definitions of execution incompetence).
386. See Due Process and Insanity, supra note 29, at 108-09 (citations omitted).
A judicial inquiry is the best alternative for the initial hearing [concerning a
prisoner's execution competence] .... [P]sychiatrists can analyze, if not agree
upon, factual medical aspects of the prisoner's competency, [but] they should
19921
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
incompetent condemned can be legally authorized.8 7
Although it is an issue that will personally and directly concern
very few individuals, the question of whether psychiatrists should
evaluate or restore the competency of the condemned touches all of
us. Answering the question leads us to examine the foundations of
political obligation, the justification of punishment, the ends of
medical practice and the implications of respect for our fellow
human beings' autonomy, rationality, and responsibility. Answering
the question also forces us to examine both the appearance and the
moral status of psychiatrists' social role as it is increasingly affect-
ed by judicial decisions.388
If the death penalty is just, psychiatrists will not be ethically
not be expected to apply the law and arrive at formal legal conclusions regard-
ing the prisoner's rights .... [R]esponsibility for the final decision with re-
spect to the legal question [sh]ould be placed in the hands of a judge.
I
387. If capital punishment is just, then psychiatrists may morally assume that the crimi-
nal has implicitly requested the psychiatric care necessary to effect his choice to be pun-
ished for his crime. Criminals hypothetically request such care because the evaluation is
the means for determining whether the criminal needs care that would allow him to
achieve his wishes. However, psychiatrists should not actually evaluate or treat incompe-
tent persons without first obtaining proper judicial authorization. The point is, in thinking
about how to deal with the criminal's incompetence, both the legal system and psychia-
trists may, with some justification, assume that the incompetent criminal's paramount
desire is to have his humanity vindicated. This entails engaging in those activities that
will enable him to be punished.
Various authors have disagreed as to what findings the American legal system, which
does not recognize a -right to be punished," actually would require to permit involuntary
treatment of someone adjudicated incompetent for execution. Compare G. Linn Evans,
Perry v. Louisiana: Can a State Treat an Incompetent Prisoner to Ready Him for Execu-
tion?, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 258 (1991) (arguing that the Louisi-
ana court order forcing Perry's treatment violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Washing-
ton v. Harper. "From Harper, the state must establish both a police power and parens
patriae interest in forcibly administering psychotropic drugs to an incompetent inmate,"
but there can be "no parens patriae justification for facilitating an incompetent prisoner's
death.") with Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85 ("[Dlocs the incompetent prisoner have a right
to refuse treatment? I doubt it. If presented with this question, the courts would probably
hold that the state has a compelling interest in carrying out its lawful sentences that over-
rides the prisoner's interests in bodily privacy and self-determination."). For a summary of
pre-Ford case law that might bear on these issues, see Ward, supra note 23, at 95-97.
For additional discussion of "suggested procedures," see Miller, supra note 385, at
80-82 (discussing different ways to deal with execution competency such as choosing
"death qualified" evaluating clinicians, establishing a "conscientious objector" status for
clinicians and automatically changing a death sentence to life imprisonment upon a finding
of competency to be executed).
388. Cf. Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 596 ("Even for clinicians who will never be
involved with inmates under death sentence, the competency issue is useful as a heuristic
device with which to explore issues such as trust and beneficence.").
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compromised when they perform competency evaluations of, or
give competency-restoring treatment to, death row inmates. Some
psychiatrists will not be swayed by this argument, especially those
who profoundly dislike being associated with the execution compe-
tency process. However, their sentiment really expresses moral
reservations about capital punishment's place in the modem crimi-
nal justice system, not a reasoned assessment of psychiatric partici-
pation itself.

